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INTRODUCTION
Through the child welfare system, the state provides help to endangered
children.' In dispensing assistance, child welfare officials traditionally en-
joyed broad-and unquestioned-discretion to determine when state inter-
vention on behalf of the child was necessary and what form it should take.
But over the past twenty years, this authority has been subjected to searching
criticism and reappraisal.2 Critics have argued that the system has inter-
1. Child welfare as used herein primarily refers to a specialized form of social work practice
adapted to the needs of service programs for children. States usually provide child welfare services,
and state child welfare policy is the focus of the article. All state child welfare systems provide
counseling, social casework, and placement in foster family or institutional care. Some child wel-
fare agencies also offer a wider variety of services to children in the home, including daycare, home
aides, and parent training.
In 1977, child welfare services were provided to 1.8 million American children. Of these, 28%
were in foster care. A. SHYNE & A. SCHROEDER, NATIONAL STUDY OF SOCIAL SERVICES TO
CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: OVERVIEW 1-8 (1978).
2. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter GFS I]; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter GFS II]; JOINT COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUS-
TICE STANDARDS, INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NE-
GLECT (1981) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (prepared under auspices of ABA but never adopted
by that organization); Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975); Mnookin, Foster Care: In Whose
Best Interests?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973); Strauss, The Relationship Between Promise and
Performance in State Intervention in Family Life, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 28 (1972); Wald,
State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children in Their
Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
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vened too massively and too often, resulting in substantial risks to the chil-
dren the system purports to serve.
In order to protect children from the risks of unwarranted state action,
these critics have urged the adoption of a policy of minimum state interven-
tion in family life. 3 Under such a policy, intervention could not be premised
on the contention that it will somehow prove helpful to the child or family.
Instead, intervention would be limited to the "least drastic alternative," or to
only those steps necessary to protect the child froi real, imminent harm.4
This approach also utilizes stricter legislative standards and more active judi-
cial review in order to limit and prevent abuse of the discretion traditionally
afforded child welfare administrators.
Although it is a relatively recent development, the theory of minimum
intervention is not controversial. Indeed, in its basic form, the new philoso-
phy states nothing more than the premise that the state should not intervene
in family life without good reason. This is a proposition with which no one,
including earlier advocates of broad discretionary powers for child welfare
officials, would likely disagree. 5
In order to guide child welfare decisionmaking successfully, however, the
new philosophy must be translated from abstract theory into concrete legisla-
tive standards to guide child welfare decisionmaking: When is intervention
"necessary"? How much and what kind of intervention is necessary in par-
ticular types of cases? How long should the state allow the parent to rectify
STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976) [hereinafter Wald, Standards]; Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1975) [hereinafter
Wald, State Intervention].
3. E.g., GFS II, supra note 2, at 3-14, 17-18; Mnookin, supra note 2, at 631-37; Wald, State
Intervention, supra note 2, at 1004-07, 1037.
4. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 128-29 ("goal of all dispositions should be to
protect the child from the harm justifying intervention in the least restrictive manner available");
GFS II, supra note 2, at 191-92 (state may intervene only if child will be harmed and a "less
detrimental alternative" cannot be provided); Mnookin, supra note 2, at 627 ("state should not be
allowed to remove children unless less drastic means of intervention cannot protect the child");
Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 702 ("court should choose those services that least interfere with
family autonomy, provided that the services are adequate to protect the child").
5. The twentieth century child welfare system is largely a product of the Progressive movement
toward social reform. While the Progressives placed considerable faith in the diagnostic and thera-
peutic abilities of the new social work profession and thus viewed agency discretion favorably, a
paramount theme of the movement was the preservation of the home. Reformers of this era be-
lieved that "[h]ome life is ... the great molding force of mind and of character" and that "children
... should as a rule be kept with their parents." 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 365 (R.
Bremner ed. 1971) (quoting letter to the President embodying the conclusions of the 1909 Confer-
ence on the Care of Dependent Children). Therefore, the reformers supported pensions for mothers
and other measures to permit the care of children in their own homes. They also favored foster
family care over an institutional upbringing. See generally 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA,
supra, at 249-330, 348-97 (providing selection of contemporary documents on issues discussed in
this footnote).
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the conditions that require intervention before it resorts to further measures?
In addressing these specifics, minimum intervention advocates have thus far
fallen short of the mark.
The deficiencies in current standards implementing the new philosophy are
varied and important. First, some of the factual assumptions on which stan-
dards have been based are deeply flawed. Minimum intervention advocates
have uniformly asserted, for example, that state intervention poses serious
risks to children. But the current evidence simply does not support this
claim, and thus does not support the extremely narrow neglect statutes pro-
posed by some minimum intervention advocates.
Minimum intervention advocates have also largely overlooked a major
area of child welfare practice, the so-called "voluntary" sector. These cases
raise different issues than do those in which the state acts coercively. They
also make up what is probably as much as half of the child welfare caseload. 6
A theory of child welfare practice cannot afford to ignore a function this
large and important.
Another problem with the proposed minimum intervention standards is
that they have generally been drafted without a rigorous methodology. Some
commentators have failed to consider all of the evidence, and some have
6. The proportion of placements that are classified as voluntary has varied widely from state to
state, ranging from two percent to 95% in one national survey. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN
IN NEED OF PARENTS, WHO KNOWS? WHO CARES? FORGOTTEN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
32-33 (1979) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT]. This variation probably arose because,
until fiscal year 1980, federal foster care reimbursement was available only for court-ordered foster
care, and in some states, it appears that courts approved voluntary placements before 1980 by
converting them into court-ordered placements to satisfy the reimbursement requirement. Rosen-
thal & Louis, The Law's Evolving Role in Child Abuse and Neglect, in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 55, 64 (L. Pelton ed. 1981). Reimbursement was provided for volun-
tarily placed foster children in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-272, § 102(b)(1)(A), 94 Stat. 500, 513 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III
1985)), amended by Pub. L. 99-272, § 12306(c)(2), 100 Stat. 294 (1986). While § 102(c) of the 1980
Act only authorized federal funding for voluntary placements through fiscal year 1983, funding has
been extended three times, most recently through fiscal year 1987 in the Comprehensive Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 12306(b)(2), 100 Stat. 82, 294 (relevant
portions affecting Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act to amend Act at 42 U.S.C.
§ 608(a)(1)).
Surveys by researchers are more reliable and usually indicate that voluntary population consitute
at least half of the total foster care population. See CALIFORNIA STATE SOCIAL WELFARE BD.,
REPORT ON FOSTER CARE: CHILDREN WAITING 7 (1972) (half of surveyed California placements
voluntary); A. GRUBER, FOSTER HOME CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS 45 (1973) (58.8% of surveyed
Massachusetts placements voluntary); S. JENKINS & M. SAUBER, PATHS TO CHILD PLACEMENT 74
(1966) (58% of surveyed New York placements voluntary). Some "voluntary" placements may,
however, involve a plea bargain or coercion by the child welfare agency. See Levine, Caveat Parens:
A Demystification of the Child Protection System, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 23 (1973) (without in-
dependent court review many placement agreements "may be signed under duress, misinformation,
or ignorance"); Mnookin, supra note 2, at 601 ("[a] substantial degree of state coercion may be
involved in many so-called voluntary placements").
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failed to consider any of it. When the evidence is inconclusive-a typical
rather than unusual circumstance-policy choices have not always been
clearly delineated. A more rigorous approach is necessary both to ensure
that standards faithfully embody the least drastic alternative principle, and to
expose where the standards ultimately rest on guesswork and compromise.
If guesswork and compromise are obscured, so are the issues on which re-
search is desperately needed, as are the limitations on what we can expect the
new philosophy to accomplish.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, minimum intervention advocates
have frequently been guilty of excessive optimism about the limitations of
their new philosophy. Both the realities of child welfare practice and the
severity of the family problems that child welfare workers confront severely
limit what we can expect from any child welfare policy. Most families who
use the child welfare system are very poor and deeply troubled. Their many
problems would challenge the best child welfare system, and ours is certainly
not that. High caseloads, poor training, rapid staff turnover, and inadequate
funding are endemic to child welfare work and make improvements in prac-
tice extremely difficult to achieve. In order to effect any real improvement in
child welfare work, standards must be drafted with these realities constantly
in view, and expectations about what revised standards can accomplish must
be severely limited.
This article attempts to remedy these varied deficiencies in previous legis-
lative standards. Part I examines the child welfare system, and the deficien-
cies in practice that produced the minimum intervention reform movement.
Part II discusses the theory of minimum intervention and describes the defi-
ciencies in standards that have been proposed to implement that theory. Part
III develops a methodology for generating better implementation standards,
and in part IV that methodology is employed to generate the implementation
standards themselves.
I. THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM AND How IT WORKS
The child welfare system responds to a wide variety of family problems.
Abuse, neglect, abandonment, child behavior problems, a parent's mental or
physical illness, and simple poverty all come under its jurisdiction.7 In order
to ameliorate this large array of social ills, the child welfare system provides
a variety of services, which are sometimes imposed upon parents who are far
from eager to receive them and sometimes granted upon parental request.
This complex system descends from a very simple one. The child welfare
system originally focused on only one problem, and offered only one solution.
7. A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVIcEs 25-27 (3d ed. 1980).
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A. THE ORIGINS OF THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
The American child welfare system traces its descent from an early public
assistance scheme, the Elizabethan Poor Laws." Under the poor laws, desti-
tute children were placed in apprenticeship until the age of majority. 9 Such
placements could be accomplished without parental consent and divested the
parent of both legal custody and the right to obtain the child's return.10 The
poor laws aided only the destitute, however; except for the potential reach of
the criminal law, abuse and neglect did not provoke state intervention.I
The poor laws were transported to the American colonies along with other
English legal institutions. During the colonial era, child welfare administra-
tion remained largely synonymous with public assistance administration, and
apprenticeship until the age of majority remained the preferred form of aid.' 2
During the nineteenth century, as changing economic and social conditions
made the indenture of young children increasingly difficult to arrange,13 the
poorhouse, specialized children's institutions, foster care, and adoption came
to supplement apprenticeship as methods of relieving childhood destitu-
tion.14 It was not until the latter half of the century, however, that the juris-
diction of child welfare authorities was redefined to include the prevention of
harm due to parental abuse or neglect as well as poverty. Is Even then, abuse
8. For the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2. See generally Riesenfeld, The Formative Era
of American Public Assistance, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 175, 177-99 (1955) (discussing origins of poor
laws and their operation); tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Develop-
ment, and Present Status (pt. 1), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 258-91 (1964) (same).
9. For the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2, §§ I, III.
10. See G. COOPER, C. BERGER, P. DODYK, M. PAWLSEN, P. SCHROG & M. SOVERN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY 9 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter LAW AND POVERTY] (par-
ents could not regain custody even after becoming self-sufficient); tenBroek, supra note 8, at 280
n.107 (poor laws do not mention parental rights).
11. Areen, supra note 2, at 900; Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect: Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix, and Social Perspectives (pt. 1), 50 N.C.L. REV. 293, 299-306 (1972).
12. See Areen, supra note 2, at 899-902 ("the majority of neglect statutes continued to focus on
family income or idleness"); Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 201-33 (describing public assistance laws in
the colonies during 17th and 18th centuries); tenBroek, supra note 8, at 291-306 (describing recep-
tion of Elizabethan poor laws in New York).
13. See 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 262-63 (R. Bremner ed. 1971) (age at which
children were "bound out" rose during 19th century); Presser, The Historical Background of the
American Laws of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 477-78 (1972) (changes resulted from
industrialization).
14. See generally 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 137-57, 247-330 (dis-
cussing development of new forms of public child care, specifically adoption, almshouses, institu-
tions, and foster care).
15. State intervention to protect children from abuse and neglect largely developed from the
work of private child protection societies. These societies, which developed as an outgrowth of
humane work for animals, lobbied vigorously for child protection laws and were active in investigat-
ing and "rescuing" neglected children. E.g., 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA, supra note 5,
at 117-18; Areen, supra note 2, at 903-10; Thomas, supra note 11, at 306-13.
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and neglect were poorly differentiated from mere need,16 and permanent
placement was almost invariably the only service made available to children
and their parents. 17
Not until the dawn of this century did enlightened opinion conclude that
financial aid, rather than placement, was the most appropriate service for
children of poor but competent parents."' Only incompetents should lose
their children to the state, reformers argued, and even then should not lose
their children permanently. With proper diagnosis and individualized treat-
ment by trained child welfare workers, the reformers claimed, parental inad-
equacies could be rectified so as to rehabilitate the family and save the state
the cost of permanent placement. 19
With the development of this new philosophy, the modem child welfare
system was born. The enactment of state and federal welfare programs for
needy children, along with the introduction of social work techniques and
personnel into child welfare administration, seemed to ensure that the new
goals could be met.20
16. Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 435-36 (1983) (official
standard became neglect, but neglect equated with poverty); cf Thomas, supra note 11, at 314
(discussion of blurred distinctions "between poor and neglected children and child offenders").
Many jurisdictions still equate poverty with neglect. Garrison, supra, at 436 n.61.
17. A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 317-18; Garrison, supra note 16, at 437-38.
18. The most influential report was issued by a conference of experts called by President Theo-
dore Roosevelt in 1909 to consider the care of dependent children. It recommended that "[e]xcept
in unusual circumstances, the home should not be broken up for reasons of poverty, but only for
considerations of inefficiency or immorality." The report thus concluded that home aid, "prefera-
bly in the form of private charity rather than public relief," should be given to children living in
suitable homes. 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 365. After the 1909 con-
ference, numerous states enacted "mothers' aid" laws providing for direct financial assistance to
women and children in their homes. For descriptions of the mothers' aid programs, see LAW AND
POVERTY, supra note 10, at 13-14; R. BREMNER, FROM THE DEPTHS: THE DISCOVERY OF POV-
ERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 222-23 (1956).
19. The development of the rehabilitative philosophy within the modem child welfare system
paralleled its development in juvenile corrections. See generally D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205-35 (1980)
(discussing rehabilitative philosophy in juvenile corrections); E. RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS:
AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 51-54 (1978) (same).
20. By 1935, every state but Georgia and South Carolina had enacted mothers' aid legislation.
Coverage varied, however, from one locality to another. LAW AND POVERTY, supra note 10, at 13.
In 1935, the federal Grants to States for Aid to Dependent Children program was enacted. This
Act made federal funds available to support needy children with an absent parent without removing
the children from the remaining family. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-261, §§ 401-406, 49
Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1982 & Supp. III 1985))
(Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program). See generally 3 CHILDREN AND
YOUTH IN AMERICA 519-609 (R. Bremner ed. 1971) (describing AFDC legislation and its
enactment).
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B. THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM AT MID-CENTURY
1. Little Had Changed
By mid-century it was apparent that the goals of the new child welfare
system had not been realized. The change in philosophy simply had not pro-
duced the expected changes in child welfare practice. The system continued
to serve substantial public assistance functions in addition to protecting chil-
dren from parental incompetence. The most comprehensive study of foster
care undertaken during this period determined that only 14.6% of the chil-
dren surveyed were in foster care due to abuse or neglect,21 while problems
associated with poverty-poor health, inadequate housing, and insufficient
resources-were still responsible for many placements.22
At first glance, the continued association between poverty and placement
is surprising. Since 1935 federal welfare benefits have been available to needy
children in the care of a parent or relative,23 and by 1960 some three million
children and their custodial relatives were receiving such aid.24 The avowed
aim of this federal welfare program was, in fact, to prevent family dissolution
occasioned by poverty. 25 But what the large numbers of poor children in
foster care made clear was that the benefits provided were insufficient to ac-
complish this goal.26 Poor families could seldom obtain the kind of help-
daycare, for example, or temporary placement with a boarding school, friend
or relative-that enabled wealthier families to cope with their children when
an emergency occurred and were thus disproportionately forced to turn to
the child welfare system.27 Moreover, as a result of the high stress levels and
21. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A LONGITUDINAL INVESTIGATION
46 (1978) (results of research on children placed in New York City during 1966).
22. H. MAAS & R. ENGLER, CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS 380-81 (1959).
23. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-261, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) (AFDC program).
24. LAW AND POVERTY, supra note 10, at 31.
25. As articulated by a 1956 amendment, the program is "[flor the purpose of encouraging the
care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives. . . ." Social Security
Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 880, § 312(a), 70 Stat. 848 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1982)).
26. See Sussman, The Sociology and Economics of Foster Care, in FOSTER CARE IN QUESTION:
A NATIONAL REASSESSMENT BY TWENTY-ONE EXPERTS 183, 184 (H. Stone ed. 1970) ("starva-
tion level public assistance grants.., force children into foster care"). For statistics on the relation-
ship between poverty and placement, see note 212 infra and the sources cited therein.
27. Requests for child welfare services were almost invariably made by poor families. For exam-
ple, a 1969 foster care survey found that 84% of all families requesting placement were from the
two lowest socio-economic categories. Rein, Nutt & Weiss, Foster Family Care: Myth and Reality,
in CHILDREN AND DECENT PEOPLE 24, 27-29 (A. Schorr ed. 1974).
Panels charged with developing policy to strengthen the family have consistently identified pov-
erty as one of the principal risks to family functioning. E.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON CHILD DE-
VELOPMENT, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES 14-39 (1976); 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 364-69; K. KENIS-
TON, ALL OUR CHILDREN: THE AMERICAN FAMILY UNDER PRESSURE 25-48 (1977).
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substandard living conditions associated with long-term indigence, poor par-
ents were more likely to confront childcare crises,2 8 and more prone to other
serious problems that impeded their ability to cope with them.29
The system had also been less than totally successful in its goal of rehabili-
tating families and thus reducing the length of time children were wards of
the state. Although most children did go home within a year or two, long-
term placement continued to be fairly common, and some children still
stayed in placement until the age of majority.30 Those parents who did
regain their children apparently did so, in most cases, through their own
efforts; rehabilitative services to parents were seldom provided, 31 and many
agencies did not even stay in touch with parents. 32 During placement, chil-
28. See T. LANGNER & S. MICHAEL, LIFE STRESS AND MENTAL HEALTH 372-97 (1963) (stress
of all types more prevalent among poor families).
29. Multiple stresses enhance the risk of psychiatric disorder. Brown, Bhrolchain & Harris, So-
cial Class and Psychiatric Disturbance Among Women in an Urban Population, 9 SOCIOLOGY 225,
230 (1975). Psychopathology thus increases as social class declines. Id. at 231-34; Dohrenwend &
Dohrenwend, Social and Cultural Influences on Psychopathology, 25 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 417,
439-43 (1974). High stress levels have also been linked to parenting problems. See Crnic, Green-
berg, Rasozin, Robinson & Basham, Effects of Stress and Social Support on Mothers of Premature
and Full-Term Infants, 54 CHILD DEV. 209 (1983) (stress negatively affects maternal attitudes on
parenting); Land, Child Abuse: Differential Diagnosis, Differential Treatment, 65 CHILD WELFARE
33, 37 (1986) (linking high stress to parenting problems); Straus, Stress and Physical Child Abuse, 4
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 75 (1980) (parents experiencing high stress and one of several "mediat-
ing" variables, such as low socio-economic status or socialization for violence, more prone to child
abuse). Therefore, it is not surprising that surveys have found that the rate of child maltreatment
rises sharply as income level declines. See NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND SE-
VERITY OF CHILD ABUSE AND OF NEGLECT 21 (1981) (child maltreatment rate 27.3 per thousand
for families with 1979 incomes under $7,000; 2.7 per thousand for families with 1979 incomes in
excess of $25,000).
30. See, e.g., D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 34, 116-21 (37% of surveyed children
discharged from foster care within two years and 60% within five years; children discharged within
three months excluded from study); Jenkins, Duration of Foster Care: Some Relevant Antecedent
Variables, 46 CHILD WELFARE 45, 45 (1967) (54% of surveyed children left foster care within three
months, 68% within one year, 75% within two years); Lawder, Poulin & Andrews, A Study of 185
Foster Children 5 Years After Placement, 65 CHILD WELFARE 241, 246-47 (1986) (34% of surveyed
children left foster care within three months, 56% within one year, 70% within two years).
Most statistics are based on cross-sectional studies which tend to exaggerate the backlog of chil-
dren unable to move out of foster care. Researchers who conducted the first major study of foster
care thus reported that "under present conditions, if a youngster stayed in foster care for more than
a year and a half, there is great danger that he will stay indefinitely." H. MAAS & R. ENGLER,
supra note 22, at 9-10. The researchers found that 31% of their 1957 cross-sectional national sam-
ple had been in care for ten or more years, 52% for six or more years, and only 24% for three years
or less. Maas, Children in Long Term Foster Care, 48 CHILD WELFARE 321, 323 (1969).
31. See A. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 2 ("Almost all studies have shown that virtually no services
are available to biological families after a child has been placed in foster home care."); J. KNITZER
& M. ALLEN, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES 24-25 (1978) (problems of parents with children in
foster care "widely ignored").
32. E.g., D. CAPLOVITZ & L. GENEVIE, FOSTER CHILDREN IN JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI.
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dren frequently lost touch with their own parents altogether. 33 A few also
suffered frequent shifts from one home to the next, thus depriving them of
any meaningful familial relationships. 34
In short, the reality of child welfare practice was a far cry from the theory
on which the system had been based. Child welfare experts found this reality
troubling for several reasons. First, it seemed apparent that the system was
acting in opposition to its avowed aims. Rather than rehabilitating families,
it was actively promoting their dissolution. Second, the benefits to children
of indiscriminate reliance on foster care over other alternatives-services in
the home or adoption by another family-appeared dubious at best. Third,
these dubious benefits were being obtained at enormous public expense. In
1971, a year of foster care in New York cost approximately $4,354.35 In-
home services were frequently cheaper and, if a child was adopted, he cost
the state nothing at all.
In analyzing what had gone wrong, researchers discovered a system in
which discretion was largely unbounded and frequently abused.
2. The Structure of Child Welfare Decisionmaking: Discretion Unlimited
The power to assume parental functions without any specific showing of
incapacity that had been enjoyed by the child welfare system of the poor law
era had been retained by the "modern" child welfare system because of the
supposed need for individual diagnosis and treatment. Child welfare authori-
(1982) (68% of surveyed families received no visit from agency within previous year; 20% received
no contact at all); COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILDREN IN
FOSTER CARE INSTITUTIONS: STEPS GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE TO IMPROVE THEIR CARE 11
(1977) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (over 40% of parents surveyed received no visit by agency
within first six months of child's placement); S. VASALY, FOSTER CARE IN FIVE STATES 32 (1976)
(65% of Iowa mothers and 60% of Massachusetts mothers surveyed had no known contact with
foster care agency within six months).
33. E.g., D. FANSHEL, ON THE ROAD TO PERMANENCY: AN EXPANDED DATA BASE FOR
SERVICE TO CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 31 (1982) (71% of children in care for six or more years
never visited by natural mothers); D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 88-89 (57% of
children in care for five years unvisited by their natural parents); S. VASALY, supra note 32, at 36
(two-thirds of parents had not seen child in foster case for over six months).
34. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 138-39 (28% of children experienced more
than two placements); J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 187 (38% of national sample of
foster children moved once or twice and 18% moved more than twice). See generally NATIONAL
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 32-33 (1979) (state by state estimates of average number of
placements per foster child).
35. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, DOLLARS AND SENSE IN THE FOSTER CARE OF CHILDREN: A
LOOK AT COST FACTORS 23 (1972). Experts estimated that an infant who came into foster care in
1971 and remained in care until maturity would cost the child welfare system $122,500. Rearing
two children at home over the same time and in the same area would cost only $25,560. Id. at 20-
21. By 1980, the per year cost of foster care in New York was $8,376, and the national average was
$4,332. NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMM'N TO REVISE THE SOCIAL SERVS. LAW, FOSTER
CARE: A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW 9 (1981).
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ties thus possessed broad powers to define the circumstances in which inter-
vention, removal, and return home were appropriate.
These authorities became involved with a family in one of two ways.
Either they received a report of suspected abuse or neglect, or the family
itself came to the agency and requested assistance. 36 After investigation, the
child welfare authorities determined whether and how to intervene on behalf
of the child. They could bring abuse or neglect charges against the parents,
which would usually lead to a judicial hearing; they could offer placement or
other aid without judicial approval; or they could simply do nothing at all.37
In making this choice, the child welfare authorities possessed virtually un-
limited discretion; parents were not legally entitled to aid of any particular
sort or indeed to any aid at all.38 If aid was denied or if parents were offered
aid of a different type than that desired, no recourse was available.
To accept agency help also meant doing so on the agency's terms. If the
agency offered to place the child in foster care-the type of aid most fre-
quently volunteered-a parental agreement to placement often authorized
the agency to retain the child for an indefinite period.39 In many states, par-
ents were not permitted to add time limits or conditions, nor did a placement
agreement bind the agency to do anything to assist the parent in resolving the
problem that necessitated placement. 40 Even if the agency chose to press
abuse or neglect charges, statutory definitions of neglect were sufficiently
vague and procedural requirements in neglect proceedings sufficiently lax
that meaningful review was the exception rather than the rule; many courts
simply functioned, in effect, as a rubberstamp for the judgment of the child
welfare bureaucracy. 41
After placement, agencies were similarly vested with vast discretionary
powers. When a child entered foster care, whether by court order or volun-
tary placement, the parent was required to cede legal custody-the right to
decide where the child lives and the kind of care he will receive--to the
36. See supra note 6 (data on number of cases initiated upon parental request).
37. See generally Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 628-31 (providing detailed description of the
intervention process).
38. Many parental requests were denied. See Haring, 1975 Census of Requests for Child Welfare
Services (1975).
39. For a typical provision, see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383 (McKinney 1983).
40. See Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents In Child Placement
Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 459-60 (1976) (noting lack of statutory provisions to guarantee
honoring of parental requests for return of child; discussing lack of financial and legal incentives for
agency to offer rehabilitative services to family). See generally Hardin, Setting Limits on Voluntary
Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE CouRTS 70 (M. Hardin ed. 1983).
41. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 59 ("In many places, courts [hearing neglect cases]
have largely abdicated their responsibilities to social work agencies."); Levine, supra note 6, at 33-34
(describing as "alarming" "courts' laissez-faire policy towards child welfare agencies and refusal to
independently screen and review agency actions").
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state's foster care agency.42 The agency thereafter decided where the child
would reside and how long he would remain there;43 the parent retained no
right to be consulted on decisions about the child's care or, typically, to
regain custody without agency or court approval. 44 This usurpation of the
parental role was invariable. Parents who voluntarily placed their children,
no matter what the reason for placement or their parenting ability, lost cus-
tody rights just like parents who had been found unfit.
Although the rationale for these broad discretionary powers was the need
for individualized treatment in accordance with the specific needs of the
child and his family, agencies tended instead to follow uniform practices
based on bureaucratic convenience, custom, and funding priorities. Discre-
tion was seldom exercised to meet the individual needs of the child or family.
Many parents, for example, reported that daycare or housekeeping assistance
could have averted foster care placement, but that agencies seldom offered
such alternatives.45 Foster homes were typically selected with little attempt
to match a child with adults who would be sensitive to the child's particular
needs, 46 or who lived in a location conducive to retaining ties with the child's
42. "[Legal custody] includes the right to the care, custody and control of the child and the duty
to provide food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care ... It does not give an agency the
right to consent to adoption unless it is so specified by the court or statute." CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AM., STANDARDS FOR FOSTER FAMILY CARE SERVICES 48 (1959).
43. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(2) (McKinney 1983) ("custody of a [foster] child...
shall be vested ... in the authorized agency placing out or boarding out such child and any such
authorized agency may in its discretion remove such child from the home where placed or
boarded").
44. See Duchesne v. Sugerman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (mother of two children placed by
agency when she was hospitalized spent years attempting to regain custody); In re Sanjivini K., 47
N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1979) (mother who voluntarily placed child for
financial reasons but contributed to its support and visited regularly unable to regain custody for
nine years); Levine, supra note 6, at 24 n.129 (1973) ("requests for the return of children are only
rarely, if at all, honored").
45. According to parents in a Massachusetts study, "there was almost no consideration of op-
tions which may have intervened in the necessity of the child going into foster home care." A.
GRUBER, supra note 6, at 47. Homemaker assistance as an option was discussed in about three
percent of cases (as compared to 17% of parents who felt that a homemaker could have averted
foster care) while daycare was discussed in less than two percent (as compared to 29% of parents
who thought that daycare could have averted foster care). Id. at 46-47. See S. JENKINS & M.
SAUBER, supra note 6, at 184-86 (data suggesting 17% of surveyed foster care placements in New
York City preventable if homemakers, daycare, or other appropriate services available); J. KNITZER
& M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 15 (survey of communities indicated child welfare policies and
practices prevent and discourage parents from keeping children at home).
46. See, e.g., B. BERNSTEIN, D. SNIDER & W. MEEZAN, A PRELIMINARY REPORT: FOSTER
CARE NEEDS AND ALTERNATIVES TO PLACEMENT: A PROJECTION FOR 1975-1985, at 13 (1975)
(more than one-half of children studied were inappropriately placed initially; over two-fifths inap-
propriately placed at time of study); D. CAPLOVITZ & L. GENEVIE, supra note 32, at 62, 82 (43%
of children placed in "unsuitable" foster home during first or second placement; indications that
child abused or neglected while in placement in 14% of surveyed cases).
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natural parents, family, and friends.47 Frequently, foster parents were not
even advised of a child's special problems prior to receiving the child.48 Re-
habilitative efforts were also standardized, with little or no individualized
treatment of the parental and family problems that had occasioned
placement. 49
Moreover, agency practices had the effect of systematically discouraging
parent-child contact or reunion. Visiting privileges, for example, were usu-
ally inflexible and infrequent.50 Parents were also given no role in the selec-
tion of the foster family and were not involved in decisions about the child's
discipline or daily care.51
Many factors contributed to the child welfare system's failure to exercise
its discretion in accordance with the therapeutic ideal. Legislatures fre-
quently failed to give adequate funding to services other than foster care and
thus limited agency options.52 Agencies themselves also suffered from poor
funding and from massive personnel problems. Bureaucratic inertia-un-
checked by any review mechanisms-also kept alive the rigid, placement-
oriented practices of the poor law era.53 The net result of these varied
problems was that some poor children were unnecessarily placed in foster
47. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 23 n.30 (9% of children placed outside of
home counties; 40% of San Francisco foster care placements in another county); Festinger, The
New York Court Review of Children in Foster Care, 54 CHILD WELFARE 211, 241 (1975) (70% of
New York City foster care placements outside home borough); see also H.R. REP. No. 136, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1979) (distant placements undermine maintenance of family ties). Agencies
sometimes even placed children out of state. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 57-74
(discussing frequency of problems with out-of-state placements).
48. D. CAPLOVITZ & L. GENEVIE, supra note 32, at 74 (file indicated information on child's
special problems given to foster parents in only two percent or less of surveyed cases); A. GRUBER,
supra note 6, at 79-80 (only 25% of surveyed foster parents caring for child with disabilities made
aware of or realized extent of child's problems before receiving child into their home).
49. See H. MAAS & R. ENGLER, supra note 22, at 390-91 (70% of parents had no relationship
with foster care agency or relationship erratic or untrusting; staff had no time for continuous work
with parents which could effect rehabilitation); NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLERS' OFFICE, THE
CHILDREN ARE WAITING 29 (social casework services adequate in only 57.6% of sample cases).
50. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 22-24 (national foster care survey found
"over and over again policies and practices that make it difficult, if not impossible, for parents to
visit their children"); R. HUBBELL, FOSTER CARE AND FAMILIES: CONFLICTING VALUES AND
POLICIES 104-07 (1981) (reporting problems with frequency, duration, location of visits, and re-
stricted communication). In a Massachusetts survey, 37.5% of parents said the caseworker actually
prohibited parental visits. S. VASALY, supra note 32, at 33-35.
51. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 23 ("parents who want to exercise parental
responsibility must often fight the agencies that ignore their concerns and strengths"); Levine, supra
note 6, at 21 (parents "rarely made a part of therapeutic planning for their children").
52. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 8, 16-24 (discussing effects of lack of funding
for preventative, restorative, and executive services).
53. See generally Garrison, supra note 16, at 431-42 (comparing practices under poor law system
and new therapeutic model).
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care and some stayed in foster care too long. The hopes of the turn of the
century reformers had not been realized.
II. THE NEW PHILOSOPHY: MINIMUM INTERVENTION
A. THE REFORM PROGRAM
Growing awareness of problems within the child welfare system produced
a new reform movement to remedy the systemic ills that had been uncovered.
The vast discretionary powers wielded by child welfare workers were, critics
noted, quite out of keeping with the tradition of deference to family auton-
omy, privacy, and parental authority that had prevailed elsewhere in our
legal system.5 4 The philosophy of therapeutic intervention that had been
used to justify the retention of these poor law powers did not, they urged,
provide a sufficient rationale for deviation from this tradition of deference:
the philosophy had failed to achieve its expected benefits and did not take
account of the fact that state intervention could cause harm as well as
good. 55
In line with this conclusion, over the past decade commentators have been
calling for a policy of minimum intervention and the adoption of some form
of "least drastic alternative" standard in child welfare decisionmaking.5 6
Under this approach, state intervention would not be permitted unless re-
quired to protect the child from real, immediate harm;57 intervention could
not be premised on the mere contention that it would somehow prove helpful
to the family. Intervention would also be limited to those steps actually nec-
essary to protect the child from the harm threatened. If the child could, for
example, be adequately protected by assisting the parent to find better hous-
ing, the state would not be justified in placing the child in foster care. In
short, minimum intervention requires the least intrusive action that will ac-
complish the state's goal of protecting the child.
It would, of course, be possible to delegate the implementation of the new
54. See, eg., GFS II, supra note 2, at 9; Areen, supra note 2, at 893; Wald, State Intervention,
supra note 2, at 989-93.
55. See GFS II, supra note 2, at 13; Wald, State Intervention, supra note 2, at 993.
56. See supra note 4; see also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DE-
LINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 34445
(1980) [hereinafter NAC STANDARDS] ("[d]ispositions following adjudication of a neglect and
abuse petition should adequately protect the juvenile while causing as little interference as possible
with the autonomy of the family").
57. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 15 ("coercive state intervention should be pre-
mised upon specific harms that a child has suffered or is likely to suffer"); GFS II, supra note 2, at
137 ("coercive intervention [should be restricted to protect against] actual and threatened harm
about which there is a consensus"); Wald, State Intervention, supra note 2, at 987-89, 1004-05 (in-
tervention should be permitted only to prevent or alleviate well defined, serious harms to children
and when intervention likely to do more good than harm).
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philosophy to child welfare authorities. But, because of their past failures to
exercise discretion wisely, no proponent of minimum intervention has urged
this approach. Instead, the task of implementing the new philosophy has
been assigned to legislatures, which are to enunciate statutory standards to
confine the discretion of child welfare workers, and courts, which are to play
an expanded role in reviewing child welfare decisions under the new, nar-
rower rules.
Proponents of minimum intervention have also agreed on the outlines of a
program to effect the new philosophy.58 The central goal of this program is
reducing the use and length of foster care placement, and toward this end the
program would alter traditional practice in several respects. The vaguely
worded neglect laws that gave broad discretion to child welfare workers
would be redrawn to describe in greater detail the circumstances that justify
coercive state intervention.5 9 These statutes would also require judges to
place a child in foster care only after a finding that lesser measures would be
unavailing. 60 Periodic review of all placements would be instituted to ensure
that children return home as soon as the conditions that led to removal are
cured and to make certain that agencies provided the services necessary to
achieve this end.6' Rules regarding termination of parental rights would also
be redrawn. Termination of parental rights would no longer be based on
parental unfitness. Instead, in order to save the child from the uncertain
status of foster care and permit his adoption by another family, termination
would be based on parental failure to obtain the child's return after a statuto-
58. There has been less agreement on the details. Standards for intervention proposed by mini-
mum intervention advocates, for example, vary quite substantially. See, e.g., GFS II, supra note 2,
at 193-95; Areen, supra note 2, at 932-33.
59. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 16-17; GFS II, supra note 2, at 193-95; NAC
STANDARDS, supra note 56, at 254; Areen, supra note 2, at 932-33; Wald, Standards, supra note 2,
at 700-01.
60. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 128-29 ("removal of the child from the home is
specifically forbidden unless the child cannot be protected by any other means"); GFS I, supra note
2, at 100 (permitting removal from the child's current home only when established "that the child is
unwanted and that the child's current placement is not the least detrimental available alternative");
NAC STANDARDS, supra note 56, at 344-45 ("state must demonstrate with clear and convincing
evidence that one of the alternatives short of removal can adequately protect the child"); Areen,
supra note 2, at 935-36 (removal permitted only when "services ... do not within a reasonable time
reduce the probability of further neglect or abuse or... there is no other way to protect the child
from the risk of serious physical injury"); MNOOKIN, supra note 2, at 631 ("state may remove a
child from parental custody without parental consent only if the state first proves: (a) there is an
immediate and substantial danger to the child's health; and (b) there are no reasonable means by
which the state can protect the child's health without removing the child from parental custody");
Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 643 ("removal should be permissible only when the child cannot
be protected in her own home from the specific harm(s) justifying intervention").
61. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 145 (requiring mandatory review of placements every
six months); Areen, supra note 2, at 936-37 (requiring submission of progress reports to the court
every three months); Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 681-82, 699 (requiring mandatory review of
placements every six months).
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rily fixed period of time.62
This reform program has already had a considerable impact. Many states
have instituted foster care review procedures.63 The federal government,
spurred by reform program advocates, has required states to provide preven-
tive services as alternatives to placement, to institute case planning and case
review mechanisms, and to offer services aimed at either reuniting children
with their parents or finding other permanent homes for them. 64 Child wel-
fare demonstration projects across the country are also retraining
caseworkers in accordance with the new philosophy. 65 There is also evidence
that these measures have produced some concrete results: the number of
children in foster care dropped by half in five years, from 500,000 in 1977 to
243,000 in 1982, while the average stay in foster care went from forty-seven
to thirty-five months during the same period.66
But have the changes benefited the children? Proponents of the minimum
intervention approach in child welfare have promised-like the proponents
of the rehabilitative philosophy at the turn of the century-that the new
strategy will work better and cost less than the old system. However, at least
one other minimum intervention reform movement, the deinstitutionaliza-
tion of mental patients, may already have turned into a major societal trag-
62. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 74 (establishing presumption in favor of parental
rights termination after child in foster care for three years); GFS II, supra note 2, at 188, 194-95
(requiring termination of parental rights at request of foster parent who continuously cared for
child for two years); Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 691 (proposing termination of parental rights
in most cases after child in placement for specified period of time). See generally Garrison, supra
note 16, at 449-53 (examining model standards for terminating parental rights that conform to this
position).
63. The first mandatory foster care review procedures were established in New York in 1971.
Festinger, supra note 47, at 211. By 1981, at least thirteen states had statutorily required review
procedures. S. DOWNS, FINAL REPORT OF THE PERMANENCY PLANNING PROJECT §§ 3.13-.15
(1981).
64. These requirements were instituted pursuant to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 103, 94 Stat. 500, 514 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 627
(1982)).
65. See S. DOWNS, supra note 63 (final report of national federally funded project to disseminate
materials and provide technical assistance on "permanency planning" on a nationwide basis); U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., A HANDBOOK FOR SOCIAL WORKERS: PERMANENT
PLANNING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (1980) (training manual emphasizing permanency
planning).
66. A Place for Foster Children, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1984, at C15, col. 1; see Magura, Trend
Analysis in Foster Care, 15 Soc. WORK RES. & ABSTRACTS 29, 32 (1979) (reporting steady decrease
between 1973 and 1978 in percentage of children remaining in care from one base year to next in
New Jersey). Evidence exists that the trend away from placement may now have reversed, at least
in some parts of the country. For example, in New York City, placements rose by 6.9% between
1984 and 1986. Nix, Lacking Foster Care, Children Sleep in Offices, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1986, at
Al, col. 3. Officials view the increase as a result of a rise in the number of abuse and neglect reports
rather than any diminution in impact of the minimum intervention philosophy. Id.
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edy. 67 During the 1970s, thousands of mental patients in the United States
were released from mental institutions into the community.68 Reformers had
anticipated that they would be cared for in small, "less drastic" community
based facilities. Early pilot projects demonstrated considerable success, at
what appeared to be less cost than hospital treatment. 69 Politicians happily
subscribed to the new program, eager to do better and save money simultane-
ously. 70 But the reformers had misjudged the real cost of deinstitutionalizing
and the problems that would arise when the concept was applied on a broad
scale. Few community facilities were created, and many patients thus left
the institution for the street, where they received no treatment and were
forced to fend for themselves in often hostile urban environments. 71 More-
over, in those facilities that did become established, the successes of early,
well-funded, well-staffed pilot projects could not be maintained as budgets
and staffs were cut.72 Thus while the deinstitutionalization movement cer-
tainly accomplished some good, it also failed to achieve its goals, and it has
caused some serious harm as well. The dangers of the minimum intervention
reform movement in child welfare pose similar risks: too little intervention
can be just as bad as too much. The current reform movement may shrink
the total network of available child welfare services without producing bene-
fits. 73 To avoid such dangers,74 it is necessary to analyze rigorously and pessi-
67. See H. LAMB, THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (1984) (report done for American Psychiat-
ric Association); see also COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RE-
TURNING THE MENTALLY ILL TO THE COMMUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO DO MORE 172-81
(1977) (reporting problems associated with deinstitutionalization such as incomplete release plans,
inadequate referral procedures, haphazard follow-ups).
68. The number of patients in mental hospitals declined significantly between 1955 and 1980.
See generally H. LAMB, supra note 67.
69. A frequently cited pilot project compared a group of 412 patients in two intensive treatment
centers with patients admitted to five mental hospitals in Missouri. Average stays in the mental
hospitals were 237 days longer than for similarly diagnosed patients at the treatment centers. See
Lyons, How Release of Mental Patients Began, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1984, at Cl, col. 2.
70. Dr. M. Brewster Smith of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, an agency
highly influential in implementing the new policy, recently noted that the Commission chose its
direction because of "the sort of overselling that happens in almost every interchange between sci-
ence and government. Extravagant claims were made for the benefits of shifting from state hospitals
to community clinics .... The professional community made mistakes and was overly optimistic,
but the political community wanted to save money." Id. at C4, col. 2; see Plum, Moving Forward
with Deinstitutionalization: Lessons of an Ethical Policy Analysis, 57 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
508, 509 (1987) (deinstitutionalization movement came from two different sources: civil libertari-
ans, and fiscal conservatives; former naively assumed deinstitutionalization would produce more
humane, community-based care; latter wanted to reduce costs).
71. Morganthau, Abandoned, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1986, at 14, 16 (estimating that approxi-
mately one-third of nation's homeless-a population put by various commentators at numbers
ranging from 350,000 to 3,000,000-chronically mentally ill); cf J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra
note 31, at 45-47 (discussing similar problems of deinstitutionalization in context of juvenile justice
system).
72. See Lyons, supra note 69, at Cl, col. 2 (discussing decline from pilot program success).
73. See Magazino, Services to Children and Families at Risk of Separation, in CHILD WELFARE:
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mistically the potential impact of changed standards, taking into account the
constraints that will likely influence their interpretation and implementation.
B. ITS DEFICIENCIES
Rigorous analysis has not typically been employed by the drafters of stan-
dards implementing the least drastic alternative. Indeed, the reform move-
ment's leading theoreticians, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert
Solnit, provide an excellent example of cavalier and over-optimistic analysis.
In two books75 published during the 1970s, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
propose the most extreme standards that the minimum intervention move-
ment has thus far produced. They also claim that their proposed standards
are supported by psychoanalytic theory and research, a theoretical basis
other proposals have lacked, and one that thus gives their work a particularly
prominent place in the minimum intervention literature. Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit propose that intervention by child welfare authorities be limited to
cases of "[s]erious bodily injury inflicted by parents upon their child, or an
attempt to inflict such harms, or repeated failure of the parents to prevent the
child from suffering such injury"; conviction of a sexual offense against the
child; or abandonment. 76 They explicitly argue against intervention in cases
of "minor assaults" and other less serious physical harms, and in cases of
emotional or intellectual harm, even when these harms are very serious. 77
Their primary rationale for this position is that state intervention itself
poses serious risks to children, risks so substantial that only the most serious
harms justify removing the child from his parents or even providing services
in the house. A child's placement in foster care, they argue, poses several
types of risks. Removal from the home disrupts "[c]ontinuity of relation-
ships, surroundings and environmental influences [that] are essential for a
child's normal development." '78 The shared authority between parents and
agency creates "insecurity caused by the constant need to find a balance be-
tween the competing demands of fostering parents and external authori-
CURRENT DILEMMAS-FUTURE DIRECTIONS 211, 250-51 (1983); see also Lindsay, Achievements
for Children in Foster Care, 27 Soc. WORK 491, 495 (1982) (noting potential problems in restric-
tions on availability of foster care like those that arose in deinstitutionalization movement).
74. See tenBroek & Barth, Learning the Hard Way: A Pilot Permanency Planning Project, 65
CHILD WELFARE 281, 292-94 (1986) (describing unanticipated results of a permanency planning
project).
75. GFS I, supra note 2; GFS II, supra note 2.
76. GFS II, supra note 2, at 193-95. Other grounds for intervention include parental failure to
abide by labor, education, and immunization laws affecting the child, the commission of acts by the
child criminal under the adult penal system, and certain instances of medical treatment denial. Id.
77. Id. at 73-78.
78. GFS I, supra note 2, at 31-32.
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ties."' 79 The multiple placements some children encounter while in care
interfere with the "attachments that are essential for an individual's
growth."80 And the child's return to his parents when he has formed attach-
ments elsewhere "causes distress and harm[s] .. his psychological develop-
ment."' 81 Because of these varied harms from foster care, Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit also urge that foster parents who have cared for a child continu-
ously for one or two years, depending on the child's age, should be able to
obtain termination of the natural parents' rights to regain custody automati-
cally, regardless of the reason for placement, the efforts of the natural parents
to regain custody, or the level of assistance the natural parents have received
from the foster care agency.82
Even intervention without removal, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit opine,
poses great risks: "When family integrity is broken or weakened by state
intrusion, [the child's] ... needs are thwarted and his belief that his parents
are omniscient and all-powerful is shaken prematurely. The effect on the
child's developmental progress is invariably detrimental. ' 83 Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit thus adopt the same narrow standards for intervention in
the home that they favor for removal.
Are these good standards? In order to evaluate the proposal, it is neces-
sary first to assess carefully the risks of intervention ini the home and removal
from it, and then to balance these risks against the risks of nonintervention
and the possible benefits of intervention. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit not
only fail to do this; they also provide no evidence at all, other than vague
pronouncements on the tenets of psychoanalytic theory, in support of their
claims. 84 They ignore the many studies of how children in fact fare in foster
care, along with the evidence on the risks of nonintervention and the benefits
of state action. Because Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit are so cavalier about
supporting their claims, they also ignore the problem of insufficient evidence:
on many issues of child welfare practice the evidence is far from conclusive,
79. GFS II, supra note 2, at 49; see GFS I, supra note 2, at 117-18 (court's disruption of parent-
child relationship prevents development of needed trust between them).
80. GFS II, supra note 2, at 136; see id. at 39-45 (long-time "caregivers" entitled to parental
rights to promote continuity for child).
81. Id. at 136.
82. Id. at 46. The one exception mandates a hearing in some circumstances for older children to
determine whether their real parents are still their "psychological" parents. Id. at 47-48.
83. Id. at 9; see id. at 25 ("children... react to even temporary infringement of parental auton-
omy with anxiety, diminishing trust, loosening of emotional ties, or an increasing tendency to be out
of control").
84. Several commentators have recognized the failure of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit to provide
evidentiary support for their conclusions. See, e.g., Katkin, Bullington & Levine, Above and Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Social Science and Social
Action, 8 LAW & Soc. REV. 669, 672-76 (1974); Miller, Book Review, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 1093,
1096 (1974); Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of Children: A Review
of Before the Best Interests of the Child (Book Review), 78 MICH. L. REv. 645, 669 n.56 (1981).
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and the drafter of standards to guide child welfare authorities must somehow
take account of this fact.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit also fail to recognize that state intervention
often does not occur through state coercion. Consider, for example, this case:
Ritchie Adams, six years old, was brought to Juvenile Hall by a baby sitter.
The child's mother told the baby sitter to take him there because she had
no way of caring for him.
When contacted by the Probation Officer... [Mrs. Adams] said she was
unable to care for Ritchie. [She requested that he be placed in foster care.]
She told of her own unhappy childhood with quarrelsome parents, a sharp
sibling rivalry with preference given to boys in the family, and an early and
unhappy marriage following a pregnancy with Ritchie. She described
Ritchie as subject to temper tantrums beyond her control, hateful like his
father, and hyperactive .... She talked of her wish to marry again, and was
very much involved with a new male friend. She reported that there had
been no recent contact with Mr. Adams and she did not know where he
was living. Mrs. Adams explained that Ritchie's sister.., lived with her.
An older brother ... was in a mental hygiene foster home .... 85
Should Ritchie be accepted into foster care? Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
suggest no standards for the voluntary sector of the child welfare system and
thus do not address the question.8 6 However, their standards for terminating
parental rights would apply with full force to parents who had voluntarily
placed children in foster care,87 even if the placement was occasioned by
agency failure to provide in-home services that would have met the family's
needs and the agency thereafter did nothing to assist the parent in getting the
child back. Thus, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit penalize the parents of chil-
dren who seek help for their problems by placing them at serious risk of
losing their children altogether when they do so.
,On a deeper lever, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit pay little attention to the
context in which the problems they describe emerge and in which their pro-
posed standards would be administered. Thus, despite their view of instabil-
ity in placement as an unmitigated evil, they provide no incentives to
improve agency performance in this-or any other-area of child welfare
practice.
While Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit provide a good short course in how not
to implement the minimum intervention philosophy, their views have been
extremely influential in shaping the minimum intervention implementation
85. R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW 512-13 (1978).
86. But see GFS II, supra note 2, at 31-36 (dealing only with contested custody after divorce and
parental requests to surrender all legal parental rights).
87. See GFS I, supra note 2, at 75-85 (hypothetical court decision, favored by authors, terminat-
ing parental rights of mother who had voluntarily placed her child).
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program. The quest for "permanency" in relationships is now often treated
as synonymous with the least drastic alternative itself and "permanency
planning" has become the new catchword in child welfare work. 88 Although
no commentators have urged limiting state intervention as narrowly as Gold-
stein, Freud, and Solnit,89 commentators tend to agree with the conclusion
that foster care is extremely damaging to children, and that the damage de-
rives from separation, "status anxiety" about the conditional nature of the
placement, and disruption of attachments due to multiple placements. 90
Most have also followed Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in advocating the same
standards for intervention in the home that apply to placement, 91 in advocat-
ing termination of parental rights based on passage of time,92 and in giving
very short shrift to the voluntary sector of the child welfare system.93 The
work of these other minimum intervention advocates also frequently lacks
thorough consideration of the evidence or reasoned explanations for the con-
88. "In the second half of the seventies, permanency planning became a movement that spread
from state to state." S. DOWNS, supra note 63, § 1.16; see E. Fein, A. Maluccio, M. Hamilton & D.
Ward, After Foster Care: Outcomes of Permanency Planning For Children, 62 CHILD WELFARE
485, 486 (1983) [hereinafter After Foster Care] (discussing generally permanency planning move-
ment and its spread). Two federal initiatives have facilitated the spread of permanency planning.
Since 1976, the federal Children's Bureau has awarded incentive grants to 45 states to carry out
permanency planning projects. The Children's Bureau also has funded a national Permanency Plan-
ning Project to develop and disseminate written materials and provide technical assistance to state
child welfare agencies interested in incorporating permanency planning into their programs. S.
DOWNS, supra note 63, § 1.16. Moreover, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
conditions federal child welfare funding on state adoption of a number of specific procedures
designed to ensure that permanency planning is carried out. 42 U.S.C. § 608(f) (1982); see Allen,
Golubock & Olsen, A Guide to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in FOSTER
CHILDREN IN THE COURTS, supra note 40; at 575, 575 (describing act in detail).
89. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 67-70 (authorizing intervention based on serious
emotional damage when parents unwilling to provide treatment); NAC STANDARDS, supra note 56,
at 178 (authorizing intervention when emotional health is severely impaired); Areen, supra note 2,
at 932-35 (authorizing intervention based on actual or threatened emotional harm); Wald, Stan-
dards, supra note 2, at 700-01 (authorizing intervention based on serious emotional damage when
parents unwilling to provide treatment).
90. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 54-55; Areen, supra note 2, at 889, 912-14; Mnookin,
supra note 2, at 622-26; Wald, State Intervention, supra note 2, at 993-96.
91. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 131 (noting danger of all forms of intervention);
Wald, State Intervention, supra note 2, at 996-99 (arguing against lessened deference to parental
autonomy when considering in-home intervention).
92. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 163 (authorizing termination of parental rights in
certain situations when child out of home for three years); Areen, supra note 2, at 937 (power to
consent to adoption vests in state after six months or one year depending on child's age, unless
reasonable probability of reunion with parents exists); Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 691 (termi-
nation would be norm if child not returned home within six months if child under three or 12
months if child over three).
93. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 183-95 (voluntary sector considered only in final 12
pages of 156-page volume); Areen, supra note 2, at 921-22, 935 (devoting few paragraphs to volun-
tary sector; proposing judicial hearings to ensure voluntariness of placements).
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clusions. 94 Even the reform movement's central aim-reducing the use and
length of placement-has been supported by rhetoric more often than rea-
soned analysis. 95 Moreover, a large amount of research data now exists that
was unavailable to early minimum intervention advocates. 96 A fresh and
comprehensive look at the meaning of the least drastic alternative in child
welfare decisionmaking is thus desirable, and overdue.
III. THE MEANING OF MINIMUM INTERVENTION:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
What harms are serious enough to warrant state intervention? What re-
sponses are minimal? In an ideal world, we would consult experts on child
development and psychotherapy and obtain answers to these questions.
Child welfare workers would then be instructed to behave accordingly, and a
perfect system would fall into place. The world is, of course, far from per-
fect, and the task of implementing the new philosophy is thus far more
difficult.
A. INFORMATION AND FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS
Experts cannot, unfortunately, provide all or even most of the answers on
many key issues of child welfare administration. The experts do not agree on
the long-term effects of many child rearing practices, or on the efficacy of
various treatment strategies.97 One of the few points on which they do gener-
ally agree is the present difficulty of predicting adult personality on the basis
of childhood experiences. 98 And there is little empirical research keyed di-
94. Only one commentator has thoroughly reviewed the evidence available. Wald, Standards,
supra note 2, at 644-49, 665-76.
95. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 5 ("the foster care system in America
is an unconscionable failure, harming large numbers of the children it purports to serve").
96. See, e.g., D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21; M. JONES, A SECOND CHANCE FOR
FAMILIES-FIVE YEARS LATER: FOLLOW-UP OF A PROGRAM TO REDUCE FOSTER CARE (1985);
M. WALD, J. CARLSMITH, P. LEDERMAN, R. FRENCH & C. SMITH, PROTECTING ABUSED/NE-
GLECTED CHILDREN: A COMPARISON OF HOME AND FOSTER PLACEMENT (1985) [hereinafter
PROTECTING CHILDREN].
97. See S. ESCALONA, THE ROOTS OF INDIVIDUALITY: NORMAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOP-
MENT IN INFANCY 13 (1968) (summarizing studies and reporting that "[v]hen childrearing tech-
niques... are treated as the independent variable, no significant relationship can be shown to exist
between childrearing techniques and later personality characteristics"); GFS I, supra note 2, at 51
("[no one] can.., predict in detail how the unfolding development of a child and his family will be
reflected in the long run in the child's personality and character formation"); cf Opaku, Psychology:
Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1137-44 (1976) (describing
deficiencies of psychological theory and research findings as aids in resolving child custody cases).
98. One of the best known predictive studies is Macfarlane, Perspectives on Personality Consis-
tency and Change from the Guidance Study, 7 VITA HUMANA 115 (1964). Arlene Skolnick has
observed that "[tihe most surprising [finding] of the [Macfarlane study] was the difficulty of predict-
ing what thirty-year-old adults would be like even after the most sophisticated data had been gath-
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rectly to the types of problems that arise in child welfare decisionmaking. 99
In many instances, then, the available data can produce only a vague design
for the least drastic alternative in child welfare practice.
Moreover, much of the available data is highly flawed. Although some
very high quality research on child welfare issues has been done, most of the
research is simply not very good: control groups are frequently lacking, fol-
low-up is often inadequate, and variable methods of measuring outcomes
make comparisons extremely difficult. 1° The conclusions that researchers
draw therefore must often be viewed with skepticism, and it is extremely
risky to rely on a single research report as establishing a fact. Only when a
substantial number of reports reach similar conclusions can claims of fact be
tentatively drawn. Even then, conclusions must remain tentative if most of
the reports are based on flawed research.
Even if perfect information were available, child welfare workers could not
be expected to implement it perfectly. To begin with, child welfare adminis-
tration has been consistently characterized by its noncompliance with legal
standards. A change in child welfare rules simply does not automatically
translate into changes in agency behavior. Examples of this phenomenon
abound. A recent national survey of foster care agencies, for instance, deter-
mined that six-month reviews required by federal law were performed in less
than forty percent of surveyed cases.101 While the law was clear, it was sim-
ply being ignored.
One reason for this phenomenon is insufficient resources. Over the last
twenty years researchers have repeatedly found that child welfare work suf-
fers from high caseloads, 10 2 rapid staff turnover, 10 3 and inadequate training
among workers. 1°4 These conditions virtually ensure shoddy services, and
ered on them as children." A. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 378 (1973).
99. See generally Wald, Legal Policies Affecting Children: A Lawyer's Request for Aid, 47 CHILD
DEV. 1, 3-5 (1976) (providing list of child welfare research topics in need of further study).
100. See generally PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 96, at 13-17 (describing common meth-
odological problems in child welfare research).
101. GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at iii, 9-10.
102. Caseloads of 80 or 90 per worker are common in some states. GAO REPORT, supra note 32,
at 12; NATIONAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 15; D. SHAPIRO, AGENCIES AND FOSTER
CHILDREN 19-24 (1976).
103. See D. CAPLOVITZ & L. GENEVIE, supra note 32, at 25-26 (only half of children had fewer
than three caseworkers during stay in foster care); A. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 58 (only 16% of
sampled cases assigned to same worker for more than two years). See generally NATIONAL
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 6, 15-18; Freudenberger, Burn-out: Occupational Hazard of the
Child Care Worker, 6 CHILD CARE Q. 90 (1977).
104. See A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 687 (quoting New York Commission on Child Welfare
that half of child welfare workers surveyed "considered themselves unequipped for [offering] coun-
seling"); D. SHAPIRO, supra note 102, at 19-20 (46% of surveyed child care workers had only B.A.
degree; median experience two years); Campbell, The Neglected Child: His and His Family's Treat-
ment under Massachusetts Law and Practice and their Rights under the Due Process Clause, 4 SuF-
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they are not easily cured. Caseload reduction alone has shown little effect in
improving performance,10 5 while the low pay and low prestige of child wel-
fare work makes it extremely difficult to attract committed, well-qualified
personnel. 10 6 And until child welfare administration becomes a high social
priority in this country, it is unlikely that a major change in funding will
occur, or that the status of child welfare work will improve.
Given these problems, in order to implement the minimum intervention
philosophy effectively, we must decide what to do when information fails and
make sure that our approach is within the present capability of child welfare
personnel.
B. WHAT TO DO WHEN INFORMATION FAILS
1. A Question of Values
If the empirical and theoretical evidence fails to indicate clearly the least
drastic alternative, how do we decide what standard to apply? In such cases,
we could grant discretion to child welfare workers, but there is no reason to
believe that this would achieve results different from those obtained in the
past. We could also grant discretion to judges, but without some policy
guidelines unpredictable and inconsistent results would likely follow. 10 7 Or
the legislature could establish arbitrary rules or presumptions for child wel-
fare workers and judges to follow. But a preferable approach is surely to
enunciate rules that are supported by a coherent policy choice if reliable evi-
dence cannot be obtained.
In my view, the family law traditions and values prevailing within our
legal system in other contexts prescribe the best policy to employ. The cen-
tral values of this tradition-family autonomy, privacy, and parental author-
FOLK L. REV. 631, 642 (1970) (most Massachusetts child care workers had only B.A. degrees
usually in fields other than psychology or social work).
105. See D. SHAPIRO, supra note 102, at 90 (workers with smallest and largest caseloads moved
children out of foster care more quickly than those with medium size caseloads). Probation and
parole researchers have also reported pessimistic conclusions on the value of caseload reduction.
See D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREAT-
MENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES 45-49, 59 (1975).
106. In 1985 the median salary for social workers with a graduate degree was $19,000, while the
median salary was $15,000 for practitioners with no graduate training. M. BOTSKO & M. JONES,
ANNUAL SALARY STUDY AND SURVEY OF SELECTED PERSONNEL ISSUES 21 (1985). See A.
KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 677 (social work ranked low among professions in terms of prestige;
like other traditional women's professions, social work considered a minor, almost marginal
profession).
107. See, e.g., M. PHILLIPS, A. SHYNE, E. SHERMAN & B. HARING, FACTORS ASSOCIATED
WITH PLACEMENT DECISIONS IN CHILD WELFARE 69-84 (1971) (reporting results of simulation
study in which three experienced judges were asked to determine, based on actual case files, whether
children should be provided services in home or removed; judges agreed in only 48% of cases and
"[e]ven in cases in which they agreed on the decision... [they] did not identify the same factors as
determinants, each seeming to operate to some extent within his own unique value system").
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ity-have been ignored by the current child welfare system with no apparent
justification and no apparent benefit. These traditional values are entirely
consonant with the minimum intervention philosophy. Indeed, minimum in-
tervention advocates have uniformly turned to these values to support the
minimum intervention approach. Courts and legislators have also developed
and refined rules to embody these values in a variety of family law contexts.
The rules that have evolved within the tradition thus reflect lengthy debate,
thought, and consensus.
Use of the values underlying the family law tradition would also harmo-
nize child welfare law with the other branches of family law. This is appeal-
ing, first of all, on grounds of logic: Why should one set of principles apply
to the family in relation to the child welfare system and another in all other
contexts? Using these principles would, additionally, end a long history of
confusion between public assistance and child protection aims. As we have
seen, the child welfare system originated as part of the poor laws, where
public assistance goals took precedence over the family law values applied
elsewhere. Continued rejection of these values within the child welfare sys-
tem, coupled with its continued service of disproportionate numbers of poor
families, has, indeed, led one commentator to describe child welfare law as
"the family law of the poor."' 08 But there is no good reason for a family law
that differentiates on the basis of wealth. Reliance on the family law rules
that have been applied in other contexts can thus serve the salutary function
of ending a long history of discrimination against the indigent, in addition to
promoting a coherent family law and policy. To the extent that empirical
data does not adequately describe the least drastic alternative, I therefore
believe that child welfare decisionmaking should be guided by the principles
that govern American family law in other contexts.
2. Family Law Tradition: The Model of Family Autonomy
Outside the child welfare system, our legal tradition has generally accepted
the premise that parents have a paramount claim to the care and custody of
their minor children in all but exceptional circumstances. 10 9 Courts have
usually held that parents have the right to determine their child's care and
upbringing without interference by the state unless the child is threatened
with serious harm,"10 and that the claims of other relatives and strangers,
108. tenBroek, supra note 8, at 262.
109. See 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 16, at 201 (1978) (parental rights "may be limited or
interfered with only for the most compelling and sufficient reasons"); cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ("primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now estab-
lished beyond debate as an enduring American tradition").
110. The medical decision is the context in which the limits of parental authority have been most
frequently tested. Courts usually require a showing that the child will suffer serious harm before
overruling a parental decision. See, e.g., In re Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 752, 379 N.E.2d
176919871
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even if based on the best interests of the child, must give way to parental
rights.' Since the nineteenth century, this "parents' rights" doctrine has
been justified both as a natural outgrowth of a parent's duty to support and
maintain the child and because it serves the child's best interests. "The
wants and weaknesses of children," courts and commentators have urged,
"render it necessary that some person maintain them, and the voice of nature
has pointed out the parent as the most fit and proper person." 1 2
This deference to parental authority reflects a social consensus that the
family, rather than the state or other organized interests, should play the
primary role in educating and training the young.1 3 Deference to parental
child rearing, commentators have suggested, also serves society's interests in
fostering social pluralism and diversity, and supports our basic social institu-
1053, 1065 (1978) (ordering chemotherapy when child's life at stake and parents unwilling "to
provide the type of medical care necessary and proper for child's well-being"); In re Hofbauer, 47
N.Y.2d 649, 656, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013-14, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936, 940-41 (1979) (courts may not
choose most effective treatment when parents considered reasonable alternatives); In re Green, 448
Pa. 338, 348, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (1972) (state may not override parental judgment about medical
care that is based on religious belief when child's life not immediately imperiled). But see In re
Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 901, 278 N.E.2d 918, 918-19, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (1972) (affirming
lower court's ordering of nonvital operation over parent's religious objection). See generally Gold-
stein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE
L.J. 645 (1977) (discussing circumstance under which state should overrule parental decision to
deny medical care to child).
Courts have also given substantial deference to parents' educational decisions. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (refusal of Amish parents to send child to public schools allowed);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925) (statute requiring all children to attend
public schools struck down as interfering with parents' right to direct upbringing and education of
child).
111. See, e.g., In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 688-89, 523 P.2d 244, 257-58, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 457-
58 (1974) (court may award custody of child to "nonparent" against claim of parent only upon
"clear showing that such award is essential to avert harm to the child"); Dickson v. Lascaris, 53
N.Y.2d 204, 208, 423 N.E.2d 361, 363-64, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (1981) (only extraordinary cir-
cumstances justify removal of child from parent's custody); Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549,
554-55, 348 N.W.2d 479, 482 (1984) (best interests of child not proper standard in custody dispute
between natural parent and third party; compelling reason necessary to justify denying custody to
natural parent). But see Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1396, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (1966)
(custody of child awarded to nonparent since "primary consideration is the best interest of the
child"); Ellerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 367-68, 416 A.2d 512, 513-14 (1980) (in custody disputes
between parent and third party, parent has prima facie right to custody which may be forfeited if
convincing reasons appear that best interests of child will be served by awarding custody to some-
one else). See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 17.5 (1968) (analyzing rele-
vant cases). When parents have abandoned their children to others for a lengthy period, however,
their claims have been accorded less deference. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
112. tenBroek, supra note 8, at 905.
113. See S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 1-3, 12-13 (1971) (America has "cultural preference"
for deferring to family decisions); Heymann & Barelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and
its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 772 (1973) (state should not interfere with "fundamental decisions
that shape family life"); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (the parent's role in
training children for adulthood "in large part is beyond the competence of impersonal political
institutions").
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tions and values, 114 which presuppose a social system of family units in
which members provide for each other's economic and emotional needs.115
Indeed, this tradition of deference to parental rights is now, at least in
some circumstances, constitutionally mandated. The constitutional rights of
parents were first established more than a half-century ago and have been
repeatedly reaffirmed. In a long series of cases the Supreme Court has held
that the state may not contravene parental decisions regarding the child's
education and training for adulthood absent compelling justification.11 6
Although the family autonomy doctrine has not been systematically ap-
plied to the child welfare system, the Supreme Court has held that child
welfare authorities may not deprive an unwed father who has lived with and
supported his children of their custody on the presumption that he is unfit;
instead, the state must demonstrate his unfitness at an evidentiary hearing. 11 7
And the importance of the interests at stake have led the Court to require
clear and convincing evidence before a parent's rights are terminated.11 8 A
few lower courts, influenced by the reform movement, have also recently
114. See AREEN, supra note 2, at 893 (deference to parental autonomy promotes diversity and
personal freedom); Wald, State Intervention, supra note 2, at 991-93 (same); cf Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (state may not "standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (state may
not "foster a homogeneous people with American ideals" by forbidding teaching of foreign lan-
guages to children).
115. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977) (discussing family's role in
protecting its members from economic and personal hardship); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (importance of familial relationships stems from "the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association").
116. Vague assertions of benefits to the child are apparently insufficient to meet this test; a clear
demonstration of harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace,
order, or welfare has been required. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(before restriction of right to choose family living arrangements permitted, court "must examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15
(1972) (state interest in compulsory education not great enough to overcome parents' rights absent
harm to child or to public welfare); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972) ("de minimis"
state interest insufficient to justify restriction on parental rights of unwed father); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (state generally may not enter "private realm of family life");
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925) (statute requiring all children to attend
public schools interferes with rights of parents to direct upbringing and education of child); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (state interest in encouraging American ideals by prohibiting
teaching of foreign languages not sufficient to permit infringement of rights of parents to raise
children as they see fit). See generally Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family,
93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1235-42 (1980) (discussing parents' constitutional right to control custody
and upbringing of children). The Supreme Court has also recognized a fundamental right of pri-
vacy in other family matters. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (state
statute restricting and prohibiting sale of contraceptives to minors; restriction of right of privacy
can only be justified by compelling state interest); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86
(1965) (state statute forbidding use of contraceptives; bill of rights implies a right of privacy).
117. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
118. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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struck down child welfare laws that give the state broad discretion to inter-
vene coercively in family life. In Roe v. Conn,'1 9 for example, a federal dis-
trict court struck down a child neglect statute that authorized termination of
parental rights if the child "has no proper parental care." In view of the
constitutional protection due the "fundamental right of family integrity," the
court held that the severance of the parent-child relationship was permissible
"only when the child is subjected to real physical or emotional harm and less
drastic measures would be unavailing."' 120
These cases suggest that, when information is lacking on where the least
drastic alternative lies, the state should, in general, defer to the parent. In
recent years, however, courts have increasingly been forced to confront cases
that test the boundaries of parents' rights. These cases have made it apparent
that deference to parental judgment must vary with differences in parental
commitment, childhood maturation, and the decisionmaking context.
For example, it now appears that parental fights may be entitled to less
deference if the parent has not maintained an ongoing relationship with his
child. As early as the nineteenth century, scholars have found, courts some-
times gave precedence to the claims of nonparents who had cared for a child
at parental request for substantial periods of time.' 2 ' This trend seems to
have accelerated in recent years, and a number of courts have held that pro-
longed voluntary cessation of contact is sufficient to defeat a parent's attempt
to regain custody. 122 This distinction between biological and "psychologi-
cal" parentage has even crept into the constitutional parents' rights doctrine.
In Quilloin v. Walcott,123 the Supreme Court declined to hold that an unmar-
ried father who had never sought actual or legal custody of his child was
entitled to veto a proposed adoption of the child by the mother and stepfa-
119. 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
120. Id. at 779. Cf Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 24 (S.D. Iowa 1975), (termination
of parental rights permissible only "where more harm is likely to befall the child by staying with his
parents than by being permanently separated from them") aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
See generally Note, Constitutional Limits on the Scope of State Child Neglect Statutes, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 719 (1979) (arguing that many child neglect statutes overly broad in light of constitutional
"right to family integrity").
121. See generally Zainaldan, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Cus-
tody, Adoption, and the Courts, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038, 1075-84 (1979).
122. See, e.g., In re Marino, 30 Cal. App. 3d 952, 958, 106 Cal. Rptr. 655, 661 (1973) (awarding
custody to aunt who cared for child for six years); Ross v. Hoffmann, 280 Md. 172, 192, 371 A.2d
582, 594 (1977) (upholding custody award under best interests of child standard to babysitter who
provided full time care five days each week for eight years); Reflow v. Reflow, 24 Or. App. 365, 373-
75, 545 P.2d 894, 899-900 (1976) (awarding custody to relatives who provided care during most of
five-year period). See generally McGough & Schindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interest of the
Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209 (1978) (examining
constitutional and psychological aspects of parental rights doctrine); Annotation, A ward of Custody
of Child Where Contest is Between Natural Parent and Stepparent, 10 A.L.R.4TH 767 (natural par-
ents' voluntary lack of contact with child often factor when child awarded to stepparents.)
123. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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ther absent a showing of his parental unfitness. While the Court had "little
doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended if a state were to at-
tempt to force the breakup of a natural family without some showing of un-
fitness,"1 24 in this situation a best interests test was sufficient. In a
subsequent case, the Court noted that "[t]he mere existence of a biological
link does not merit the same constitutional protection accorded a parent who
acts as a father toward his children." 125
Parents' rights may also merit less weight when they conflict with the
wishes of a mature minor regarding a matter of significant, long-term impor-
tance. Courts have, for example, routinely deferred to the wishes of older
children regarding the choice of a custodial parent in the case of divorce. 126
Adoption statutes similarly require consent of children over a certain age.127
And in reviewing parental decisions about an older child's medical care,
courts have also sometimes turned directly to the child to determine whether
the parental judgment should stand or fall. 128 Once again, constitutional
doctrine appears to be moving in a similar direction. In Bellotti v. Baird,129
for example, the Supreme Court held that the state could not permit a parent
to veto a mature minor's decision to have an abortion. The importance of the
interest at stake and the magnitude of the impact of the decision on the child
required the state to permit mature minors to make their own choice.130
The Court has also made it clear that, at least in some instances, parental
willingness to waive a child's constitutional rights is insufficient to absolve
the state of responsibility for providing the child with due process protection.
In Parham v. £..R.,1 for example, the Court limited the right of parents to
place their children in mental health institutions. The risks inherent in insti-
tutionalization and the possibility of parental error required the state to con-
124. Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)).
125. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
126. Annotation, Child's Wishes as Factor in Awarding Custody, 4 A.L.R.3D 1396 (1965). A
child's wishes are also considered in a contest between parent and "nonparent," and they may be
determinative when a parent has largely abdicated his responsibilities. Id. at 1445-46.
127. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 5(a)(5), 9 U.L.A. 11 (1971) (requiring consent of minor
adoptee "if more than [10] years of age, unless the court in the best interest of the minor dispenses
with the minor's consent").
128. See In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 84-85, 127 N.E.2d 820, 822-23 (1955) (refusing to order
custody of boy who had cleft palate and harelip transferred to state when boy and father opposed
corrective operation); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 349-50, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (1972) (when mother
unwilling to consent to dangerous operation requiring blood transfusions and child's life not in
danger child's wishes should be determined).
129. 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Belotti II).
130. Id. at 642. Under this opinion, even if a minor has not been able to convince a court that he
or she is mature enough to make the abortion decision alone, the minor still must be given an
opportunity to convince the court that the abortion is in his or her best interests. Id. at 647-48. The
minor is entitled to attempt these showings before parental notification occurs. Id. at 647.
131. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
1987] 1773
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
duct an inquiry to determine whether the medical standards for admission
had been met. 132
All of these developments within traditional family law have implications
for child welfare decisionmaking. This is not surprising, since the same is-
sues-the appropriate scope of parental authority, child autonomy, and state
intervention-are central to both. When information fails to reveal clearly
the least drastic alternative, we should thus turn to the developed body of
family law for direction.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that family law principles, like
empirical data, will often fail to yield precise directives. For example, in
establishing standards to govern state intervention into family life, the princi-
ples of traditional family law clearly point to harm to the child as a requisite
for state action; neglect statutes that point to parental conduct, or simple
poverty, as a basis for state intervention thus are certainly suspect. But the
notion of "serious harm" does not specify what harms are indeed serious,
and thus does not help in evaluating a very strict standard of serious harm
such as that proposed by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, in comparison with
another that employs a broader definition of serious harm. Family law con-
cepts can thus supplement empirical data, but on many issues both will yield
indeterminate results.
C. WHAT TO DO IN THE FACE OF FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS: FOSTERING
ACCOUNTABILITY, LOWERING EXPECTATIONS
Even if information is adequate or, failing that, if traditional family law
provides clear guidance on an issue, the least drastic alternative cannot be
formulated without considering feasibility constraints: if a result cannot be
accomplished, it cannot be the least drastic alternative.
The feasibility constraint demands, first of all, that standards implement-
ing the least drastic alternative approach be drafted to promote agency ac-
countability. To this end, they should be as clear as possible and should
structure agency discretion. They should also incorporate grievance mecha-
nisms and provisions for review of key agency decisions. 133
The feasibility constraint also demands pessimism. Standards must be
drafted with the current deficiencies of child welfare practice in mind. As we
have seen, these deficiencies are considerable, and many obstacles stand in
the way of improvement. We must therefore be wary of basing predictions
about agency performance on demonstration projects that involve low
caseloads or special staffing. As in the deinstitutionalization context, these
132. Id. at 606-07.
133. This is consistent with the views of other minimum intervention theorists. See supra note
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results may prove extremely difficult to replicate in a nondemonstration pro-
ject. Instead, standards should generally reflect the assumption that in-
creased funding or better personnel will not materialize. Thus if the present
child welfare system, with all its imperfections, cannot be expected to imple-
ment successfully what would appear to be the least drastic alternative, an-
other feasible alternative should be substituted in its place.
The feasibility constraint also demands pessimism in the larger arena
within which child welfare reform will be carried out. If the least drastic
alternative is too costly, we cannot expect it to be implemented. If it would
encounter widespread opposition, we cannot expect that opposition to disap-
pear. If it conflicts with other state policies, we cannot expect these to be
passed over or subordinated.
In short, the feasibility criterion demands that we attempt to improve
agency performance by making agencies more accountable for their deci-
sions, but that we maintain low expectations about the quality of child wel-
fare work and the social and political sphere in which that work is
performed.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE LEAST DRASTIC ALTERNATIVE: STANDARDS
FOR INTERVENTION, PLACEMENT, AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL CUSTODY RIGHTS
This section employs this analytic framework to develop standards for
child welfare decisionmaking. But a caveat is first in order: the standards
can approach the least drastic alternative, but cannot precisely define it. Not
only will reliable information on the variety of constraints that the standards
reflect (e.g., child development and rehabilitative strategies, family law prin-
ciples, bureaucratic capability, cost, public opinion) often be lacking, but the
direction suggested by one constraint will not always, or even typically, com-
port with that suggested by another. On many issues, the standards must
ultimately rest on guesswork and compromise.
A. COERCIVE INTERVENTION: THE ISSUES
1. Hard and Easy Cases
How much harm is enough to justify intervention? When is removal nec-
essary to protect the child? In some cases, the need for intervention or re-
moval is so apparent that it arouses little controversy. Few would dispute
that state intervention on behalf of the child is justified in cases of parental
abandonment, intentional infliction of serious injuries, sexual abuse, or other
behavior that creates grave risks of death or serious physical harm. All cur-
rent jurisdictional statutes permit state intervention in these circum-
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stances, 134 and every minimum intervention advocate has agreed that they
should.135 By the same token, every recent commentator has held that a
parent's unconventional beliefs or behavior should not suffice to justify inter-
vention unless it results in real risks to the child. 136
The more difficult cases fall between these two extremes. They are typical
"neglect" cases-those which involve deficiencies in parental capacity or be-
havior that create risks to the child's emotional or intellectual development,
or that create less grave risks to the child's physical well-being. The follow-
ing cases are representative of this middle ground:
Mrs. Harvey's situation was referred to the agency by the police ....
The police had been called to her home the previous night, upon complaint
of neighbors that Mrs. Harvey's six children, ranging in ages from one to
six years, were alone in the apartment and were not being cared for....
The police described Mrs. Harvey's children as dirty and unkempt. The
two-year-old twins were unclothed except for undershirts. They had rem-
nants of feces on their bodies, and were sleeping in a bed with a worn-out
dirty mattress. The baby was nursing a bottle of curdled milk. All of the
children seemed to be underweight .... 137
Liz [Flynn], age 7, was living with her father and mother and two dogs
in a van. They had been living there for six months. Liz was found locked
in the car, while it was parked in a shopping center lot. Close to her was a
pan containing sand, placed there for her toileting needs .... Her mother
had a history of mental illness, her father a severe alcohol problem. When
the police found Liz, they took her to a County Children's Home. 138
The [Barnes] family was reported to the agency by the school's learning
disability specialist and the school nurse .... [The mother] reports that
134. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 75-349 (1975)
(digest of state statutes).
135. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 70-72; GFS II, supra note 2, at 193-94; Areen, supra note
2, at 932-33 (no specific mention of sexual abuse in proposed neglect and abuse statutes, but these
grounds probably subsumed within emotional harm aspect of neglect statute); Wald, State Interven-
tion, supra note 2, at 1008-14, 1024-31. But see GFS II, supra note 2, at 62-72, 91-110 (urging limits
for jurisdiction based on sexual abuse to cases in which parent convicted, or acquitted on grounds of
insanity; limit jurisdiction for medical neglect to cases in which child's life at stake).
136. E.g., GFS II, supra note 2, at 77-85; Areen, supra note 2, at 918-19; Wald, State Interven-
tion, supra note 2, at 1033-34. While there are instances in which child protection proceedings have
been brought in such circumstances in recent years, see Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 781 & n.16
(M.D. Ala. 1976) (mother living with man out of wedlock not sufficient ground for termination of
parental rights); In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1967) (same), these cases are
rare. See Pelton, Child Abuse and Neglect and Protective Intervention in Mercer County, New Jersey,
in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 6, at 90 (describing circum-
stances in surveyed neglect cases); Wald, State Intervention, supra note 2, at 1033-34 (same).
137. A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 243-44.
138. PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 96, at 1.
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her welfare check runs out within the first two weeks of the month. Two of
her children sleep in blankets on the floor.
[She] is a heavy drinker and she has hypertension. She has been de-
scribed as a manic depressive. Her children also have many problems. The
8-year-old... is described as having a poor self-concept and is growing
obese. The 9-year-old boy has a hearing loss and is neurologically impaired.
The mother screams and yells at the children and calls them names such
as "dunce" and "stupid." She threatens to have them put away. One child
came to Head Start with a clump of hair pulled out, and the mother admit-
ted having pulled it. She describes herself as being dead tired when she
comes home from the night shift, which makes her very impatient with the
children .... A worker from another agency has seen the mother.., hit
one of the children for no apparent reason.
139
Yet Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit and some other minimum intervention ad-
vocates have urged the adoption of standards that would preclude interven-
tion in all of these cases. 140 Substantial numbers of judicial child protection
proceedings involve fact patterns like these. Although estimates vary, neglect
cases probably outnumber abuse cases by at least two to one. 141 Where
should the line be drawn? We look first at the evidence on the risks of
intervention.
2. How Risky Is Intervention: The Evidence
Foster Care. There is no doubt that separation from parents, family,
and community poses some risks to the child. The crucial question, of course,
is just how considerable these risks are.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's claim that continuity is essential for the
young child derives from a substantial body of literature describing the ef-
fects of maternal deprivation on childhood development. 142 This concept de-
139. Horowitz & Wolock, Material Deprivation, Child Maltreatment and Agency Interventions
Among Poor Families, in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 6, at
137, 160-61.
140. Under the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit standards, intevention would be impermissible in all
of these cases. See GFS II, supra note 2, at 193-94 (describing grounds for intervention). Under
other narrow standards, jurisdiction might be appropriate in some cases. The standards created
under the auspices of the ABA, for example, sufficiently circumscribe the definition of emotional
neglect that intervention would not be justified in any of the cases on this ground. See ABA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 2, at 67-70. If, however, the definition of disfigurement were stretched to include
the pulled hair in the Barnes case, jurisdiction might be justified on the serious physical injury
ground. Id. at 63-65. One could argue the Harvey case justifies intervention because the lack of
supervision creates a "substantial risk ... of serious physical injury," id. at 63, but the commentary
appears to restrict intervention based on parental absence to situations when a very young child is
repeatedly left unattended because of a parent's mental illness, alcoholism, or drug abuse. Id. at 67.
141. Estimates of the ratio of neglect to abuse cases range from 2:1 to 10:1. See Wolock &
Horowitz, Child Maltreatment as a Social Problem: The Neglect of Neglect, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSY-
CHIATRY 530, 534 (1984) (citing reports).142. For a detailed review of research on maternal deprivation, see M. Rutter, Maternal Depri-
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rives from studies of institutionalized children conducted during the 1940s in
which researchers found that language and intellectual retardation, and de-
linquency and serious personality disorders were all associated with institu-
tional care or multiple separations from parents.143 These researchers
theorized that it was essential to mental health for "the young child [to]...
experience a warm, intimate and continuous relationship with his mother (or
permanent mother substitute) in which both find satisfaction and
enjoyment. '144
The concept of maternal deprivation was used by researchers of this era,
however, to include inadequate care (i.e., neglect) as well as discontinuous
care, and for some time it was unclear which of the two posed the greater
risks. 145 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit strongly suggest that discontinuity is
the more damaging, but the current evidence in fact suggests the opposite. As
one expert recently put it, "research has confirmed that, although an impor-
tant stress, separation is not the crucial factor in most varieties of depriva-
tion." 146 The "failure to thrive" syndrome that researchers first reported in
institutionalized children 147 has since been well documented in families that
remained intact.14 In fact, some researchers have reported that there is less
deviant or disturbed behavior in children of divorce or separation than in
those living in intact homes where there is chronic conflict. 149 Recent studies
vation Reassessed (2d ed. 1981). See generally DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE: A REASSESS-
MENT OF ITS EFFECTS (World Health Organization ed. 1962); Yarrow, Maternal Deprivation:
Toward an Empirical and Conceptual Reevaluation, 58 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 459 (1961).
143. See J. BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH 15-51 (1952) (describing early
research in area).
144. Id. at 11.
145. See generally Ainsworth, The Effects of Maternal Deprivation: A Review of Findings and
Controversy in the Context of Research Strategy, in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE: A REAS-
SESSMENT OF ITS EFFECTS, supra note 142, at 97, 98-99, 108-09 (describing definitional issue and
problems it has created).
146. M. RUTTER, supra note 142, at 217 (emphasis in original). This is apparently the current
view of even John Bowlby, who has long been the foremost proponent of the maternal deprivation
thesis. See J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss II: SEPARATION 208-10 (1980).
147. The classic study of institutionalized children is described in Spitz, Hospitalism: An Inquiry
Into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood, in I PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF
THE CHILD 53 (1945). See also Spitz, Hospitalism: A Follow-Up Report, in 2 PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CHILD 113 (1946).
148. See, e.g., Coleman & Provence, Environmental Retardation (Hospitalism) in Infants Living
in Families, 19 PEDIATRICS 285 (1957); Elmer, Failure to Thrive: Role of the Mother, 25 PEDIAT-
RICS 717 (1960); Evans, Reinhardt & Succop, Failure to Thrive: A Study of 45 Children and Their
Families, 11 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 440 (1972); Fischhoff, Whitten & Pettit, A Psychlat-
ric Study of Mothers of Infants with Growth Failure Due to Maternal Deprivation, 72 J. PEDIATRICS
209 (1971).
149. See, e.g., W. MCCORD & J. MCCORD, THE ORIGINS OF CRIME: A NEW EVALUATION OF
THE CAMBRIDGE-SOMERVILLE YOUTH STUDY 104-23 (1959); Nye, Child Adjustment in Broken
and Unhappy Unbroken Homes, 19 MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 356 (1957); Power, Ash, Schoen-
berg & Sorey, Delinquency and the Family, 4 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 13 (1975); Rutter, Parent-Child
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have also shown strong links between marital discord and conduct disorders
in children in the absence of any separation experience. 150 Nor have child-
hood neuroses been clearly linked to discontinuity per se.151
Evidence that inadequate care poses greater risks than discontinuity also
comes from a growing body of research that suggests that the child's adjust-
ment following separation from his or her parents varies significantly de-
pending on the type of care the child then receives. Children who are
separated from severely disturbed homes and then experience a more harmo-
nious family environment seem to improve.' 52 Conversely, children who de-
velop a psychiatric disorder following loss of a parent are more likely to have
received deficient care following the loss than those who do not. 153 And
there is some evidence that the risks of psychiatric disturbance increase the
longer the child is subjected to a disturbed family environment. 154 In short,
the available evidence does not suggest continuity is essential for normal
Separation: Psychological Effects on the Children, 12 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 233,
241-42 (1971). See generally M. RUTrTER, supra note 142, at 109-11, 135-36 (describing research).
150. See Rutter, supra note 149, at 243 (discord more important than family break-up in predict-
ing antisocial behavior). See generally J. BOWLBY, supra note 146, at 208-310 (discussing separa-
tion and whether it is crucial factor); S. WOLFF, CHILDREN UNDER STRESS 126-41 (2d ed. 1981)
(chapter entitled "The Neurotic Family").
151. See Rutter, supra note 149, at 243 (separation experiences "have never been shown to be
associated with child neurosis").
152. See Rutter, supra note 149, at 245-46 (among children separated from parents due to family
problems, those who went to happy homes exhibited reduced antisocial behavior); Hetherington,
Cox & Cox, Play and Social Interaction in Children Following Divorce, 35 J. Soc. ISSUES 26 (1979)
(reporting that children who experienced parental divorce showed significantly less psychiatric dis-
turbance two years later than children who remained in intact homes with continuing marital con-
flicts); Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the PreSchool Child, 14
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 600 (1975) (reporting relation between post-divorce changes in
mother-child relationship and child's psychological condition); cf M. ALLERHAND, R. WEBER &
M. HAUG, ADAPTATION AND ADAPTABILITY: THE BELLEFAIRE FOLLOW-UP STUDY 140 (1966)
(among boys discharged from residential treatment center, adaptation at discharge not itself indica-
tive of adaptation at follow-up; current living situation was main determinant for majority); Tizard
& Hodges, The Effect of Early Institutional Rearing on Eight Year Old Children, 19 J. CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 99, 113 (1978) (reporting that subsequent development of institution-
alized child depends "very much on the environment to which he is moved"). See generally M.
RUTTER, supra note 142, at 72-73 (surveying reports).
153. See Elizur & Kaffman, Factors Influencing the Severity of Childhood Bereavement Reactions,
53 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 668, 675 (1983) (post-traumatic factors, such as quality of mother-
child relationship and mother's ability to cope, most influential in determining child's long-term
response to bereavement). See generally J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss III: Loss 312-19
(1980) (surveying studies showing importance of child's experience after loss of parent).
154. See M. SHEPHERD, B. OPPENHEIM & S. MITCHELL, CHILDHOOD BEHAVIOR AND MENTAL
HEALTH 162 (1971) (favorable change in family circumstances associated with marked reduction in
psychiatric risk); E. WERNER & R. SMITH, VULNERABLE BUT INVINCIBLE: A LONGITUDINAL
STUDY OF RESILIENT CHILDREN AND YOUTH 124 (1982) (among high-risk children with serious
learning and/or behavior problems by age 10, improvement most consistently associated with more
favorable parental attitudes and fewer stressful life experiences). See generally M. RUTTER, supra-
note 142, at 72-73 (summarizing studies).
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childhood development. Quite the contrary-although the research data is
not yet definitive, separation from a disturbed home, which produces an im-
provement in the child's care, is often preferable to a child's remaining in the
disturbed environment.
Nor does any evidence support Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's assertion
that the conditional nature of foster placement inherently creates a sense of
instability or causes other problems. To the contrary, researchers generally
have not found that children suffer status anxiety based simply on the condi-
tional and impermanent nature of foster care placement. Weinstein, for ex-
ample, found that two-thirds of the long-term foster children he studied
expected to remain indefinitely in their current homes. The expectations of
the children were also, he found, "highly realistic"; in only twenty percent of
the cases did the children's impression deviate from the social worker's., 55
More recently, Fanshel found that the majority of a group of children who
had been in the same foster home for an average of six years thought of their
foster homes as their "real homes."' 156 Other researchers have reported that
neither a child's functioning nor sense of permanence correlates with his
placement status in foster care, an adoptive home, or with the child's natural
parents. 157
On the issue of stability during placement, the evidence does provide some
support for Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's position, although the results are
far from uniform. The most thorough study of foster care to date found no
association between the number of placements a child had experienced and
the number of negative behavioral symptoms exhibited, 158 and some other
researchers have reported similar findings. ' 59 But others have found an asso-
155. E. WEINSTEIN, THE SELF IMAGE OF THE FOSTER CHILD 35-36 (1960).
156. D. FANSHEL, COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION FOR CHILD WELFARE: FOSTER CHILDREN
AND THEIR FOSTER PARENTS 63 (1979).
157. See After Foster Care, supra note 88, at 508-12 (placement status-returned to family, adop-
tion, or permanent foster home-not significantly correlated with family adjustment, emotional/
developmental functioning, child behavior, or school functioning after 12 to 16 months); A.
KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 389 (describing study finding no statistically significant differences in
functioning of children in long-term foster care and children in adoptive homes); J. LAHTI, K.
GREEN, A. EMLEN, J. ZADNY, Q. CLARKSON, M. KUEHNEL & J. CASCIATO, A FOLLOW-UP
STUDY OF THE OREGON PROJECT 9.1 (1978) [hereinafter OREGON PROJECT] (child's functioning
not correlated with placement status).
158. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 452.
159. See After Foster Care, supra note 88, at 508-14 (number of foster care placements significant
predictor of emotional/developmental functioning and school success at 6 to 10 months after per-
manent placement, but not at 12 to 16 months after permanent placement); E. MEIER, FORMER
FOSTER CHILDREN AS ADULT CITIZENS 382-85, 465-66 (1962) (doctoral dissertation, Columbia
University) (social effectiveness ratings and well-being scores of adults who were foster children not
significantly related to number of placements); OREGON PROJECT, supra note 157, at 4.18 (number
of foster care placements did not account for significant amounts of variation in current status
ratings of children).
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ciation between the number of placements and emotional problems. 160
Moreover, researchers have found that the perceived stability of the place-
ment is an important factor in determining its success. In one study, re-
searchers found that "a sense of permanence was one of the best predictors of
a child's well-being." 161 Children in three status categories-still in long-
term foster care, returned home from foster care, or adopted-were all more
likely to be in the high status group162 if their parents (or parent substitutes)
viewed the placement as durable and likely to last until the child's major-
ity. 16 3 It is also important to keep in mind, however, that most foster chil-
dren do not suffer multiple placements. 164
But perhaps the best evidence on the impact of removal and placement
comes from research on the functioning of current and former foster chil-
dren, a body of evidence that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, and many other
minimum intervention theorists have totally ignored. This evidence does in-
dicate that substantial numbers of children in foster care exhibit signs of
emotional impairment.' 65 But researchers have also reported that these
problems are not found more frequently than among disadvantaged children
generally.' 66 And while some research has reported that longer stays in fos-
160. H. MAAS & R. ENGLER, supra note 22, at 354 (negative psychological symptoms positively
associated with number of moves, not with length of time spent in care); E. WEINSTEIN, supra note
155, at 66-67 (significant relationship between number of placements and emotional development);
R. ZIMMERMAN, FOSTER CARE IN RETROSPECT 90 (1982) (over half of inadequately functioning
adults who were foster children had lived in five or more homes, versus only one-sixth of those in
adequately functioning group); Caplan & Douglas, Incidence of Parental Loss in Children with De-
pressed Moods, 10 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 225, 227 (1969) (significantly higher
incidence of depression in children subject to more than one foster placement).
161. OREGON PROJECT, supra note 157, at 9.3.
162. Each child included in the study was scored on seven factors designed to assess the quality
of his current placement. A child was ranked as high status if his scores on five or more factors were
above the mean. For a description of the factors and score distribution, see id. at 4.6-.11.
163. Id. at 4.14. Sense of permanence was measured by interviews that assessed the beliefs of the
parents about the durability of the placement. The parents' permanence score also included an
interviewer rating of whether or not the placement was likely to last. Id. at 4.12. Perceived perma-
nence did not correlate with the legal character of the placement. Seventy-two percent of the foster
parents of children who had been placed in special caseloads designed to facilitate their adoption or
return home, and for whom such efforts had failed, said that the child would stay in their home no
matter what happened. Fifty-six percent of a group of nonproject foster homes made the same
statements, and parents in this group who described the placement were not necessarily those who
had had the child for longer periods of time. Id. at 8.6-.8. Oddly, the interviewers felt that more of
these homes (62%) would remain intact than would project foster homes (45%). Id.
164. Most children experience only one or two placements. See supra note 34; infra notes 375-78.
165. See S. VASALY, supra note 32, at 62 (35% of surveyed children in Arizona, 45% in Califor-
nia, and 53% in Iowa exhibited some emotional or behavioral problems). See generally D. FAN-
SHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 14-16 (surveying clinical reports).
166. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 494-95 (reporting that emotional impairment
rate of 25% to 33% for foster children "quite in line" with data on children from similar social
circumstances not in foster care).
1782 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:1745
ter care are associated with a greater likelihood of emotional difficulties, 167
more recent and better research has failed to find signs of deterioration dur-
ing foster care.168 The most careful and thorough of these studies reported
that "[c]ontinued tenure in foster care is not demonstrably deleterious with
respect to IQ change, school performance or measures of emotional adjust-
ment." 169 Indeed, some recent studies have reported definite improvements
in emotional and cognitive functioning during placement. 170
Research on adults who were foster children reports similar conclusions.
Although former foster children may exhibit higher than average delin-
quency rates171 and lower than average educational attainments, 172 research-
ers have repeatedly found that the vast majority are functioning adequately
in terms of social, family, and work roles. 173 The best-known American
167. R. HOLMAN, TRADING IN CHILDREN: A STUDY OF PRIVATE FOSTERING 121 (1973); S.
VASALY, supra note 32, at 63. See generally A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 380 (listing studies on
incidence of emotional problems among foster children).
168. E.g., D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 490-91; S. PALMER, CHILDREN IN LONG-
TERM CARE: THEIR EXPERIENCES AND PROGRESS 31-46 (1976); Kent, A Follow-Up Study of
Abused Children, 1 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOLOGY 25 (1976).
169. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 491. The researchers also determined that
"staying in care as opposed to returning home does not seem to compound the difficulties of the
children." Id. There was "some greater tendency for problems to be reported for the children who
were at home as opposed to those [who remained] in care," although this tendency apparently was
not statistically significant. Id. at 423.
170. Id. at 490-91 (length of tenure in foster care positively related to enhancement in IQ); S.
PALMER, supra note 168, at 32 (reported behavior problems decreased over five-year period in
foster care); Kent, supra note 168, at 28-30 (after at least a year in foster care, surveyed children
showed gains in weight, height, IQ scores, academic performance, and "nearly all problem
behaviors").
171. See T. FERGUSON, CHILDREN IN CARE AND AFTER 135 (1966) (31% of males who were
foster children in Scotland convicted of crime versus 16% of boys who left school at earliest permit-
ted age); R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 76, 86 (18% of former foster children-28% of male
foster children-convicted of crime and incarcerated at least six months in New Orleans; but sam-
ple disproportionately composed of individuals at high risk of incarceration); Bohman & Sigvard-
sson, Negative Social Heritage, 3 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 25 (1980) (males reared from infancy in
foster care had higher levels of criminality than those reared at home or those adopted); McCord,
McCord & Thurber, The Effects of Foster Home Placement in the Prevention of Adult Anti.Social
Behavior, 34 Soc. SERV. REV. 415, 417 (1960) (males placed in foster care during early adolescence
had higher criminal record rate than matched control group). But see T. FESTINGER, No ONE
EVER ASKED US... A POSTSCRIPT TO FOSTER CARE 208-09 (1983) (when ethnicity taken into
account no significant difference in arrest rates between foster children and others).
172. See T. FERGUSON, supra note 171, at 127 (many foster children weak academically); T.
FESTINGER, supra note 171, at 236-38 (men from foster care tended to have less education than men
nationally while women did not differ substantially); E. MEIER, supra note 159, at 318-24 (educa-
tional achievements of girls in foster care only slightly below state norms for age range but boys
markedly below norms); R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 66-67 (median education level of foster
care children between 10th and 11 th grades; educational achievements of group low "even com-
pared with other groups of minority youngsters"; no significant differences found on basis of race,
sex, or whether the children returned home or stayed in foster care).
173. See, e.g., E. BAYLOR & E. MONACHESI, THE REHABILITATION OF CHILDREN: THE THE-
ORY OF CHILD PLACEMENT 422 (1939) (among former foster children 21 or older, 73.5% "had not
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study of former foster children examined adults between twenty-eight and
thirty-two who had been in foster care for at least five years and had never
been returned to their natural families. 174 The researchers measured their
current social effectiveness 175 and sense of well-being. 176 With few excep-
tions, the group compared favorably with the general population. The ma-
jority were self-supporting individuals with stable marriages who adhered to
accepted community mores. 177 A few with out-of-wedlock children had
placed them for adoption or in foster care, but no legitimate child had been
placed. 178
misbehaved" and 70.5% lived in "favorable" environment); T. FERGUSON, supra note 171, at 136-
37 (80% of adults who were formerly foster children rated as having "a reasonable chance of mak-
ing good, of living reasonably happy and useful lives"); T. FESTINGER, supra note 171, at 4 (citing
R. SALO, MUNICIPAL CHILD WELFARE WORK AS PROMOTER OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT (1956)
(former adult foster children showed less criminality, less alcoholism, better occupational status and
increased success in life than siblings who remained in natural parent's home)); T. THEIS, How
FOSTER CHILDREN TURN OUT 23-25 (1924) (former foster children at least 18 years old evaluated
by "experienced supervisors"; over three-quarters considered "capable," defined as law-abiding,
honest, and able to manage affairs sensibly); Rest & Watson, Growing Up in Foster Care, 63 CHILD
WELFARE 291, 297 (1984) (13 subjects aged 19 to 31 "were functioning for the most part at quite an
acceptable level"); Roe & Burks, Adult Adjustment of Foster Children of Alcoholic and Psychotic
Parentage and the Influence of the Foster Home, in 3 MEMOIRS OF THE SECTION ON ALCOHOL
STUDIES, YALE UNIVERSITY 1, 69 (1945) (approximately two-thirds of former foster children,
many from completely disorganized homes with alcoholic or psychotic parents, rated as well or
satisfactorily adjusted); Triseliotis, Growing Up in Foster Care and After, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION 131, 155-56 (J. Triseliotis ed. 1980) (of 40 former foster children,
all from "socially disorganized and deprived families" and with average of four moves, 60% "gener-
ally coping well," 15% had "many satisfactions but also some identifiable difficulties," and 25%
"gave cause for some concern"; researchers attributed most poor outcomes to "the type of interac-
tions that occurred between the children ... and foster parents"). See generally T. FESTINGER,
supra note 171, at 3-10 (discussing studies); R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 8 (same).
174. E. MEIER, supra note 159.
175. Social effectiveness ratings were obtained by positive or negative ratings in each of the fol-
lowing five areas of adaptation: (1) homemaking and living arrangements, (2) employment and
economic circumstances, (3) health, (4) care of children, and (5) social relationships outside the
family group. Id. at 56-62, 349-51.
176. "Well-being" was defined as "a feeling of adequacy in performing the functions for which
the individual is responsible and the experience of pleasure in carrying out the activities in the
various areas of adaptation." Id. at 389. Ratings were obtained from self-reports, and evaluations
of indicators derived from interviews and observation. Id. at 403. Well-being scores were not com-
pared with those of the general population.
177. Id. at 2. A total of 92% were self-supporting or living within self-supporting family units.
Eighty percent of the female subjects were married, which is a figure equivalent to census data for
the general population in the age range of the sample studied. Id. at 278. Male subjects, however,
did have a lower marriage rate (68%) than general population norms (78%) and a higher divorce/
separation rate (14%) than the general male population (3.8%). Id. at 281-83. Only 11% of the
women and 19% of the men were rated negatively for "social effectiveness," i.e., exhibiting "crimi-
nal or anti-social behavior which brought punishment or ostracism, repeated difficulties with associ-
ates, landlords, employers or official agencies, [and] drinking which was accompanied by or
followed by job loss or conflicts with associates." Id. at 380-81.
178. Approximately 10% of the women had had a total of 12 illegitimate children, a rate consid-
erably in excess of general population norms. Id. at 287-88. Ten of the 12 illegitimate children had
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Two recent, more sophisticated studies report similar findings. Research-
ers who studied young adults who had grown up in foster care in New York
City discovered that they generally "were managing their lives adequately
and feeling quite satisfied with their physical, social and psychological envi-
ronments."' 179 There were few differences between them and others of their
age nationally.'8 0 Another study,' 8 ' which evaluated young adults ,82 who
had spent at least one year in foster care in New Orleans,183 found that two-
thirds of the sample were functioning in a "good" or "adequate" manner. 18 4
The subjects were law abiding citizens, supporting themselves by working or
obtaining education, who were adequately caring for their children if they
had any.185 Although health 186 and education levels 8 7 were below normal, in
most other respects, the subjects were not substantially different from similar
population groups.188
Moreover, the inadequately functioning group in the New Orleans study
consisted largely of those who had left foster care. All children who were in
foster care for seven or more years and whose foster homes received a posi-
been placed elsewhere for care, either in independent adoptions arranged by the mother or through
social agency services. None of the legitimate children born to the former foster children had been
placed in foster care, and only four parents (three male and one female, seven percent of those
surveyed) had lost children by adoption following divorce. Id. at 285, 289.
179. T. FESTINGER, supra note 171, at 133.
180. Id. at 229-52. Those discharged from group homes showed worse results. Id.
181. R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160.
182. Subjects were aged 19 through 29 when interviewed. Id. at 21.
183. Sixty-nine percent had been discharged to a parent or relative; the rest had grown up in
foster care. Id. at 22. They had been placed for varied reasons. Approximately one-third had been
neglected or abused; 18% were placed because of parental unwillingness or inability to provide care;
and 17% were placed because of parental mental illness. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 88.
186. Id. at 86.
187. Id. at 84 (only 39% completed high school, compared to 69% of all southern blacks aged
25-34 in 1975).
188. The public assistance rate among the group was close to the rate for the area. Id. at 82; cf
T. FESTINGER, supra note 171, at 241, 251 (slightly higher public assistance rate among younger
group of adults who had grown up in foster care; same rate among older group). The employment
rate of the New Orleans subjects was "not out of line" with that of comparable population groups.
R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 82; cf T. FESTINGER, supra note 171, at 238-40 (females and
white males had employment rate similar to that of general population; black and hispanic males
from foster group homes had worse employment rate). Their marriage and divorce rate was compa-
rable to national age group averages. R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 84; cf T. FESTINGER,
supra note 171, at 234, 249 (marriage rate lower than national rate but similar to regional rate;
divorce rate and reported marital satisfaction same as national norms). Of the 46% with children in
the New Orleans study, none had placed any children in foster care. R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note
160, at 84-85; cf T. FESTINGER, supra note 171, at 43-44 (49 of 53 mothers had all of their children
at home; only one had offspring in foster homes, although "a few others" had in previous years used
foster care temporarily). Between two-thirds and three-quarters of the New Orleans subjects were
content with their lives. R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 79; cf T. FESTINGER, supra note 171,
at 247, 252 (sense of happiness and satisfaction comparable to national averages).
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tive rating in emotional climate were in the adequately functioning group. 18 9
The researchers thus concluded that "long-term foster care in and of itself
was not injurious to the youngsters in the study. When judged by the criteria
of the current adjustment of the former foster children, long-term foster care
provided a better environment for rearing the majority of youngsters than
did natural homes."'190 The conclusion by these researchers that foster care
was preferable to remaining at home is not unique. Other researchers have
reached similar conclusions, 191 and one recent study also reports that chil-
dren in long-term foster care did as well as those who left foster care for
adoptive homes. 192
This is not to say that long-term foster care is an unmitigated blessing.
Researchers have reported that some former foster children find it difficult to
talk about their experience and suffer from unresolved feelings about their
biological families. 193 These problems, like those reported in some adopted
children, 194 support the proposition that children feel keenly the lack of a
normal home life. Foster care research also largely describes the results of
foster family care, not institutions of the sort that first led to the maternal
deprivation thesis on which Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit rely. There is rea-
son to believe that institutional care does pose more serious risks to the child.
These settings typically deprive the child of all family life, and thus of normal
developmental experiences. In some institutional settings, the child may be
subject to confinement or to association with other children who are delin-
quent or seriously disturbed. 195 Multiple caretakers are likely in these set-
tings, which impedes the formation of parental-type relationships.196
189. R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 91.
190. Id. at 105.
191. See OREGON PROJECT, supra note 157, at 4.15-.16 (63% of children returned to natural
parents scored lower on various measures of adjustment than children adopted or remaining in
foster care); T. FESTINGER, supra note 171, at 4 (citing R. SALO, supra note 173 (former adult foster
children showed less alcoholism, less criminality, better occupational status, and increased success
in life than siblings who remained at home)); Leitenberg, Burchard, Healy & Fuller, Nondelinquent
Children in State Custody: Does Type of Placement Matter?, 9 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY
347 (1981) (status offenders placed in foster homes had better school attendance and fewer police
contacts than those placed in institutional care or at home); Roe & Burks, supra note 173, at 69-70
(low number of serious disorders in children of alcoholic and psychotic parents who were foster
children attributed to being brought up in homes other than their own).
192. OREGON PROJECT, supra note 159, at 4.15, 9.6 (children remaining in foster care not worse
off on variety of measures than those adopted).
193. See Rest & Watson, supra note 173, at 299-304 (discussing comments of group of foster
children concerning biological and foster families).
194. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 469-72 (surveying research concerning emotional problems
of adopted children).
195. Cf In re Andrew R., 115 Misc. 2d 937, 454 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (foster child
"voluntarily" placed in institution containing juvenile delinquents and disturbed children).
196. Early proponents of the maternal deprivation thesis attributed the poor outcomes of institu-
tionalized children to the lack of "parental-type" relationships. More recent research tends to sup-
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Institutional settings are also stigmatizing, implying that the child needs
some sort of treatment. Moreover, inadequate facilities and treatment are
not uncommon, 197 and in some institutions the child may actually suffer seri-
ous abuse or neglect.198
But foster care typically does not entail institutional care,' 99 and, while
institutional placements should certainly be subject to strict limitations, 200 no
evidence supports the proposition that coercive state intervention must be
severely limited because all forms of care outside the family home are injuri-
ous. Inadequate parental care appears to outweigh discontinuity as a deter-
minant of long-range psychological problems, and although the instability of
foster care may cause problems for some children, the available evidence sug-
gests that foster care is not injurious to most children who experience place-
ment. Although the evidence is based on research that varies widely in
timing, technique, and quality, and thus can serve as the basis for only tenta-
tive conclusions, the findings are quite uniform and some of the research is
quite good. On balance, it suggests that the vast majority of foster children
mature without serious problems, while many seem to benefit from the expe-
rience of placement.
Intervention in the Home. No evidence supports limiting intervention
in the home because children suffer from the imposition of outside rules or
port this conclusion, at least for younger children. See Tizard & Rees, The Effect of Early
Institutional Rearing on the Behavior Problems and Affectional Relationships of Four Year Old Chil-
dren, 16 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 61, 73 (1975) (four-year-old children reared in
institutions less likely to experience deep relationships than family reared children); Wolkind, The
Components of "Affectionless Psychopathy" in Institutionalized Children, 15 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
& PSYCHIATRY 215, 219 (1974) (reporting fewer behavioral disturbances in institutionalized chil-
dren in the care of same house mother for at least two years).
Institutional care may have transient effects. One research team reported no significant differ-
ences in intelligence or psychopathology between adults who were foundlings and reared in institu-
tions for a mean period of 24 to 27 months and adults who were foundlings and reared in family
homes. Heston, Denny & Pauly, The Adult Adjustment of Persons Institutionalized as Children, 112
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 1103, 1107-08 (1966).
197. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 23-24 (over half of foster care institutions inspected by
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare either unlicensed or had serious physical deficien-
cies); J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 42 (documenting inadequate institutional care);
cf New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
(granting preliminary relief to correct deficiencies threatening physical safety of inmates at institu-
tion for mentally retarded).
198. See generally K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S INCAR-
CERATED CHILDREN (1976) (detailing abuses in juvenile detention system).
199. See 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1460 (Department of Health and Human
Services estimates that 400,000 in foster families, 35,000 in group homes, and 73,000 in residential
treatment or child care institutions out of 500,000 total).
200. There are numerous reports of children inappropriately placed in institutions. See generally
J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 39; D. PAPPENFONT & D. KILPATRICK, CHILD CAR-
ING INSTITUTIONS 1966: SELECTED FINDINGS 458 (1969).
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other requirements that may shake their belief that their parents are omnis-
cient and all-powerful. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit provide no evidence to
support this proposition, nor do they cite other authorities who share the
same view. In fact, there appear to be none. Experts have at times ques-
tioned the efficacy of intervention with a noncooperative parent201 or the im-
pact of intervention on a parent's self-image,202 but no expert has suggested
that intervention is harmful because it damages a child's belief in his parents'
omniscience.
Nor does common sense support Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's view.
20 3
Parents are not, in fact, omniscient or all-powerful, and evidence of this real-
ity is available daily from a variety of sources. It is thus quite unlikely that
intervention by child welfare authorities would provide the first evidence of
parental limitations. Additionally, only very young children are likely to
maintain such beliefs, and the ability of these young children to comprehend
that the authorities pose a challenge to parental authority seems doubtful.
Given these facts, it is not surprising that studies of intervention have only
rarely reported negative effects.20 4
In sum, the available evidence about the impact of placement in foster care
and intervention in the home largely fails to substantiate the risks as ex-
tremely grave. Thus, on the basis of the risks from intervention, there is no
reason to define neglect in extremely narrow terms.
3. The Risks of Nonintervention
The minimum intervention philosophy requires more, of course, than a
showing that intervention is not demonstrably harmful. State intervention
must also be necessary in order to be justified. Unless the harms risked by
nonintervention are greater than those risked by intervention, the state
should not intervene.
While minimum intervention advocates have tended to greatly overesti-
mate the risks of intervention, they have devoted little attention to the rela-
tive risks of intervention versus nonintervention. The risks of
nonintervention are, of course, far more variable and difficult to define; every
case presents a different and complex evaluation problem. Moreover,
201. See generally G. BROWN, THE MULTI-PROBLEM DILEMMA: A SOCIAL RESEARCH DEM-
ONSTRATION WITH MULTI-PROBLEM FAMILIES (1968).
202. See Davoren, Working with Abusive Parents: A Social Worker's View, 4 CHILDREN TODAY
2, 39 (1975) (parents reported for child abuse feel blamed, "picked on," and interfered with in
raising child); cf Elmer, Hazards in Determining Child Abuse, 45 CHILD WELFARE 28, 32-33
(1966) (false accusations by caretakers can cause serious psychological damage to parents).
203. See Wald, supra note 84, at 669-70 (although children rely on parents and trust them, only
very young children do not doubt their parents).
204. See M. JONES, supra note 96, at 79 (services found harmful in only one percent of surveyed
cases).
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although researchers have reported that separation from a disturbed or inad-
equate home can improve a child's emotional condition, they have not speci-
fied the precise level of disturbance that mandates intervention or removal.
We do not know the relative importance of biological, interpersonal, and
environmental factors, nor can we describe exactly how they operate in com-
bination. We do know, however, that deficits in any of these three areas may
place a child at significant risk. 20 5 For example, a biological defect, a con-
genital disease, or even low birth weight interferes with normal developmen-
tal progress and may render an infant particularly vulnerable to adverse
environmental conditions.20 6 Psychologists also agree that a child's relation-
ship with his parents is a key factor in his development, 20 7 and that a serious
disturbance in the parent-child relationship places the child at risk. An irre-
sponsible, unpredictable, or simply unloving parent cannot provide an envi-
ronment conducive to normal emotional or intellectual growth. Clinical
studies thus show that disturbed children often have disturbed parents.208
Studies also report risks from environmental deficits. Lack of a social sup-
port network has been identified as a significant correlate of inadequate child
care,20 9 and low socio-economic status has consistently been linked to poor
205. Even normal infants vary significantly in reaction patterns and temperament. These differ-
ences may influence parental behavior and the child's subsequent development. See generally A.
THOMAS, S. CHESS & H. BIRCH, TEMPERAMENT AND BEHAVIOR DISORDERS IN CHILDREN
(1968).
206. See E. WERNER & R. SMITH, supra note 154, at 32-33 (60% of surveyed 10-year-old chil-
dren determined to need long term mental health services; 30% of those with learning disabilities
had records of moderate perinatal stress, low birthweight, congenital defects, or central nervous
system dysfunctions, while control groups of same age, sex, socio-economic, and ethnic background
"did not display these factors to a significant extent"; learning disabled and disturbed children also
displayed infant temperamental traits distressing to caretakers more frequently than controls).
207. See, e.g., A. FREUD, NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD 179 (1965) (severe
disturbances of socialization arise when identification with parent disrupted through separations,
rejections, and other interference with emotional ties); M. RUTTER, supra note 142, at 110-11, 135-
136 (conduct disorders in part response to family discord and disturbed interpersonal relationships);
Winnicott, The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship, 41 INT'L. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 585, 594
(1960) (inadequate maternal care may disturb infant development).
208. See, e.g., M. RUTTER, CHILDREN OF SICK PARENTS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PSYCHI-
ATRIC STUDY 34 (1966) (one in five children attending psychiatric clinic had parent who had been
under psychiatric care; three times more frequent than control groups); Wolff& Acton, Characteris-
tics of Parents of Disturbed Children, 114 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 593, 595-96 (1968) (51% of mothers
and 29% of fathers with children attending psychiatric clinic had personality disorders, compared
to 18% of control mothers and 14% of control fathers). Studies that focus on the children of
parents known to have personality disorders report similar conclusions. E. WERNER & R. SMITH,
supra note 154, at 108 (55% of children born to parents diagnosed as schizophrenic or depressive
developed antisocial behavior or mental health problems by age of 18). See generally M. RUTrER &
N. MADGE, CYCLES OF DISADVANTAGE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 198-201, 209-211 (1977) (sur-
veying relevant reports).
209. See N. POLANSKY, M. CHALMERS, E. BUTrENWIESER & D. WILLIAMS, DAMAGED PAR-
ENTS: AN ANATOMY OF CHILD NEGLECT 89 (1981) [hereinafter DAMAGED PARENTS] (78% of
control group but only 15% of neglecting families classified as "supported," that is, having at least
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emotional and intellectual functioning. Children from poor families in poor
neighborhoods, it appears, tend to exhibit higher levels of emotional distur-
bance210 and lower levels of intellectual and social functioning than their bet-
ter-off counterparts. 211
The risks inherent in low socio-economic status are particularly significant
for child welfare decisionmaking because virtually all of the child welfare
system's clientele come from these circumstances. 212 Indeed, one recent re-
port suggests that this factor alone correlates with developmental defects as
often as abuse.213 Of course poverty will not by itself produce developmental
one family member and two friends available for help); D. SHAPIRO, PARENTS AND PROTECTORS:
A STUDY IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 26-28 (1979) (describing low level of family and social
supports in surveyed families receiving child protective services).
210. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 6, at 493-94 (surveying reports). But cf M. RUT-
TER & N. MADGE, supra note 208, at 213 (correlation between social class and mental disorder in
children variable and inconsistent).
211. See, e.g., H. BIRCH & J. Gussow, DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN: HEALTH, NUTRITION &
SCHOOL FAILURE 266 (1970) (environments of disadvantaged children relatively less conducive to
intellectual growth); Guidubaldi & Perry, Divorce, Socioeconomic Status and Children's Cognitive-
Social Competence at School Entry, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 459 (1984) (presence of single
parent and socio-economic status more predictive of school entry competency than other family
background factors, developmental history, and health variables).
212. Researchers have found that the vast majority of children in foster care come from an im-
poverished environment, and that the majority receive public assistance benefits. See, e.g., A.
EMLEN, J. LAHTI, G. DOWNS, A. McKAY & S. DOwNS, OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO PLANNING
FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 19 (DHEW Publ. No. (OHDS) 78-30128 1978) [hereinafter
OVERCOMING BARRIERS] (76% of sample mothers "always or usually" on public assistance); S.
JENKINS & E. NORMAN, FILIAL DEPRIVATION AND FOSTER CARE 25-29 (1972) (two-thirds of the
surveyed New York City families with children in foster care had incomes at or below poverty line;
52% received public assistance, compared to 7.9% of general New York City population); D. SHA-
PIRO, supra note 207, at 21 (80% of child welfare caseload wholly or partially supported by public
assistance); Pelton, supra note 136, at 94 (81% of child protective caseload in New Jersey county
received welfare benefits at some time; 58% wholly or partially supported by welfare benefits at
time of case acceptance; 79% had income of $7,000 or less at time of case acceptance). Also,
studies have found that families who utilize placement usually are more seriously disadvantaged,
with fewer friends and neighbors to whom they can turn than families to whom services in the home
are offered. See A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 325-26 (reviewing relevant studies).
213. E. ELMER, FRAGILE FAMILIES, TROUBLED CHILDREN-THE AFTERMATH OF INFANT
TRAUMA 110 (1977). The study compared the long-term development of abused and non-abused
children. The abused children were matched on the basis of age, race, sex, and socio-economic
status with unabused children. The two groups were then compared in terms of health, cognitive
development, language development, nervous mannerisms, neurological problems, school achieve-
ment, self-concept levels, impulsivity, aggression, and empathy. The researchers found that the
abused children did not vary significantly from their unabused peers on any of these measures. Id.
at 80. The researchers concluded that because of "membership of the majority in the lower social
classes, which connotes poverty and its well-known companions-poor education, menial jobs, in-
adequate housing, undernutrition, poor health and environmental violence," all of the children
studied were doing poorly. Id. at 84. Ninety percent had chronic disorders, of which marked
speech and language problems were the most common. Eighty-six percent had behavioral and/or
learning difficulties. The study team therefore concluded "that the results of child abuse are less
potent for the child's development than his class membership." Id. at 110; see Elmer, A Follow-Up
Study of Traumatized Children, 59 PEDIATRICS 273 (1977) (describing same research); Elmer,
17891987]
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problems; most poor children mature without problems. Poverty is linked to
developmental problems so often because it increases the likelihood of other
risks, and the likelihood of developmental problems increases along with the
number of adverse factors.214 A recently published report, which attempted
to assess the factors differentiating those children who grew up in high risk
environments and emerged relatively unscathed from those who experienced
developmental problems, provides evidence of this fact.215 The men and wo-
men who proved "resilient" reported a significantly smaller number of cumu-
lative life stresses than did those who developed serious coping problems. 216
Moreover, as the cumulative number of stressful life events increased, more
protective factors in the children and their caregiving environment were nec-
essary to ensure a positive developmental outcome.217
We also know that the children served by the child welfare system have
typically experienced such multiple risks. 218 These children typically live in
extreme poverty, in inadequate housing, with inadequate social and commu-
nity supports.219 Most parents show massive disability in their function-
ing,220 and many are mentally ill, alcoholic, or addicted to drugs. 221
Traumatized Children, Chronic Illness, and Poverty, in THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT, supra note 6, at 185, 185 (same). Socio-economic background may also be a signifi-
cant factor in determining placement success. See Fein, supra note 88, at 545.
214. See generally L. MURPHY & A. MORIARITY, VULNERABILITY, COPING AND GROWTH
FROM INFANCY TO ADOLESCENCE (1976) (dicussing children's coping abilities and interplay be-
tween vulnerability, stress, and resilience); M. SHEPHERD, B. OPPENHEIM & S. MITCHELL, supra
note 154, at 1978 (deviant children more likely from less healthy, less sucessful families and more
likely exposed to stress at home and school than control group); Richardson, Koller & Katz, Conti-
nuities and Change in Behavior Disturbance: A Follow-Up Study of Mildly Retarded Adults, 55 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 220, 227 (1985) (among retarded male youths those with persistent behavior
disturbance from significantly more unstable conditions of upbringing than those whose disturbance
behavior did not persist); see also Douglas, Early Hospital Admissions and Later Disturbances of
Behavior and Learning, 17 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 456 (1975) (strong evi-
dence that one admission to hospital of more than week or repeated admission before age of five
increased rate of behavior disturbances and poor reading in adolescence); Quinton & Rutter, Early
Hospital Admissions and Later Disturbances of Behavior: An Attempted Replication of Douglas'
Findings, 18 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 447 (1976) (repeated hospital admis-
sions significantly associated with emotional and conduct disorders in children, especially children
from disadvantaged homes). See generally Rutter, Early Sources of Security and Competence, in
HUMAN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 33 (J. Bruner & A. Garten eds. 1978) (research findings of
conditions facilitating normal development of emotional security and social competence).
215. E. WERNER & R. SMITH, supra note 154.
216. Id. at 94-95.
217. Id. at 132.
218. See M. JONES, supra note 96, at 55 (surveyed families had average of 3.4 problems); D.
SHAPIRO, supra note 207, at 36 (only 25% of surveyed families receiving child protection services
experienced three or fewer stresses); T. STEIN, E. GAMBRILL & K. WILTSE, CHILDREN IN FOSTER
CARE: ACHIEVING CONTINUITY OF CARE 70 (1978) (43% of cases had six or more problems).
219. See DAMAGED PARENTS, supra note 207, at 87-89 (only 15% of neglectful families sur-
veyed found to be "supported" by social or family ties).
220. D. FANSHEL, supra note 33, at 8.
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Frequently, they or their children have chronic physical illnesses.222 They
are seldom employed and poorly educated. 223 Multiple stresses and severe
deprivation overwhelm these families, with the result that many parents be-
come unable to cope with their children.224
Given this picture, it is not surprising that researchers have failed to find
large numbers of children receiving child welfare services on frivolous
grounds. In a survey of New York City foster care case records, for example,
trained case readers with extensive experience in child welfare casework
found that in only 7.3% of cases examined should the children be returned to
their own homes;225 of this group, 98% were found to require one or more
services in order to make the return home possible and stable; 40% required
3 or more services. 226 In another survey, composed largely of families receiv-
ing services in the home, researchers rated the level of child maltreatment as
"severe" or "very severe" in two-thirds of the surveyed cases. 227
The laxity of traditional standards has undeniably permitted intervention
in some cases in which there were no discernible problems in family function-
ing,228 but these egregious abuses of discretion appear to be the exception
rather than the rule.229 Thus, at least based on the risks children who receive
221. See M. JONES, supra note 96, at 56 (according to social workers, 49% of parents had "emo-
tional problem or mental illness"); D. SHAPIRO, supra note 209, at 105-06 (chronic pathology such
as alcoholism or severe depression present in "substantial minority" of surveyed parents); Horowitz
& Wolock, supra note 139, at 146 (33% of main caretakers suffered from "severe" mental or emo-
tional problem, 60% of families included an adult member who used alcohol excessively, and 20%
had at least one member who had been heroin user).
222. See M. JONES, supra note 96, at 56 (19% of parents had a physical illness or disability); cf
Horowitz & Wolock, supra note 139, at 146 (53% of main caretakers had severe physical illness or
condition; 76% of families had at least one child with serious health problem).
223. See A. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 72-73 (over 67% of biological parents unemployed or hold
unskilled jobs; almost 70% never finished high school); M. JONES, supra note 96, at 19 (83% of
biological mothers and 85% of fathers never went past eighth grade; only 8% of mothers and 44%
of legal fathers could report "having had a steady employment at the same job or consistent, though
not steady employment").
224. D. FANSHEL, supra note 33, at 8 (38.3% of New York City foster care placements in 1979
involved parent "unable to cope").
225. B. BERNSTEIN, D. SNIDER & W. MEEZAN, supra note 46, at 23. This finding was made
despite the fact that "the criteria for placement placed heavy stress on keeping or returning [the
child] home wherever possible," and any study staff bias was in the same direction. Id. In only
16% of cases where children were "at home awaiting placement" was remaining home was found to
be possible. Id. at 25.
226. Id. at 32. About 40% needed help from a comprehensive family service center. Another
40% needed help from a casework agency. Approximately 15% of children required help from a
child guidance agency, 16% needed a homemaker, and 22% needed alternate schools or special
education programs. Id. at 32-33.
227. Horowitz & Wolock, supra note 139, at 144-45, 151.
228. See Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ala. 1976) (white child removed from his home
because he and his white mother lived with black man in black neighborhood).
229. See Wald, State Intervention, supra note 2, at 1033-34 (noting that intervention based on
parental "immorality" or lifestyle relatively rare). Surveys ofchild welfare recipients also show that
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child welfare services typically confront, and the evidence regarding the risks
of intervention, we cannot say that neglect should be redefined to exclude
large numbers of families currently served by the child welfare system.
4. The Benefits of Intervention
The minimal intervention philosophy also holds that intervention is not
justified unless it is beneficial. The question thus remains: What good does
intervention accomplish?
One major problem in judging the effectiveness of intervention programs is
that the impact of various types of programs has not been evaluated in any
systematic or rigorous way.230 Many project reports describing successful
outcomes provide little substantiating evidence and are made on the basis of
highly subjective criteria.231 Among the reports, estimates of effectiveness
also vary enormously, even among very similar client populations. A
number of reports, for example, describe the results of efforts to provide in-
home treatment to abusive parents. One indicates that intervention based on
two or more years of intensive therapeutic services resulted in a reincidence
rate of 2.2%,232 while the next, describing a similar approach over a compa-
rable time period, reports a reincidence rate of 54%.233 Success rates also
vary considerably with the measurement selected 234 and the type of service
most have significant problems. See Horowitz & Wolock, supra note 139 (describing circumstances
in surveyed cases); Pelton, supra note 136 (same).
230. A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 205-06.
231. See id. at 206-07 (providing representative examples). See generally Halpern, Lack of Effects
for Home-Based Early Intervention? Some Possible Explanations, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 33
(1984); Simeonson, Scheiner & Cooper, A Review and Analysis of the Effectiveness of Early Interven-
tion Programs, 69 PEDIATRICS 635 (1982).
232. M. HOLMES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROGRAMS: PRACTICE AND THEORY 24
(1977).
233. E. BAHER, AT RISK: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WORK OF THE BATTERED CHILD RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT, NSPCC 173 (1976). Research has yielded equally varied outcomes on other evalua-
tion measures, such as changes in parental attitude and behavior. Compare M. SULLIVAN, M.
SPASSER & G. PENNER, BOWEN CENTER PROJECT FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN: A
REPORT OF A DEMONSTRATION IN PROTECTIVE SERVICES 107 (1977) (comprehensive treatment
project for abusive and neglectful parents, reporting that "all of these mothers, except those with
psychotic conditions, made considerable progress") with E. BAHER, supra, at 171 (similar project
employing similar techniques reporting "minimal" change in behavior of mothers).
234. For example, one research project provided intervention services to half of a group of
mothers determined to be high risks for abusive behavior and gave no services to the other half. At
the end of 17 months, the children in both groups and a control group were evaluated. The study
found no significant statistical differences between the two groups in the area of abnormal parenting
practices, accidents, immunizations or Denver Developmental Screening Test scores. Gray, Predic-
tion and Prevention of Child Abuse Neglect, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 249 (1978). There was, however, a statistically
significant difference in the number of children who suffered injuries warranting hospitalization. Id.
at 250.
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provided. 235
Intervention projects aimed specifically at preventing foster placement
pose similar evaluation problems. Although the measure of success-place-
ment prevention-is uniform among these reports, most have failed to use
control groups and have measured entry into care over only a short period
and in an unsystematic way. 236 Reported entry rates also vary substantially
from one study to the next,237 and as the client groups and services vary
substantially from one project to the next, comparisons of projects are also
difficult. 238
While overall assessments are thus extremely difficult to make, the evi-
dence suggests that only a minority of parents show significant improvement
as a result of intervention programs. A recently published five-year report
from a well-designed and carefully evaluated program to reduce placement
shows, for example, that only twenty-three percent of the project cases re-
ceiving intensive services were closed because "things seemed to be going
well, '' 239 and that the project ultimately achieved a placement rate only
twelve percent lower than the rate in the control group receiving typical serv-
ices.240 Another recent, well-designed study reports equally pessimistic con-
clusions.241 The assertion of one expert that child welfare intervention
programs have achieved only a "modest measure of success" 242 thus appears
to be an apt appraisal.
235. For example, early childhood education programs have recently reported significant suc-
cess. See J. BERRUTA-CLEMENT, CHANGED LIvES 31 (1984) (youngsters who participated in one-
year early childhood education program exhibited at age 19 rates of participation in college or
vocational training past high school nearly double those of youths without preschool education;
teenage pregnancy rate slightly more than half; number of arrests 20% lower; drop-out rate 20%
lower); Royce, Minority Families, Early Education and Later Life Chances, 53 AM. J. ORTHOPSY-
CHIATRY 706, 715-16 (1983) (program participants significantly more likely than controls to attain
high school degree and have white collar aspirations; significantly less likely to require special
education).
236. See M. JONES, supra note 96, at 35-37 (providing a good description of methodological
problems in these studies).
237. For a survey of foster care prevention projects, see id. at 32-33.
238. Id. at 28-33.
239. Id. at 79.
240. Id. at 86.
241. PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 96, at 89 (among families with children at risk of foster
placement given in home services, only four of 23 (17%) showed any improvement, and only two
(nine percent) "changed substantially"); see Horowitz & Wolock, supra note 139, at 152, 169 (in
73% of surveyed cases receiving child protective services, there was either no improvement or con-
ditions worsened).
Although a study relying on social work records reports more positive results, it was less rigorous
and employed shorter follow-up periods. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, MORE CAN BE LEARNED AND DONE ABOUT THE WELL BEING OF CHILDREN 17
(1976) (report to Congress) (in 10 agencies throughout country 37% of surveyed children improved
as result of child protective services).
242. A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 212.
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There is, to date, very little research analyzing the efficacy of rehabilitative
efforts directed at the natural parents of children placed in foster care. What
is apparent, however, is that rehabilitation has been a low priority among
foster care agencies. It has been reported that work with natural parents
receives a disproportionately low level of agency resources, 243 and that many
parents go unvisited by workers. 244 On the other hand, although coercively
placed children may be underrepresented among this group,245 it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that most children who enter foster care apparently do
go home within a year or two.2 46 Moreover, while we should be wary of
presuming that these results can be replicated in general child welfare prac-
tice, special demonstration projects aimed at releasing children from foster
care to their natural parents have shown considerable success. 247 While it is
unclear how many of these returns were advisable,2 48 most of them appear to
be stable.249
Thus, while intervention and removal do not appear to pose grave risks to
the child, they appear, at least under current circumstances, to offer less than
certain benefits in terms of ameliorating family problems. This is not surpris-
ing given the level of problems many families exhibit, and the modest level of
services most programs provide. Lengthier, more intensive, more expensive
treatments do appear to be generally more successful than shorter, less inten-
sive treatments. 250 But the feasibility criterion suggests that such intensive
243. See, e.g., D. SHAPIRO, supra note 102, at 20 (reporting that only 10% of childcare workers
were assigned to natural families, while 27% were assigned to admission procedures or supervisory
responsibilities).
244. See supra note 32 (describing survey results).
245. Lawder, Poulin & Andrews, supra note 30, at 249.
246. See supra note 30 (describing survey results).
247. See OREGON PROJECT, supra note 157, at 5.1 (26% of children classified as unlikely ever to
return home returned to natural parents four years after project initiation); T. STEIN, E. GAMBRILL
& K. WILTSE, supra note 218, at 56 (56% of planned outcome cases resulted in children returned to
natural parents). But see E. SHERMAN, R. NEUMAN & A. SHYNE, CHILDREN ADRIFT IN FOSTER
CARE: A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 47 (1973) (children with specially trained work-
ers returned to their parents at approximately same rate as children with regular workers).
248. See OREGON PROJECT, supra note 157, at 4.20-.22 (63% of children returned to natural
parents scored significantly lower on various measures of current adjustment than children adopted
or retained in foster care).
249. See OREGON PROJECT, supra note 157, at 9.3 (no more than 20% of children returned to
parents returned to foster care); N. BLOCK & A. LIBOWITZ, RECIDIVISM IN FOSTER CARE 25
(1983) (only 30.5% of children returned to natural parents or other relatives returned to foster care
within two years); AfterFoster Care, supra note 88, at 549 (only 32% of children returned to natural
parents from foster care went back to foster care within 12 to 16 months).
250. See, e.g., M. JONES, supra note 96, at 125-26 (children whose families given services to
prevent foster care significantly less likely to enter care if preventive worker had year or more of
social work experience and family received preventive services for "a long time"); D. SHAPIRO,
supra note 209, at 74-75 (among cases active for 37 or more months 42% showed high improvement
while only 22% of cases active 12 or fewer months so rated); Land, supra note 29, at 37-43 (abusive
parents who received therapy for at least 12 hours a week for minimum of four to six months more
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programs will continue to be the exception rather than the rule. Of course,
some families are helped through intervention, and where placement is em-
ployed, parents gain a temporary respite from child care responsibilities that
often permits them to resolve problems themselves. But for many children
whose families receive child welfare services, state intervention appears to
offer few tangible benefits.
B. COERCIVE INTERVENTION AND REMOVAL: DERIVING STANDARDS
1. The Issues and the Problems
Intervention in the home appears to pose no risks, while the circumstances
typically present in neglect cases appear to pose clear risks. But in-home
intervention is successful in only a relatively small minority of cases, and the
feasibility criterion requires us to predict that the ability of the child welfare
network to rehabilitate natural families will not improve and may even di-
minish with additional cases. Foster care agencies appear to be no more suc-
cessful in rehabilitating families, although their failures are less damaging to
the child since he is not in the parental home. However, if the child is re-
turned to a still disorganized family-a quite likely result under current prac-
tice-the gains from removal will probably be lost. If he is not returned, he
may suffer from instability in placement. We must also assume that agencies
will not improve in rehabilitating families of children in foster care, or in
protecting children from unstable placements and ill-advised returns to natu-
ral parents.
The crucial question, of course, is what does this data tell us about how to
define neglect? In my view, it does not, unfortunately, provide any definitive
answers. A case can be made that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit and other
minimum intervention theorists who have advocated extremely narrow inter-
vention standards are ultimately right: as intervention apparently fails far
more often than not, families should not be forced to undergo intrusion into
familial privacy for such uncertain benefits. However, an equally convincing
case can be made for a fairly broad definition of neglect, coupled with a more
drastic form of intervention: if neglected children were neither given services
in the home nor placed in foster care, but instead were immediately made
available for adoption, both the perils of inadequate parenting and the risks
of incompetence by child welfare personnel in rehabilitating the family or
providing a stable foster care placement would be avoided. This approach
likely assessed as rehabilitated than control group receiving less intensive therapy over shorter
term); Ramey, Bryant & Suarez, Pre-School Compensatory Education and the Modifiability of Intel-
ligence: A Critical View, in CURRENT ToPics IN HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 27 (D. Detterman ed.
1984) (results from infancy intervention programs aimed at improving intellectual development
support an "intensity hypothesis"; home visits alone not found to alter IQ at all while daycare plus
other family services effected largest improvement).
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would also save the substantial sums now expended on rehabilitative efforts
and maintenance payments to foster families; rehabilitative efforts would no
longer be needed, and adoptive parents-like natural parents but unlike fos-
ter families-would be liable for the child's support.2 51 At least for younger
children, such an approach is also eminently practicable. Although adults
willing to adopt were in short supply at the time the philosophy of rehabilita-
tion became popular,252 this is no longer the case. Instead, there is now a
severe shortage of adoptive infants, and even older children can often be
found adoptive homes. 25 3 Finally, a case can also be made for the status quo:
intervention, even in the form of removal, poses few risks while noninterven-
tion in the types of cases in which neglect jurisdiction is typically exercised
poses clear risks. A significant number of families definitely benefit from in-
tervention, and because foster care can provide adequate protection against
continuing abuse or neglect, immediate termination of parental rights is un-
necessary. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is not adequate to establish
a conclusive winner among these arguments.
Nor does the family autonomy tradition provide clear answers. The Gold-
stein, Freud, and Solnit approach is extremely deferential to family auton-
omy, the adoption approach extremely nondeferential, and the status quo
approach somewhere in between. At first glance, this suggests that at least
the second option could be eliminated, and possibly the third. After all, the
Supreme Court has held that, based on the importance of the interests at
stake, clear and convincing evidence is required in order to terminate paren-
tal rights, 254 and a number of state courts, on similar grounds, have decided
that termination can be obtained only when the parent is unfit, and not on
the basis of vague assertions of the child's best interest. 25 5 But a finding of
neglect could, of course, be taken to demonstrate unfitness, and many state
statutes do permit termination of parental rights as an immediate disposition
in a neglect action. Moreover, the family autonomy tradition clearly does
not mandate the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approach. Because the evi-
dence strongly suggests that a much broader array of circumstances can
cause serious harm to the child, a broader definition of neglect is warranted.
The least drastic alternative thus turns out to be an extremely elusive
concept.
In the face of uncertain information and conflicting values, I believe that
251. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 35, at 24-25 (savings from adoption of 17 children
estimated at $1,132,098).
252. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 437-38 (describing changes in adoption scene).
253. Id. at 443; A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 470-73.
254. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
255. See, e.g., In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981); Petition of the Department
of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 421 N.E.2d 28 (Mass. 1981); In re J.P.,
648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
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the moderate, status quo approach, is preferable. This conclusion is based on
several factors. First, both of the extreme approaches entail some fairly ex-
tensive costs. The Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approach leaves virtually all
neglected children to their fate, even in circumstances in which almost any
observer would find the balance of harms to mandate intervention. 256 The
adoption approach ensures that neglected children get help but also ensures
permanent separation for some families who perhaps could have resolved
their problems and offers nothing to parents who may themselves be victims
of forces beyond their control or understanding. Second, both approaches let
the child welfare system off very easily; in both approaches, the system's defi-
ciencies become the rationale for making no attempts to improve it. Finally,
when certainty is unavailable, it seems safest to choose a standard for inter-
vention that embodies a balance between the rights of children and parents,
and between the deficiencies and responsibilities of the child welfare system.
This conclusion is, of course, open to argument. A moderate approach itself
entails costs: families for whom intervention does not work, children re-
turned home inappropriately, and children subjected to unstable placements.
Only one conclusion cannot be gainsaid: the evidence quite unequivocally
points out that no standards for intervention can work any major improve-
ments in the lives of the children and families whom the child welfare system
serves. As long as we remain unwilling to give families sufficient support to
avert the extreme stresses that produce neglect there will be damaged chil-
dren and families. And unless our financial commitment to rehabilitation
and our rehabilitative ability improve markedly, many of these children and
families will stay that way.
2. A Moderate Approach
Having concluded that the moderate approach is, on balance, preferable to
either of the extremes, it remains to define moderate. Moderate does not, in
my view, mean that the extremely vague neglect statutes that characterize
traditional child welfare law are appropriate: under these standards, inter-
vention has occurred in some cases in which it is unwarranted. Moreover,
both family law principles and the feasibility constraint require that the stan-
dards be as precise as possible: parents must receive adequate notice of the
circumstances that may lead to intervention, and agency discretion must be
circumscribed. But neither should neglect jurisdiction be rigidly confined.
Unlike the advocates of extremely narrow intervention standards, for exam-
ple, I believe that intervention is warranted in each of the cases described
earlier.257 The comparative risks of intervention versus nonintervention, the
256. See Wald, supra note 84, at 666 (describing variety of outrageous cases in whicb Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit standards would preclude intervention).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
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relatively minor interference with family autonomy occasioned by services in
the home, and the improvement of some families from state intervention all
suggest this result. The moderate approach thus requires that standards gov-
erning intervention be broad enough to encompass the more serious cases
traditionally subject to neglect jurisdiction-apparently the bulk of the
caseload-while providing sufficient definitional clarity to ensure that less
serious neglect cases do not lead to state intervention.
A high level of definitional clarity is not, however, easy to achieve, particu-
larly given the wide range of fact patterns encompassed by neglect. In some
circumstances, of course, the need for intervention can be determined from
relatively objective criteria. Symptoms in the child evidencing serious harm
are the most obvious objective test. Medical personnel can diagnose malnu-
trition and major developmental delays, for example, on the basis of physical
evidence, and even emotional damage is sometimes accompanied by clear
symptomology. Standards drafted under the auspices of the American Bar
Association thus provide that jurisdiction over neglect that does not create a
risk of serious physical injury should extend-but should also be limited-to
cases in which "a child is suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by
severe anxiety, depression, or withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior
toward self or others, and the child's parents are not willing to provide treat-
ment for him/her. ' 258
While this emphasis on symptomology is well placed, exclusive reliance on
the short number of symptoms listed would preclude intervention in many
cases in which the evidence suggests that it is appropriate. In infants these
particular symptoms may be impossible to detect, while other symptoms,
such as feeding and sleep disturbances or developmental delay, will be more
appropriate and more easily measurable indicators of harm. 25 9 Even for
older children, other symptoms-serious school problems, major problems in
cognitive development, poor results on psychological tests, for example-
may be more reliable indicators of harm than vaguely defined states such as
depression or withdrawal.
Requiring symptomological evidence in every case also prevents interven-
tion before serious damage has been done, even in instances where eventual
harm is virtually guaranteed. An infant living alone with an acutely
258. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 67-68.
259. Because infants cannot be tested through play, games, or verbal assessment, psychologists
typically rely on symptoms of emotional disturbance such as interaction with parents and distur-
bances in feeding, sleep, and activity to determine the existence of emotional problems in infants.
Marcus, Examination of the Infant and Toddler, in BASIC HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 509,
527-28 (J. Noshpitz ed. 1979). Standardized developmental tests such as the Bayley Scales of Infant
Development, N. BAYLEY, BAYLEY SCALES OF INFANT DEVELOPMENT: MANUAL (1969), are also
widely used in assessing infants and toddlers. None of these measurements are included in the list
developed under the auspices of the ABA.
1798 [Vol. 75:1745
CHILD WELFARE DECISIONMAKING
psychotic parent, for example, is in danger of serious harm. To incorporate
such cases into a definition of neglect, one could provide for intervention
based on parental conditions, such as serious mental illness, retardation, al-
coholism, or addiction, that render the parent incapable of providing child
care. But this approach is on balance inadequate. Some parents who are
retarded, mentally ill, or addicted and incapable of providing adequate care
themselves live in a stable situation-for example with a grandparent or
other relative-that does provide the child with adequate care.260 In these
circumstances, the child is not endangered and intervention is therefore inap-
propriate. Moreover, many parents who fail to provide adequate care are not
victims of an overt mental illness or addiction, and their children may not
show clear symptoms until a lengthy period of inadequate care has passed.
In view of the varied circumstances that can evidence a serious risk to a
child's well-being, and the concomitant difficulty of formulating a precise
definition of the circumstances in which intervention is appropriate, I believe
that a somewhat open-ended definition of neglect, which relies on a broad
array of symptoms and measurements, is warranted.261 If the risks of inter-
vention were greater, or if neglect findings were more frequently made on the
basis of frivolous evidence, a narrower, less discretionary standard would be
appropriate. But on the basis of the current evidence, the needs of children
are better served by a model that recognizes the infinite variability of family
life.
This conclusion is reinforced by the availability of other devices to reduce
the risks of unstructured agency and judicial discretion. For example, de-
scriptive definitions can contain precatory examples to demonstrate the type
of circumstances in which a neglect finding is appropriate. 262 More detailed
judicial findings, specifying the type of harm and supporting evidence on
which the decision is based, can also be required. Stricter evidentiary require-
ments can be imposed: expert testimony on the child's current functioning
can be mandated, and standardized measurements of family functioning
263
260. Focusing on parental symptomology also creates the danger that judges will assume inade-
quate care from a parental condition without carefully considering the child's condition. This dan-
ger is exacerbated by the fact that traditional neglect statutes typically focus on parental behavior
without requiring that it endanger the child.
261. For a similar approach, see NAC STANDARDS, supra note 56, at 254-56 (urisdiction over
neglect should include "[j]uveniles whose emotional health is seriously impaired and whose parents
... fail to provide or cooperate with treatment"; child psychology not advanced enough to provide
definitions of emotional abuse and neglect); Areen, supra note 2, at 933 ("A 'neglected' child is one
whose physical or emotional health is significantly impaired, or is in danger of being significantly
impaired, as a result of the action or inaction of his parent, guardian, or primary caretaker....
Until the experts in child behavior reach greater consensus . . . a general phrase is most
appropriate.").
262. Cf N.Y. FAM. Cr. AcT § 1012 (McKinney 1983).
263. See, eg., L. GEISMAR, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY FUNCTIONING (1971) (describing Family
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can be required to supplement impressionistic evidence.
Given the availability of procedural mechanisms to structure decisionmak-
ing, and the need for a broader and more flexible definition of neglect, I be-
lieve that "parental failure to provide minimally adequate child care which
has caused serious emotional, mental, or physical harm, or which creates a
substantial and imminent probability of serious emotional, mental or physi-
cal harm to the child," is an appropriate neglect standard if coupled with
examples of serious harm264 and lack of minimally adequate care2 65 and ac-
companied by strict evidentiary requirements like those outlined above.
One caveat to this definition is also in order: a child whose house has
burned down may be in imminent danger of serious harm, but we would not
deem it appropriate for the state to intervene unless the parent undertook no
steps to obtain other shelter. Therefore the standards should also provide
that intervention is impermissible if the parent is willing to provide or obtain
adequate treatment, or if the parent's failure to provide adequate treatment
has been occasioned solely by financial inability to do so. 2 6 6
3. After a Finding of Neglect: Services in the Home or Removal
Choosing between services in the home and removal is, unfortunately, no
easier then determining appropriate standards for intervention. At first
glance, this would appear to be an easier issue: services in the home entail no
apparent risk, some potential benefits, and minimal intrusions upon parental
authority. Moreover, in-home treatment also offers improved therapeutic
opportunities. With child and parent apart, problems in their relationship
are harder to treat. The family may also reorganize in ways that make the
Functioning Scale); R. Moos & B. Moos, FAMILY ENVIRONMENT SCALE MANUAL (1981); Curtis,
Rosman & Pappenfont, Developing an Instrument for Measuring Psychosocial Assessment in Clinical
Child Welfare, 64 CHILD WELFARE 309 (1985) (describing development of research instrument
that can be used to quantify caseworker's assessment of child and family functioning); Polansky,
Assessing Adequacy of Child Care: An Urban Scale, 57 CHILD WELFARE 439 (1978) (describing
Childhood Level of Living Scale).
264. Examples include conditions such as malnutrition, major developmental delays, self-de-
structive or aggressive behavior, truancy, or other serious defects in school achievement.
265. Specific examples of minimally adequate care are hard to provide, because a situation that
falls below the minimum will typically include deficits in several areas of care. The statutory stan-
dard should make this clear. For example, the standard could specify that less than minimally
adequate child care typically combines deficiencies in the following areas: physical care, including
irregular or insufficient feeding and hygiene, or the failure to obtain needed medical treatment;
supervision, including leaving a young child unattended for lengthy periods; discipline, including
repeated excessive corporal punishment or unreasonably cruel punishment; stimulation and atten-
tion; concern and emotional warmth; and other inappropriate or uncontrolled parental behavior.
266. This is consistent with the approach taken by other minimum intervention standards. ABA




child's reentry more difficult. 267 As an apparent result of these factors, one
study recently found that ninety-seven percent of children who stayed in
their own homes while the family was treated remained there, while only
sixty-eight percent of children who had been placed and then returned were
able to remain. 268 These various advantages suggest that intervention in the
home should presumptively be preferred to placement, and most minimum
intervention theorists have argued for this approach. There are, however,
significant, countervailing factors. As we have seen, intervention in the home
seldom works. While this fact alone would not weigh that heavily if the
children could be adequately protected from further abuse and neglect while
rehabilitative efforts were underway, the inadequacies of child welfare prac-
tice suggest that such protection will not always be available.
Two recent and very thorough research efforts make it clear that these
potential disadvantages of in-home intervention are indeed significant
problems. One researcher evaluated the impact of a special demonstration
project in New York City designed to reduce the use of foster care by giving
families at high risk of placement intensive casework and other services in
the home.269 Outcomes in these families were compared to a control group
that had received typical agency services. Almost half of the control group
and a third of the experimental group receiving intensive services were ulti-
mately placed in foster care.270 Moreover, in approximately one-quarter of
the families in both groups, substantiated child maltreatment reports were
made.271 The other researchers evaluated a special demonstration project in
California that provided intensive services in the home to children who
would otherwise have been placed in foster care.272 They reported even more
sobering conclusions. Although only twenty percent of the children who ini-
tially remained at home were placed during the two years of the study,273
approximately two-thirds were subject to continuing neglect or to physical or
sexual abuse.274 Moreover, while the data did not permit firm conclusions, it
appeared that a control group composed of children who were placed in fos-
ter care fared slightly better in terms of self-esteem, school and peer satisfac-
tion, and adult-child conflict than their counterparts who remained at
home.275
267. Heying, Family Based, In-Home Services for the Severely Disturbed Child, 64 CHILD WEL-
FARE 519, 526 (1985).
268. Id.
269. M. JONES, supra note 96.
270. Id. at 86.
271. Id. at 95.
272. PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 96.
273. Id. at 88.
274. Id. at 88-89.
275. Id. at 125, 157-58.
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Because of these disadvantages of in-home intervention, I find it difficult to
agree with other minimum intervention theorists who urge that in-home
services should presumptively be preferred to placement. 276 However, the
evidence is not sufficient to establish a presumption in favor of foster care
either. The California study did not find unequivocal evidence that foster
care resulted in better emotional and behavioral development than remaining
at home, 277 nor did foster care result in major gains for the children who
experienced it. In most areas of functioning, foster case produced only mar-
ginal improvements over the two years of the study.278 Moreover, the Cali-
fornia study evaluated only a small group of children in a relatively narrow
age range.279 Further research is thus necessary before firm conclusions can
be drawn. Finally, unless foster care becomes permanent placement, there is
no evidence that gains the child has made while in care will be retained when
the child is returned home.
The lack of conclusive evidence suggests that the choice between foster
care and in-home services should be made without a presumption in favor of
either approach. Instead, the decision should be based on a careful balancing
of the long-term risks of continued care in the home against the trauma and
long-term risks inherent in removal. In striking this balance, a judge should
consider the severity of the harm risked by leaving the child in the home, the
parents' apparent capacity for change, the type and level of services and sur-
veillance available, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of place-
ment.280 This determination will frequently be extremely difficult. The
evidence will often be lacking on many issues, and sometimes the balance will
be quite equivocal; in such a case, the family autonomy tradition requires
that the child be left at home. But a more structured method of decision-
making is simply not justifiable on the basis of the current evidence.
C. AFTER INTERVENTION
The intervention decision is only the first phase in the relationship between
the family and child welfare system. A treatment plan for the child and
276. E.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 129; GFS II, supra note 2, at 15-29; NAC STAN-
DARDS, supra note 56 at 360-61; Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 681-84.
277. PROTECTING CHILDREN, supra note 96, at 157-58. At the initial evaluation a few weeks
after placement the foster children were much better off on several measurements than their coun-
terparts who remained at home. The researchers could not determine whether the difference re-
sulted from foster placement or other factors. Id. at 70-71. A small group of black children in the
study exhibited no improvement in foster care. Id. at 161.
278. Id. at 157-58, 161.
279. Sixty-five children between the ages of 5 and ten were evaluated. Id. at 3.
280. If a relative or family friend is available, for example, the trauma of removal and the risks of
instability may be diminished substantially. On the other hand, a child with serious behavioral
problems is at great risk of multiple, or even institutional, placement. For him, the risks of foster
care are enhanced. Or an older child might vehemently want--or reject-the idea of placement.
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family must be developed and implemented, and the rights and future rela-
tionships among the parent, child, and agency must be determined. If place-
ment has been ordered, an appropriate foster home for the child must also be
found. Traditionally, these tasks were the sole province of child welfare au-
thorities; after determining whether neglect had been established and order-
ing a disposition, a court retained no further involvement in the case. But
the notable failure of agencies to provide careful, individualized planning and
treatment requires greater judicial scrutiny of agency decisionmaking and
implementation efforts.281
Minimal intervention advocates have typically proposed periodic judicial
review of child welfare cases in order to ensure agency accountability.
2 82
Standards drafted under the auspices of the American Bar Association go
further and require, during the dispositional phase of the neglect proceeding,
judicial supervision of a case plan specifying where the child will be placed,
the steps that will be undertaken to return the child home, and the actions
that will be undertaken to maintain parent-child ties. 28 3 This additional form
of judicial involvement appears to be warranted, in light of consistent reports
of agency failure to plan and implement treatment programs carefully. In
performing these supervisory and review functions, courts should, of course,
attempt to maximize the chances of successful intervention. While the avail-
able data do not provide definitive evidence on how to achieve such success,
the data do suggest some basic guidelines.
The treatment plan should, first of all, be formulated in consultation with
the parent and, depending on age and maturity, the child. Social work litera-
ture frequently asserts, for example, that active involvement and participa-
tion by clients in formulating treatment plans is helpful in achieving
change.284 This process is thought to foster motivation and self-confidence as
well as to create a less punitive atmosphere.28 5 Although there appears to be
no empirical research substantiating these claims, there is evidence that pa-
rental willingness to participate in the treatment planning process is a good
281. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text (discussing failures of child welfare agencies).
282. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing various proposals). No state provided
for review of foster care placements until 1971. T. FESTINGER, supra note 47, at 211.
283. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 138.
284. See, eg., D. KLINE & H. OVERSTREET, FOSTER CARE OF CHILDREN: NURTURE &
TREATMENT 167-76 (1972) (describing importance and development of working alliance with par-
ent); Sinanoglu, Working with Parents: Selected Issues and Trends as Reflected in the Literature, in
THE CHALLENGE OF PARTNERSHIP: WORKING WITH PARENTS OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 3,
13-15 (1981) (describing characteristics of successful techniques for involving parents).
285. See D. KLINE & H. OVERSTREET, supra note 284, at 172-73 (absence of efforts to engage
parent in treatment scheme often leads to lack of self-esteem, shame, guilt, regressions, and frustra-
tion of parental desire to maintain contact with child); Blumenthal, Involving Parents: A Rationale,
in ESTABLISHING PARENT INVOLVEMENT IN FOSTER CARE AGENCIES 1-12 .(1984) (when parents
not involved children more likely to remain in foster care for prolonged periods).
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predictor of case outcome.286 Moreover, the involvement of parent and child
offers both the opportunity to ask questions and provide information that
may be useful in the planning process. The family autonomy tradition also
supports this approach. Courts have not considered parental failure to pro-
tect the child from serious harm of one type to be a sufficient ground for
divesting the parent of authority on other issues. A parent's failure to pro-
vide adequate medical care, for example, has not been considered an ade-
quate ground for divesting him of authority over the child's education,
discipline, or upbringing.287 This tradition also suggests that older children
should have a voice in the planning process. If older children are routinely
given a voice in decisions regarding their caretaker after divorce or in the
context of adoption,288 there is no reason to ignore their wishes here.
Treatment plans should also specify concrete tasks to be accomplished by
the parent and services to be provided by the agency within a given time
frame. In one study, workers used contracts with parents in order to clarify
precisely what parents had to do in order to regain their child and what the
agency would do to assist them.289 The contracts detailed what was expected
on a daily or weekly basis and set out assessment points. Not only was the
reaction of the parents who signed the contracts overwhelmingly positive,290
but the experimental workers who used the contracts were also considerably
more successful than regular workers in averting long-term placement. 291
Moreover, the clearly specified goals and timetables facilitated case manage-
ment, transfer, and judicial review.292
For children who are placed, the plan should also maximize parent-child
contact. Researchers have reported that parents are more likely to regain
their children when they visit regularly.293 Parental contact also appears to
286. See Stein, Gambrill & Wiltse, Contracts and Outcome in Foster Care, 22 Soc. WORK 148
(1977) (in 70% of cases where families signed restoration agreements children returned to parents;
only 16% returned where agreements not signed).
287. See supra note 110 (cases where parental treatment choice is overridden, but state intervenes
in no other respect).
288. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text (older child's wishes considered in custody
and adoption cases).
289. See Stein & Gambrill, Facilitating Decision Making in Foster Care: The Alameda Project, 51
Soc. SERV. REV. 502 (1977) (describing project); Stein, Gambrill & Wiltse, supra note 286, at 156
(same); see also T. STEIN, E. GAMBRILL & K. WILTSE, supra note 218, at 43-54 (describing similar
techniques); Simmons, Gumpert & Rothman, Natural Parents as Partners in Child Placement, 54
Soc. CASEWORK 224 (1973) (same); Rooney, A Task-Centered Reunification Model for Foster Care,
in THE CHALLENGE OF PARTNERSHIP: WORKING WITH PARENTS OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER
CARE, supra note 284, at 135, 137-38, 141 (same).
290. Stein & Gambrill, supra note 289, at 507.
291. Seventy-eight percent of the experimental cases were closed or in the process of being closed
at the end of two years, whereas only 40% of the control group cases were closed. Id. at 505.
292. E. GAMBRILL & T. STEIN, SUPERVISION IN CHILD WELFARE: A TRAINING MANUAL 16-
17 (1978).
293. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 98-104, 486-90; Mech, Parental Visiting and
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be an important factor in helping the child cope with separation. Over the
years an impressive body of data has established that children in foster care
who are visited by their natural parents exhibit higher levels of well-being on
a variety of measures than children who do not.294
Finally, placement plans should foster continuity and quality of care for
the child. Researchers have found that the presence of a sibling and the
provision of care by a familiar parent substitute that creates, to the maximum
extent, a situation like that in the child's home helps to reduce the trauma of
separation. 295 Placement in a home with an intellectually stimulating envi-
ronment has also been linked with positive behavioral changes, 296 and a sig-
nificant relation between the emotional climate of the foster home and the
adequacy of adult functioning has been reported. 297 These are not surprising
findings in view of research that suggests that the quality of care over time is
the best predictor for long-range development. 298
The feasibility criterion requires us to predict, however, that, even with
judicial involvement at the dispositional stage, these guidelines will be ex-
tremely difficult to effectuate. Maximized parental involvement and visita-
tion, concrete and goal-oriented planning, and sound placement management
are quite contrary to past agency practice;299 they are not, however, novel
Foster Care, 64 CHILD WELFARE 67, 69-70 (1985); Milner, An Ecological Perspective on Duration of
Foster Care, 66 CHILD WELFARE 113, 116-17 (1987). Contra D. FANSHEL supra note 33, at 97.
294. See, e.g., D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 486-90; E. WEINSTEIN, supra note 155,
at 64-67; cf Bergman, The Influence of Family Visiting Upon Boys' Behavior in a Juvenile Correc-
tional Institution, 64 CHILD WELFARE 629 (1985) (describing similar beneficial effects for institu-
tionalized children). See generally Garrison, supra note 16, at 461-67 (surveying research on
visitation and its impact on children in foster care).
Recent research on adults who were foster children has produced contradictory findings on the
long-term impact of visitation. Compare R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 91 (of subjects who
had been in long-term placement, those visited were more frequently represented in adequately
functioning group; of total group frequent parental visiting associated with low adult functioning
but "these were the youngsters who for the most part were returned to the custody of the natural
parents, and it is that fact rather than the visiting itself that is thought to be truly associated with
outcome") with T. FESTINGER, supra note 171, at 95-96 (among those discharged from foster homes
contact with kin generally had no impact on "their view of themselves and their lives" at time of
interview; only among those from group care was contact with kin associated with "more positive
appraisal of themselves and their lives").
295. See Robertson & Robertson, Young Children in Brief Separation: A Fresh Look, 26 PsY-
CHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 264 (1971) (preseparation introductions to foster parents,
familiar toys and possessions, family visits, familiar methods of care, and talking to child about
absent parent reduced disturbance caused by separation of several weeks to manageable levels and
permitted positive development to continue); D. KLINE & H. OVERSTREET, supra note 284, at 87-
150 (urging preplacement visits, continuity of child care routines, and supportive care during initial
stages of foster placement).
296. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 364-65.
297. R. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 160, at 33.
298. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text (discussing evidence).
299. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (discussing agency failures).
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suggestions. Child welfare experts have urged changes of this sort for years,
although few improvements have been noted. Nor is there reason to expect
significant improvements in the future. While case review mechanisms can
help somewhat in ensuring agency accountability, 300 some states have pro-
vided for review for years, but still have massive case management problems.
Moreover, commentators have found that automatic periodic reviews tend to
become quite perfunctory. 301 A court can, of course, refuse to approve a
placement until it has received adequate assurances that an appropriate home
has been found. It can also provide some additional safeguards-for exam-
ple, in an appropriate case, ordering the agency to accord the parent a right
to consultation on decisions regarding the child's care, or even to joint cus-
tody with the agency. But it cannot effect drastic improvements in agency
practice, and thus, when push comes to shove, it cannot ensure that agencies
continue to act in accordance with its orders after the dispositional phase has
passed.
This judicial inability to improve agency practice is, of course, a serious
problem, because what happens after judicial disposition determines whether
intervention succeeds or fails. More workers, fewer cases, better training and
supervision, and much more are undoubtedly needed in addition to an en-
hanced judicial role in order to ensure that change really occurs. But these
additional resources are not likely to materialize and there are no other
methods available for ensuring improvement. In this most important area of
child welfare practice, a realistic least drastic alternative thus appears to be
an unattainable mirage.
Because of the difficulties in changing agency practice, and the magnitude
of the problems among many child welfare clients, it must be anticipated that
the proposed treatment plan will simply fail in many cases. Children whose
parents are given a chance at rehabilitation in the home will, we can expect,
very frequently go into placement. Massive parental problems-or simple
lack of parental motivation-will prove too much for the limited capabilities
and resources of child welfare personnel. Similarly, many parents of children
300. In New York City, foster parents may request an administrative hearing prior to removal of
a foster child from their home to another foster home. In approximately 45% of cases in which
hearings are held, the agency decision is reversed. Chambers & Wald, Smith v. OFFER, in IN THE
INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM AND PUBLIC POLICY 115 (R. Mnookin ed.
1985). Only 20 to 30 foster parents a year take advantage of this hearing opportunity. Id. Reversal
rates in public assistance administrative hearings are similar. See Note, Procedural Due Process and
the Welfare Recipient: A Statistical Study of AFDC Fair Hearings in Wisconsin, 1978 WIs. L. REv.
145, 198 (estimates from 23% to 65% in various Wisconsin counties).
301. See Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Function in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 234 (1975) (usually neither parent nor social worker present at
hearing); Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 683 ("[I]n most cases neither the parent nor the social
worker was present and the hearing lasted only seconds. Even when parents were present, the
hearings averaged less than five minutes.").
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in placement can be expected to fail in making needed improvements; agen-
cies will fail to provide needed services and fail to keep parents involved in
their children's lives. But despite these massive, systemic problems, the court
must eventually confront the next difficult decision-whether to terminate
the parent's right to regain custody and permit the child's adoption into a
new family. This decision must be made, moreover, not just for children
who have been coercively placed, but also for those who were voluntarily
placed. Thus, before looking at termination, we first turn to the voluntary
sector of the child welfare system.
D. VOLUNTARY CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
1. Who Seeks Child Welfare Services and Why
We have seen that the least drastic alternative is an elusive and likely unat-
tainable goal in coercive child welfare efforts. But what is the least drastic
alternative when a parent seeks child care help or foster placement? The
question is an important one because court-imposed services-and even
placements-amount to no more than a fraction of the total services pro-
vided by child welfare agencies. Probably more parents seek help from the
child welfare system than are coerced into accepting it.3o2 Services in the
home typically are requested when parents feel that they cannot manage on
their own, while requests for placement occur for more varied reasons. Some-
times the parent cannot obtain the help- housing, daycare, a homemaker-
necessary to continue caring for the child at home. Sometimes the parent
cannot cope with the child's disability or behavior problem. 30 3 Sometimes
the parent decides, for reasons good or bad, that he is unwilling or unable to
care for the child at present. 3°4 And sometimes the request for placement
represents a plea bargain of sorts, in which the parent agrees to placement
rather than contest an imminent abuse or neglect action.30 5
Because foster care agencies do not keep good records, it is difficult to
302. See supra note 6 (discussing percentage estimates).
303. See A. GRUBER, supra note 6, at 15 (7% of surveyed placements due to child's behavior); S.
JENKINS & M. SAUBER, supra note 6, at 62-66 (8% of placements due to child's personality or
emotional problems). More recent surveys tend to indicate that a higher percentage of cases result
from certain child-related problems. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 5 (33% of foster
children in California and 16% in New York City placed because of child-related problems such as
behavior or disability); A. KADUSHIN, supra note 7, at 322-23 (15-20% of placements caused by
child-related problems); T. LASH & H. SIGAL, STATE OF THE CHILD 176 (1976) (39.3% of New
York City children placed for child-related reasons).
304. See D. FANSHEL AND E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 47 (21.6% of voluntary placements
caused by parent unwillingness to assume or continue care). This category includes a wide range of
situations. Cf Duchesne v. Sugerman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (parent placed child during
hospitalization); In re William S., 120 Misc. 2d 790, 466 N.Y.2d 914 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (parent placed
child in foster care in order to punish him).
305. Levine, supra note 6, at 23.
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estimate the proportion of placements which fall into these categories, 30 6 and
more than one reason is often present. But available information suggests
that many voluntary placements do not involve parents who are pleading
guilty and soon would be coerced into accepting help from the state.30 7 Sub-
stantial numbers simply involve parents who have recognized problems and
have thus sought state aid. Sometimes, of course, these parents are not en-
tirely sympathetic figures. Reconsider the case of Ritchie Adams:
Ritchie Adams, six years old, was brought to Juvenile Hall by a baby sitter.
The child's mother told the baby sitter to take him there because she had
no way of caring for him.
When contacted by the Probation Officer... [Mrs. Adams] said she was
unable to care for Ritchie. [She requested that he be placed in foster care.]
She told of her own unhappy childhood with quarrelsome parents, a sharp
sibling rivalry with preference given to boys in the family, and an early and
unhappy marriage following a pregnancy with Ritchie. She described
Ritchie as subject to temper tantrums beyond her control, hateful like his
father, and hyperactive.... She talked of her wish to marry again, and was
very much involved with a new male friend. She reported that there had
been no recent contact with Mr. Adams and she did not know where he
was living. Mrs. Adams explained that Ritchie's sister ... lived with her.
An older brother ... was in a mental hygiene foster home .... 308
Should Ritchie be accepted into foster care? If so, on what terms?
2. The Minimum Intervention Perspective
In looking at this case, and at the voluntary sector generally, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the minimum intervention philosophy supports
state child protection efforts only when intervention is necessary to protect
the child from harm. If parents who volunteer for services are not found to
pose any threat to their children, there is no basis, under the minimal inter-
vention view, to support state interference with the parent's decision to ob-
306. Additionally, classification procedures are neither uniform nor reliable. Even foster care
studies conducted by professional researchers employ a wide range of classification schemes. See,
e.g., A. Gruber, supra note 10, at 15; S. JENKINS & M. SAUBER, supra note 6, at 47. Some fail to
distinguish between voluntary and court-ordered placements. See, e.g., E. SHERMAN, R. NEUMAN
& A. SHYNE, supra note 247, at 26. Moreover, many children enter foster care for multiple reasons.
One of the most reliable studies to date reports the following breakdown of voluntary placements:
mental illness of childcaring person (25.1%), child behavior (11.9%), physical illness of childcaring
person (12.8%), abandonment or desertion (12.3%), parent unwilling to assume (10.9%) or con-
tinue (10.7%) care (21.6%), family problem (9.5%), abuse or neglect (4.3%). D. FANSHEL & E.
SHINN, supra note 21, at 47.
307. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 47 (abuse or neglect reason for only 4.3% of
voluntary placements). This figure, however, almost certainly underestimates the level of neglect.
For example, a fairly high proportion (25.1%) of the placements were caused by mental illness of
the person caring for child, id., which is a situation often leading to neglect.
308. R. MNOOKIN, supra note 85, at 512-13.
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tain child welfare services unless the very receipt of the services threatens the
child with harm. As noted previously, the services offered by the child wel-
fare system generally do not pose sufficient risks to warrant interference on
this basis.309 In Ritchie's case, the minimum intervention perspective thus
suggests that, unless investigation reveals evidence of Ritchie's abuse or ne-
glect by Mrs. Adams, she should be permitted to place him in foster care,
and to retain her right to regain custody.310
This model is, of course, essentially identical to the model that has pre-
vailed when parents seek child care help outside the child welfare system.
Parents with the resources to obtain help without state aid have been permit-
ted to choose the type of care their child receives without qualification.
When a parent privately places his child in a boarding school, or with a
friend or relative, no state agency interferes. These parents lose no legal
rights, they may continue to direct the child's care and upbringing, and, ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances, they may also regain physical custody
of the child upon demand.
This model also stands, however, in marked contrast to the traditions of
the child welfare system, which has treated parents who request help just like
those parents the courts have found incapable of functioning without it. As
we have seen, parents who request help were traditionally given no choice as
to the type of services they would receive; placement was, in fact, often the
only service made available. Following placement, these parents-like those
who had been found neglectful by a court-lost legal custody of their child
and thus retained no right to be consulted on decisions about the child's care
or, frequently, to get the child back without agency approval.
311
Surprisingly, minimum intervention advocates have not urged that the vol-
untary sector be governed by the minimum intervention philosophy.
Although standards proposed under the auspices of the American Bar Asso-
ciation urge,312 and some states have adopted, 313 laws that permit parents to
reclaim their children more easily, parental control over choice of services
and parental retention of custody and decisionmaking authority have no-
where been proposed or adopted. Indeed, the minimum intervention move-
ment has largely ignored the voluntary sector of the child welfare system
309. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
310. Given the greater risks of institutional care and multiple placements, minimum intervention
could support restrictions on a parent's ability to unilaterally subject his child to these conditions.
See infra notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (describing child welfare agency practices).
312. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 188-89.
313. For example, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-a(2)(a) (McKinney 1983), specifies that a place-
ment agreement may provide for return of a child on a particular date or upon occurrence of an
identifiable event. If the agreement fails to specify a return date, the agency must return the child
within 20 days of the parental request, unless the agency obtains a court order.
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altogether. Most commentators fail to mention the voluntary sector,314 and
recent changes in federal law, motivated by the minimum intervention phi-
losophy, similarly sweep most of the issues under the rug. The legislation
actually goes so far as to deny federal funding to nonjudicial placements, 31 5
thus encouraging states to convert what are in reality voluntary placements
into court-ordered placements by virtue of pro forma judicial review.316
3. Another Source of Limitations on Parental Authority:
Public Assistance Goals
One reason that recipients of voluntary child welfare benefits have been so
poorly differentiated from those who are coerced is that they come from the
same socio-economic group. Most are welfare recipients and almost all are
poor. The reasons for this pattern are not hard to fathom. When families
with resources suffer a crisis, they acquire the help they need-a babysitter,
daycare, psychotherapy, temporary placement with a relative or in a board-
ing school-by themselves. But for those families that lack social and eco-
nomic resources, the state is likely to be the only resort. Just like its ancestor
agency that administered the poor laws, the voluntary sector of the child
welfare system thus serves many of the functions of a public assistance
agency.
Therefore, while child protection rationales provide no basis for limiting
the rights of parents like Mrs. Adams, public assistance rationales do provide
such limits. Indeed, the state has no obligation to provide families with any
type of childcare assistance. Its child protection authority serves to justify,
but not to require, state action. In other words, the state could, if it chose,
provide no child welfare services at all.
Moreover, under current constitutional standards, if the state chooses to
provide child welfare benefits, it is probably not obligated to do so in a way
that comports with the minimum intervention philosophy. Under the Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court has held that the state may allocate public
assistance benefits in any way that is minimally rational, even if such alloca-
tion has some impact on the exercise of constitutionally protected parental
314. The ABA standards are the one major exception, but even these standards devote little
attention to voluntary sector issues. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 183-95.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 608 note (1982) (discussing effective and termination dates of 1980 amend-
ment). Funding of voluntary placements had been provided from Sept. 30, 1979, to Oct. 1, 1984.
316. R. HUBBELL, supra note 50, at 147-48. The federal child welfare legislation markedly con-
trasts with federal legislation for children with special educational needs, which grants parents a
voice in decisions regarding their children's schooling. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, 94-142
AND 504: NUMBERS THAT ADD Up TO EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR




rights. Thus, in Dandridge v. Williams,317 the Court held that a state could
specify maximum welfare payments regardless of family size, despite the im-
pact of the restriction on the plaintiff's rights of family integrity.318 Simi-
larly, in Maher v. Roe319 and Harris v. McRae,320 the Court upheld state and
federal statutes that provided indigent women with free childbirth treatment
but no abortion services, despite the fact that a woman's right to choose
whether to bear a child is constitutionally protected. 321
Whether the Constitution requires some deference to the rights of a parent
who seeks state aid is unclear. In Parham v. JR.,322 the Supreme Court held
that the rights of a parent who wished to place his child in a public mental
hospital could be subordinated to "the child's substantial liberty interest in
being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment 323 and the state's "sig-
nificant interest in confining the use of its mental health facilities to cases of
genuine need. ' ' 324 The Court did stress, however, that the parent should play
"a substantial, if not the dominant role" in the placement decision.325
Lower federal courts have not agreed on how to harmonize Parham with
the Dandridge line of cases. In Joyner v. Dumpson,326 one federal court of
appeals recently relied on Dandridge, Maher, and Harris to dismiss a chal-
lenge to a New York statute requiring parents to relinquish legal custody of
their children as a condition of their voluntary admission into state foster
care institutions. 327 Although a district court had sustained the challenge,
finding that the impact of the challenged statute on the plaintiffs' constitu-
tionally protected rights of family privacy and integrity was significant,328
and that the state had failed to show any legitimate fiscal or administrative
justification for its infringement of the parents' constitutional rights, 329 the
Second Circuit reversed. Characterizing the plaintiffs as parents who "want
their children to enjoy the benefits of a voluntary state subsidized program
while they retain the right to dictate how the service should be adminis-
317. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
318. Id. at 474-75, 486. The Court thus rejected the plaintiff's contention that this restriction
violated the equal protection clauses.
319. 432 U.S. 464, 470, 474 (1977).
320. 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980).
321. See Black v. Beame, 550 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1977) ("long line of precedents indicating
that the state may not unreasonably interfere with ... the freedom to conceive and raise one's
children as one wishes").
322. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
323. Id. at 600.
324. Id. at 605.
325. Id. at 604.
326. 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983).
327. Id.
328. Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233, 240, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
329. Id.
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tered, ' ' 330 the court held that "[t]he severing of ties cannot be attributed to
the state's administration of the program, but to the parents' placement of
the child in the program. ' '331
Another federal court of appeals recently relied on Parham in reversing a
district court decision directing the transfer of a voluntarily committed, pro-
foundly retarded child from a state hospital to a community home arrange-
ment over his parents opposition. 332 Although the hearing master's finding
that community living would be "more beneficial" to the child was not
clearly erroneous, 333 the parents' opposition to the move, the court held, had
not been given sufficient consideration. Citing Parham, the court declared
that, as the evidence did not support a significant countervailing governmen-
tal interest, the parents' wishes should have been given the dominant role in
the transfer decision.334
While it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will ultimately adopt the
Parham-Pennhurst or the Dandridge-Joyner approach to the rights of parents
who seek child welfare services, under either approach the state's interest in
conserving scarce resources may be used to justify some limitations on paren-
tal rights. Some limitations of this kind are also appropriate. The state does
have legitimate fiscal and administrative concerns that must be addressed in
designing a voluntary child welfare services program. If, for example, a par-
ent chose to enroll his child in an expensive boarding school when home help
would suffice to meet the child's needs, we would not expect the state to pick
up the tab.
But it is important to keep in mind that these concerns do not justify un-
limited restrictions on parental autonomy, and indeed do not justify most
present restrictions on parental rights within the voluntary sector of the child
welfare system; parental rights are now routinely ignored even if the result
would be less costly to the state. Practices such as offering parents placement
when a cheaper service is requested are thus justifiable neither on child pro-
tection nor public assistance grounds. They appear to serve no purpose
whatsoever.
What these practices in fact represent is confusion between public assist-
ance and child protection interests: child welfare agencies have simply not
attempted to differentiate between families in which the child requires pro-
tection from his parent, and those in which the child requires protection
from inadequate resources. To be sure, in many instances, the line is a thin
one. Not only do voluntary service recipients come from the same socio-
330. Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d at 780.
331. Id. at 781.
332. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 708-09, 710 (3d Cir. 1983).
333. Id. at 705-06.
334. Id. at 711.
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economic background as those who are coerced, but they share many of the
same problems. Physical and mental illness, alcoholism and drug addiction,
lack of education, and inadequate social supports are common in both
groups, and many voluntary recipients thus need multiple services. But
under no minimum intervention standard is coercive intervention permissible
when a parent is willing to provide adequate childcare were adequate re-
sources available. Moreover, while the statistical evidence permits only gen-
eral conclusions, it is safe to say that a significant number of parents who
seek state aid could not be coerced into accepting child welfare services even
under traditional neglect standards. Some, like the parents in both Joyner
and Pennhurst, have sought state help simply because their child's physical
or emotional condition cannot be cared for in the home.335 Others temporar-
ily need assistance due to a family illness, death, or crisis.336 To treat these
parents like those adjudicated to be neglectful serves no valid state interest.
4. Separating Child Protection and Public Assistance Goals
Since the child welfare system has not distinguished between its public
assistance and child protection goals, one could argue for separation of the
two functions. A public assistance sector could distribute needed childcare
benefits to parents who request them on the basis of their lack of resources,
while a child protection sector could impose services on the basis of parental
incapacity. Such a bifurcated system is not infeasible in terms of cost or the
capacity of child welfare personnel, and would end the confusion of goals
that now besets the child welfare system.
But this approach also entails risks. These risks derive from a simple fact:
neglected children are popular, but welfare recipients are not.337 Recent his-
tory makes this abundantly clear. At the same time that the federal govern-
ment has instituted new foster care and adoption programs, 338 it has
tightened eligibility requirements for public assistance. 339 Payment rates for
335. See supra notes 303, 306 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
337. Negative images of welfare recipients are held even by actual recipients. In one study, 58%
of the recipients interviewed indicated a belief that more than a quarter of all welfare recipients
remain on welfare longer than necessary. Nearly one-half indicated that more than a quarter
"cheat" welfare authorities. Most of the recipients also termed the other recipients as "they," not
"we." Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 370, 375 (1966).
338. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500.
339. The changes removed an estimated 700,000 children from the AFDC and Medicaid rolls
and reduced benefits to others. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, AMERICAN CHILDREN IN POVERTY
ix, 12-131 (1984). Substantial reductions were also made in childcare and maternal and child health
services. Id. at ix, 17. During the same period child abuse and neglect reports skyrocketed, a phe-
nomenon which some attribute to family tensions exacerbated by the severe cutbacks and concur-
rent high unemployment. Id. at 14-15.
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children in foster care also remain considerably higher than those for chil-
dren who receive welfare benefits in their own homes.3 40 The lack of rigid
eligibility requirements for voluntary child welfare benefits-made possible
because the conditions of receiving such "benefits" are sufficiently onerous to
ensure that no one but the truly needy would care to apply-has disguised
the fact that it is really public assistance that is being distributed and fostered
the impression that the program assists only neglected children. While this
image has undoubtedly contributed to stereotyping all parents who use the
system as neglectful, therefore ensuring acceptance of limitations on their
parental rights, it has also served to increase public and legislative support
for child welfare services. By restructuring the system and clearly labeling
welfare benefits as such, strong incentives are created for instituting rigid
eligibility requirements. The program would also surely forfeit a certain
amount of popular and legislative support. Failure to restructure, however,
encourages the retention of significant restrictions on parental rights as a sub-
stitute for eligibility criteria and ensures the continuing confusion between
public assistance and child protection goals.
There is no totally satisfactory solution to this dilemma without a state
commitment to provide meaningful child care benefits to all citizens. This
approach-analogies include social security and public education-ensures
broad popular support, but would undoubtedly require legislation at the fed-
eral level and is extremely costly.341 Given the lack of any tradition of pub-
licly funded childcare in this country and the current retrenchment in public
funding for welfare benefits, it is simply not a viable option at this time.
What would appear in principle to be the least drastic alternative is simply
not achievable. The retention of public assistance functions by the child wel-
fare system-but with greater differentiation between public assistance and
child protection cases-is thus the best available solution now. Even this will
be extremely difficult to achieve.
5. Standards for Voluntary Child Welfare Services
Standards for voluntary child welfare services must therefore achieve a
delicate balance. They must be sensitive to both the minimum intervention
340. See R. HUBBELL, supra note 50, at 127-29 (describing differences and noting that in one
community, a family of 10 children that would have received $8,196 in AFDC payments at home
cost $18,000 in foster care payments). Such differences have been upheld. Ramos v. Montgomery,
313 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 1003 (1971).
341. Many other industrialized nations do have universal maternal and child health programs
that help identify and treat abused or neglected children without differentiating them and their
families from others. A 1975 study of eight nations reported that only the United States and Can-
ada found it necessary to develop special programs for detecting these children. Kammerman,
Cross National Perspectives on Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILDREN TODAY, May-June 1975, at 34,
1814 [Vol. 75:1745
CHILD WELFARE DECISIONMAKING
philosophy in regard to child protection and the state's interests in regard to
cost control and administrative efficiency.
Acquiring Services. The minimum intervention approach to child pro-
tection supports only very limited restrictions on parental ability to acquire
child welfare services. As in-home services pose no apparent dangers, there
is no child protection rationale to interfere with a parental decision to obtain
any such service whenever desired. The risks posed by short-term placement
outside the home also appear to be minimal, and are well within the scope of
discretion traditionally permitted parents in the private sector. There is thus
no minimum intervention rationale for restricting parental access to short-
term foster care either. For a parent's choice to seek institutional placement
for his child, the appropriate scope of parental discretion is less clearcut.
While parents who place their children privately are, of course, entirely free
to send them off to boarding school, the type of institutions the state provides
pose greater risks.342 Moreover, parental competence to evaluate treatment
options is particularly suspect at the time of any foster care placement, since
such a step usually occurs during a period of family crisis. Given the risks
and possibilities of error, even the minimum intervention approach could ar-
guably support careful scrutiny of parental choice in regard to institutional
care. This approach also finds support in Parham,343 since the Supreme
Court held that the risks of institutionalization in a state hospital for mental
health care were sufficient to mandate "some kind of inquiry, using all avail-
able sources and including an interview with the child, in order to determine
whether the medical standards [for admission] have been met."344
Public assistance goals also support scrutiny of parental decisions to place
a child in institutional care, due to its higher cost than foster family care or
services in the home.345 These goals also mandate more comprehensive lim-
its on parental choice. The state must be able to ensure that children most in
need of services have access to the limited resources available, and that the
service granted is the one that meets the child's needs at least cost; if daycare
will do, private boarding school should not be required. The child welfare
system thus should be able to restrict the availability of its services to those
families that meet established eligibility criteria, as long as services are not
denied to families in which the child is so endangered that services could be
coercively imposed.
342. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussing problems with institutional
settings).
343. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
344. Id. at 606.
345. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 35, at 12-13 (reporting average annual costs in
New York City from 1966-70: residential treatment center, $22,089; other institutions, $12,779;
family care, $7,321).
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But public assistance goals cannot justify the system's traditional practice
of forcing a parent into "volunteering" a child for foster care by virtue of
offering no less intrusive alternatives. As in-home services are typically less
costly than placement, the state cannot assert public assistance goals as a
ground for denying this type of aid. Such a limitation on state authority is
particularly crucial in view of the fact that separation of the child from home
and parents will disrupt the child's family and community ties and may
cause him to suffer some distress and anxiety.346 If this harm can be averted,
the state should not be justified in spending more money than necessary in
order to inflict it. The state thus should be able to scrutinize parental deci-
sions in order to ensure that a less costly alternative would not suffice, but it
should not be able to impose one that is more costly.
Because of the state's justifiable interests in determining that less expensive
alternatives have been fully explored, some type of inquiry is appropriate
before a parent's request is acted on.347 The social work evaluation that child
welfare standards currently require as an antecedent to the provision of serv-
ices is an appropriate format for such an inquiry.34 This evaluation would
typically include interviews with the parents and child, and, where appropri-
ate, the acquisition of further information from schools, relatives, neighbors,
and other social agencies that have been involved with the family.
Such an inquiry would also serve the state's interest in ascertaining
whether there are grounds for coercive intervention. If investigation reveals
such grounds, child protection goals permit greater restrictions on parental
rights. If, for example, the parent does not wish services that are adequate to
resolve the problems that would support intervention, the state would be jus-
tified in imposing them; or, if circumstances would ultimately support re-
moval should in-home services fail, a higher level of agency scrutiny than
that desired by the parent may be necessary. In such a case, a parent should
be informed that his request will be accepted subject to the same limitations
on parental rights that would apply had the case gone to court. Because such
an agreement between parent and agency is tantamount to an admission of
346. See J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss II: SEPARATION 8-11, 34-56 (1973) (describing
experimental separations and comparing juvenile behavior with and without mothers); J. DUNN,
DISTRESS AND COMFORT 73-74 (1977) (discussing response of children to long separation); M.
RuTrER, supra note 142, at 31-54 (describing short-term effects of maternal deprivation).
347. Such an inquiry also prevents parental misuse of the child welfare system. See In re William
S., 120 Misc. 2d 790, 790-91, 466 N.Y.S.2d 914, 914 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (parent placed 10-year-old
child in foster care to punish him); In re Andrew R., 115 Misc. 2d 937, 454 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Fam. Ct.
1982) (parent placed "intelligent, appealing" 13-year-old boy in facility housing delinquents as well
as foster children for more than seven months without review).
348. See generally CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., STANDARDS FOR SERVICE FOR CHIL-
DREN AND FAMILIES IN THEIR OWN HOMES 21-26 (rev. ed. 1984) (suggesting potential standards);
T. STEIN & T. RZEPNICKI, DECISIONMAKING AT CHILD WELFARE INTAKE: A HANDBOOK FOR
PRACTITIONERS (1983) (discussing how to conduct evaluation).
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neglect, prompt judicial review should be required in order to ascertain the
voluntariness of the waiver, and the court should remain involved in the dis-
positional process as outlined above in part IV.c. If circumstances appear to
support state intervention, but there is no dispute between the parent and
agency as to the type of services required and level of agency involvement,
court intervention should not be required. Instead, the parent should be in-
formed that evidence of parental noncooperation might lead to future court
involvement.
Requiring agencies to focus on whether there are grounds for intervention
and judicial coercion serves to ensure "that the state's valid child protection
goals are met, and to differentiate child protection from public assistance
needs. But, once again, these changes in traditional practice will not be easily
achieved. In order to promote agency accountability, legislation should spec-
ify the various services that child welfare authorities are to provide, require
that service denials be made in writing with reasons, and provide for prompt
administrative review.349 Moreover, while review should ordinarily be initi-
ated by parental request, when an institutional placement is made, review
should be automatic; the lack of precise standards, coupled with the low level
of staff training and experience prevalent among child welfare workers, sug-
gests that there is a fairly high risk of error in agency staff decisions about the
type of placement needed by the child.350 This does not mean, however, that
a full-blown preadmission hearing is required. The need for immediate treat-
ment of children who cannot remain at home and the desirability of avoiding
family discord, which might result from requiring parents to provide evi-
dence on the need for special treatment, suggest instead a prompt postadmis-
sion review. 351
These review mechanisms cannot, however, be expected to achieve re-
markable improvements in agency performance. 352 All one can hope is that
they will encourage greater deference to parental rights and more careful
scrutiny of public assistance goals.
After Services Are Granted. When child welfare services are judicially
imposed, the court and the foster care agency determine what services the
parent is to receive and, if placement is ordered, its location and duration.
349. Similar standards apply to federal public assistance programs. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1982
& Supp. III 1985) (Aid to Families With Dependent Children); id. § 1383(c)(1) (Supplemental Se-
curity Income).
350. See B. BERNSTEIN, D. SNIDER & W. MEEZAN, supra note 46, at 13-25 (reporting that
42.8% of surveyed placements inappropriate); see also J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at
39 (reporting high rates of inappropriate institutionalizations).
351. Cf Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 633-36 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (urging that institutionalized juveniles receive traditional due process protection).
352. See supra notes 300-01 (describing review procedures that have not been completely
successful).
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The agency, not the parent, determines what the parent must do to obtain
the child's return, and when services and placement are no longer necessary.
This assumption of the parental role is appropriate if the parents have been
found abusive or neglectful. The minimum intervention philosophy suggests,
however, that when families voluntarily receive services, the parent, not the
state, should bear principal responsibility for deciding when the need for
services has ended and, if the child is in placement, when the child should
come home. The mere fact of requesting services from the state does not
justify intrusions on parental prerogatives beyond those which would be
placed on parents who obtain child care services privately.
Although the family autonomy tradition lends support to this approach, it
also provides some support for restrictions on the right of parents to make
placement decisions for older children. Although parents generally have
broad latitude to determine where their children will live, older children may
not be adopted without their consent and their wishes are often determina-
tive in a custody fight.353 Parent-child conflict-a frequent reason for the
placement of older children-has also been considered a valid ground for
state intervention and coercive placement. 354
Public assistance goals provide an even stronger case for limiting parental
rights in the case of older children and for further restricting parents' rights
generally. Public assistance goals demand that services be terminated as
quickly as possible, and that they be administered so that the child's and
family's needs are met at the lowest possible cost. Public assistance goals
thus require that the state be permitted to impose conditions to ensure that
the child goes home as soon as possible. The state would thus be justified in
consulting an older child about his placement in order to avoid unnecessary
transfers and runaways. 355 The state would also be justified, in all cases, in
requiring periodic case review, and imposing requirements on parents which
would facilitate return, such as visitation and participation in counseling or
other services designed to speed reunion.
But, in most cases, neither child protection nor public assistance goals pro-
vide a basis for denying parents in the voluntary sector the final say in their
353. See supra notes 126-27 (describing current practices).
354. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.125-27 (West 1985) (statutory scheme allowing child, parent,
or child's guardian to petition to have family declared in need of assistance); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.32(A) (1986) (allowing child to petition for alternative residential placement); see also In re
Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d 757, 621 P.2d 108 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of state intervention
based on parent-child conflict).
355. Research suggests that encouraging child participation can enhance placement stability.
See Bush & Gordon, The Case for Involving Children in Child Welfare Decisions, 27 Soc. WORK
309, 310 (1982) (foster children who had visited their current placement, had their views solicited
on choice of placement, and had chosen their placement significantly more satisfied than group of
children for whom at least one of these conditions not met).
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child's placement. The administrative costs of giving parents a choice among
available placements are obviously negligible. Furthermore, parental selec-
tion of a foster family would improve the likelihood that parents would play
an active role in the child's upbringing, strengthening his sense of parental
competence and thus improving the possibility of reunification. Parents are
likely to select a placement that is convenient and facilitates visitation.
356
They are also likely to select a placement in which they feel that a coopera-
tive relationship with the foster caretaker can be maintained.
The issue of parental retention of custody rights after placement is more
complicated. Legal custody entails the right to make decisions regarding
how the child is cared for and where he resides. 357 Parental retention of
custody rights would therefore require the agency to defer to parents on is-
sues regarding the child's day-to-day care and discipline. While this would
facilitate parental involvement in the child's upbringing and might enhance
the prospects of reunion, it would also impose greater administrative burdens
on the state. It is unclear how significant this burden would be. For children
in foster family homes, for example, the agency could reduce this burden by
encouraging a direct relationship between parent and foster parent. A
number of child welfare experts have, in fact, recently advocated greater
communication between foster and natural parents as a way of increasing the
natural parents' self-esteem, reinforcing their efforts toward return of the
child, providing them with role models, and offering a more consistent and
stable emotional environment for the child.358 But conflict between a parent
and foster parent could also erupt,359 which would not only increase adminis-
trative costs but might also necessitate an otherwise unnecessary transfer.
Moreover, if parental custody rights were absolute, parents could demand a
transfer from one home to another, even if such transfer were not in the
child's best interests.
On balance, I believe that parents should retain a substantial voice in their
children's upbringing, but not absolute custody rights. This approach is simi-
lar to that taken in Parham 360 and Pennhurst, 361 in which the parents were
356. Parents are more likely to select a family friend or relative, resources that child welfare
workers have often ignored. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 31, at 20-21.
357. See supra note 42 (quoting definition of custody).
358. See, e.g., Davies & Bland, The Use of Foster Parents as Role Models for Parents, 57 CHILD
WELFARE 380 (1978) (describing use of foster parents as role models); Ryan, McFadden & Warren,
Foster Families: A Resource for Helping Parents, in THE CHALLENGE OF PARTNERSHIP: WORK-
ING WITH PARENTS OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, supra note 284, at 189 (same); Watson, A
Bold New Model for Foster Family Care, PUBLIC WELFARE, Spring, 1982, at 14 (describing foster
family as temporary extension of biological family).
359. Ryan, McFadden & Warren, supra note 358, at 190. Therefore, some experts advocate con-
tacts only in selected cases. Seaberg, Foster Parents as Aides to Parents, in THE CHALLENGE OF
PARTNERSHIP: WORKING WITH PARENTS OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, supra note 284, at 209.
360. 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
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given a dominant-but not exclusive-role in decisions regarding their chil-
dren. Parents should retain a presumptive right to make decisions in regard
to their child's day-to-day care. They should be notified of and have the right
to attend parent-teacher conferences, doctor's appointments, and other
events at which decisions about the child's care will be made, and, in most
cases, to make decisions without state interference. Only when the agency
has reason to believe that deference to parental judgment would be seriously
harmful to the child-for example if the parent refused to consent to needed
medical care-should the agency take steps to limit parental prerogatives.
Before such limitations could be effected, the parent should, of course, be
entitled to a hearing. Parental decisionmaking regarding transfer should be
more circumscribed, however, due to the greater risks and costs of transfer.
Here, the parents' wishes should be solicited and given considerable defer-
ence, but other factors should also be considered. In order to effectuate these
custody rights, parents should be clearly advised, in writing, of the rights
they retain and relinquish at placement. They should also be entitled to a
hearing to contest agency decisions of which they disapprove.
The minimum intervention philosophy also suggests that parents should
have primary responsibility for determining when services are to be termi-
nated, and when their child is ready to come home. But public assistance
goals mandate that the state also have the right to terminate services if, after
review, it finds that need has ended or that no progress is being made.
Feasibility Issues. Were the voluntary placement system to be re-
formed as described above, there can be little doubt that it would better serve
both its child protection and public assistance goals. But problems can be
expected to arise, once again, in regard to feasibility. The model suggested is
quite contrary to past agency practice and thus it is likely that, even with
changed rules, significant changes in operation will be extremely difficult to
achieve. The model incorporates a number of review and hearing provisions,
but given the limited gains that have been achieved through foster care re-
view mechanisms, 362 it cannot be expected that review will cure more than
the most egregious defects. Moreover, in regard to many agency actions-
for example denying a parent's choice of services or placement-review
must, of necessity, be initiated by the aggrieved parent. In other public
assistance programs, appeal rates have been extremely low, 363 despite rela-
361. 707 F.2d 702, 709 (3d Cir. 1983).
362. See supra notes 300-01 (describing review procedures that have not been completely
successful).
363. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on
the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 772, 784 (1974) (reporting short-term studies showing two percent appeal rate in
public welfare programs; one percent appeal rate in Social Security disability).
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tively high agency reversal rates364 and continuing agency abuses of discre-
tion.3 65 Since clients of these welfare programs have the same background as
parents who use the voluntary sector of the child welfare system, markedly
different results cannot be anticipated.
Once again, the least drastic alternative manifests its elusiveness. A bifur-
cated system is not feasible. No other alternatives are available. The paucity
of realistic choices and the difficulty of meaningful change simply ensures
that only the most modest improvements are likely to be achieved. For many
children who are voluntarily placed, along with many who are coercively
placed, courts will thus be forced to confront the question of when parental
rights to obtain the child's return should be terminated.
E. TERMINATING FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT
1. The Issues
When should a parent lose the right to regain his or her child?366 Tradi-
tionally, statutory standards for termination of parental rights to regain the
child relied on parental fault-the same ground that provided a justification
for state intervention.367 Thus, after a child had been in placement for some
time, mustering the evidence to support a termination petition was often diffi-
cult. Foster care agencies also typically did not undertake to bring petitions
to terminate parental rights after a child was in care.368 The usual course,
even for parents who would clearly never retrieve their children, was to pre-
serve the status quo.
Minimum intervention advocates have uniformly urged that termination
should be based primarily on the length of time the child has remained in
foster care, and that termination proceedings should be brought quickly.369
Two reasons have been advanced to support this approach: the child's
364. See supra note 300 (describing reversal rates between 23% to 65%).
365. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1981, at A15, col. 2 (describing abuses in AFDC program).
366. In an earlier article, Garrison supra note 16, I urged that termination of parental visitation
rights should be considered separately from termination of parental custody rights and, based on the
evidence regarding the value of continuing parental contact for most children, id. at 55-74, that
visitation rights should not be terminated unless there was clear and convincing evidence that such
termination was necessary in order to protect the child from specific significant harm that could not
be averted without termination. Id. at 495. When speaking of termination herein, I am thus refer-
ring to termination of custody rights only.
367. Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 133, at 68 (typical termination statute includes neglect,
abandonment, moral unfitness, and parental consent as grounds for termination).
368. See R. HUBBARD, supra note 50, at 137-38 (describing infrequency of termination peti-
tions); Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 689 (few statutes require agency to explore need for
termination).
369. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (describing various termination proposals); Garri-
son, supra note 16, at 449-52 (describing and comparing termination standards inspired by mini-
mum intervention philosophy).
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chances of returning home decrease the longer he is in care, while his
chances of experiencing multiple placements increase. 370 Termination of pa-
rental rights has therefore been urged as necessary to provide children at risk
of long-term foster care with stable and permanent homes.
Two types of termination proposals have emerged from this thinking.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have proposed that a child's foster parent (or
any other person who had continuously cared for the child) could, by peti-
tion, divest the parent of the right to regain the child after that foster parent
had cared for the child for a fixed period of time. 371 Other standards provide
for termination of parental rights after the child has been in care for a fixed
period of time, regardless of how long he has been in the care of a particular
foster parent and whether that foster parent wants to adopt him.372 These
standards vary in the amount of time required as a precondition to termina-
tion and whether other factors, such as parental conduct and agency per-
formance of its obligations, should be taken into account. 373
What approach to termination is best? Ideally, a termination standard
should serve several goals: first and foremost, it should protect children from
harm occasioned by instability or being returned to a home which has ceased
to have real meaning. But, in keeping with the family autonomy tradition, it
should provide parents with an adequate period to resolve the problems that
necessitated placement and adequate notice of what they must do to avoid
termination. In keeping with the feasibility criterion, it should also give child
welfare agencies adequate incentives to ensure that parents receive services
needed to achieve reunification. These goals are not necessarily harmonious.
If, for example, the statute requires agency efforts at reunification as a pre-
condition to termination, some children may stay in foster care for lengthy
periods, perhaps subject to multiple placements, because the agency has not
performed as expected. As child protection is a paramount goal, we look
first at the evidence on children's needs in relation to the termination
decision.
370. Mnookin, supra note 2, at 634; Wald, Standards, supra note 2, at 691.
371. GFS II, supra note 2, at 46, 194-95. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit permit an exception to
automatic termination when: a child over five at the time of placement had been in continuous care
and control of his parent for not less than three years; and the child has not been separated from his
parents because they inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury upon him or were con-
victed or acquitted by reason of insanity of sexual offense against him; and the court determines that
the parents are still psychological parents of the child and that his return to them would provide the
least detrimental alternative. Id.
372. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (collecting various proposals); Garrison, supra
note 16, at 452 (describing proposed ABA standards).
373. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 452 (describing various sets of standards).
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2. The Need for Termination: The Evidence
While the evidence is not conclusive, it appears that multiple placements
may have deleterious effects on a child in foster care.374 A longer period in
care, of course, increases the risks of multiple placements. 375 Although
figures vary from one study to the next, only a small number of children
suffer multiple placements during their first year in foster care.376 By the time
five years have passed, however, it appears that more than a third of the
children who remain in care have suffered three or more placements. 377
There is also some evidence, however, that the risks of multiple placement
decline after three years in placement. One researcher found that, while chil-
dren who had been in care for at least three years had a much greater chance
of having experienced unstable care than children in care for less than three
years, there were no significant differences in the likelihood of unstable care
for children in care for more than three years.378 It should also be kept in
mind that, even after five years in foster care, most children experience only
one or two placements. It is therefore unclear whether extended foster care
poses significantly increased risks of multiple placements.
It is clear that the likelihood that the child will go home does diminish
over time. One group of researchers found that almost sixty percent of the
children who went home within five years did so during the first two.379
Moreover, parental involvement and contact with the child-the best
predictors of return home-also decline over time. In one study, seventy-one
percent of the children who had been in care for six years or more were
unvisited. 380
The empirical evidence thus suggests that after several years in placement,
a child may need protection against instability, and that terminating his par-
374. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (describing results of various studies).
375. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 141-43 (children in placement for long
periods of time experience higher turnover rates); Fanshel & Maas, Factorial Dimension of the
Characteristics of Children in Placement and Their Families, 33 CHILD DEv. 123, 128 (1962)
(same).
376. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 140 (2.1% of children discharged during first
year experienced three or more placements). But see T. PARDECK, THE FORGOTTEN CHILD: A
STUDY OF THE STABILITY AND CONTINUITY OF FOSTER CARE 38 (1982) (18% of children in
foster care less than three years experience three or more placements).
377. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 140 (45.8%); T. PARDECK, supra note 376, at 38
(32% of children in care more than three years had experienced three or more placements).
378. See T. PARDECK, supra note 376, at 38-39 (children in care for as long as 17 years have no
greater chance of suffering three or more placements than those in care for three years).
379. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 121; T. STEIN, E. GAMBRILL & K. WILTSE,
supra note 218, at 87-88 (chances of leaving care markedly reduced after placement for three or
more years; from an 82% chance in the first three years to a 55% chance of leaving foster care after
the first three years for youngsters in experimental group and from 44% to 26% for youngsters in
control group).
380. D. FANSHEL, supra note 33, at 30-31.
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ents' right to regain custody in order to provide it is not likely to conflict
with the child's prospects for reintegration into his family. For children in
care only a year or two, however, the need for termination to protect against
instability is slight and the possibility of return home is still very high.
3. Feasibility Issues and the Family Autonomy Tradition
The feasibility criterion suggests that the rate of multiple placements will
probably remain constant, and that agency efforts in reunifying families are
not likely to improve appreciably. The likelihood of improvement would be
even less if termination were permitted simply on the basis of passage of time,
because such a standard provides no incentive for improved agency perform-
ance. There is some evidence that specially trained caseworkers with smaller
caseloads can achieve more returns than can regular caseworkers with "nor-
mal" loads, even when returns appear quite unlikely.3sl But large scale ef-
forts of this sort do not appear likely, and the limited resources available for
casework suggest that continuing efforts for years on end should not be made
in "hopeless" cases. Average stays in foster care have been declining,382
however, and for most of these children a return home,38 3 rather than termi-
nation of parental rights, is the reason for the shortened stay.
While the family autonomy tradition generally demands deference to pa-
rental rights, these rights have been given considerably less weight when par-
ents have voluntarily abandoned their responsibilities. The Supreme Court
has held that unwed fathers who have not willingly shouldered parental re-
sponsibilities can be denied the right to consent to their child's adoption,384
and, when a parent leaves a child with a custodian for a protracted period
without any meaningful involvement in the child's life, courts have fre-
quently upheld the custodian's right to retain the child permanently.3 8 5 The
family autonomy tradition thus supports a policy of terminating parental
rights when parents have not remained involved with their children and have
381. E. GAMBRILL & T. STEIN, supra note 292, at 505 (project workers found permanent place-
ments for 41% of cases as opposed to 25% for control group); OREGON PROJECT, supra note 157,
at 4.2-.3 (project workers found placements for 66% of cases as compared to 43% and 46% for
control groups).
382. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing findings of various studies).
383. Natural parents have proven to be the most likely source of permanency for children in
most studies to date. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 21, at 115 (after five years 56% of
surveyed foster children returned to natural parents while 4.6% adopted); E. GAMBRILL & T.
STEIN, supra note 292, at 505 (48% of project and 64% of control group who found permanent
placements returned to natural parents while 25% of project and 17% of control group adopted);
Lawder, Poulin & Andrews, supra note 30, at 246-47 (after five years 61% of surveyed children
returned to their natural parents while 16% adopted). But see OREGON PROJECT, supra note 157,
at 4.1 (40% of project children adopted and 26% returned to natural parents).
384. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
385. See supra note 122 (citing relevant cases).
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made no serious efforts to obtain their return. However, it does not support
termination for parents who remain actively involved with their children and
who are working to achieve reunification.
4. Proposed Standards
In light of the evidence and other criteria, none of the standards proposed
to date by minimum intervention advocates is totally satisfactory. The Gold-
stein, Freud, and Solnit proposal protects the child who has formed ties to a
foster parent who wants to keep him, but does nothing for children who do
not develop such ties. Children in this group, of course, are most likely to
suffer multiple placements. The standards based on passage of time in foster
care alone have the advantage of including all children, but the disadvantage
that they do not assure a child of an ongoing stable placement; very few of
these time-based standards require the existence of an available permanent
home as a condition of termination. 38 6 The net result may be to leave the
child at continuing risk of multiple placements but without any prospect of
returning home.387 Moreover, because both the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
standards and those based solely on passage of time ignore parental efforts
and involvement, they risk terminating the rights of parents who might well
regain their children. They also ignore the problem that agencies have been
notoriously lax in providing parents with the assistance necessary to cure the
problems that caused removal.
On balance, given the low risks of instability during the early years of
placement and the fact that many parents regain their children during this
time, I believe that termination should not be permitted before the child has
been in care for at least three years. Indeed, it can be argued that a three-
year period is too short, given that the evidence in regard to both the likeli-
hood and the effects of instability is inconclusive. But agencies still fail to
initiate termination proceedings even when there is no possibility of a return
home,388 and the prosecution of a termination action may itself be quite time
consuming. Because of these problems, I believe that automatic initiation of
a termination petition after three years in placement is appropriate.
386. At least two standards do require the existence of an available permanent home as a precon-
dition to termination. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 175; MODEL DISSOLUTION OF PAR-
ENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP Act § XXI(B)(3) (1976), reprinted in M. HARDIN & P. TAZZARA,
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: A SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF GROUNDS FROM NINE
MODEL ACTS 40, 41 (ABA Nat'l Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy & Protection 1981).
387. This is a significant risk. For example, in New York City, 39.6% of the children available
for adoption in 1980 had been available for more than a year. NEW YORK STATE CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION SERV., CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN IN CARE OR RECENTLY DISCHARGED
(1980) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
388. See D. FANSHEL, supra note 33, at 138-39 (in 37% of surveyed cases both mother and
father unavailable); see also R. HUBBELL, supra note 50, at 136-38 (describing infrequency of termi-
nation petitions).
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But termination itself should not be automatic. In order to ensure that the
rights of parents who are committed to their children and willing to work to
achieve their return are not terminated, the state should be required to show:
(1) the existence of conditions that require continued foster care; and (2) the
parent's failure to make substantial progress toward achieving reunification,
despite meaningful assistance from the foster care agency. If foster care were
more damaging, it might be necessary to permit termination after three years
without mandating that agencies perform their duties. But, since the evi-
dence does not establish that foster care is damaging to most children, a
three-year period coupled with these requirements is reasonable. 389
Termination should also be available without placement in the foster care
system. If a parent has abandoned his child and cannot be found, has been
sentenced to life imprisonment or has an incurable mental disorder, there is
no reason for the child to remain in foster care before terminating the par-
ent's rights; the parent could not, under these circumstances, make progress
toward achieving the child's return home. Termination should therefore be
available in case of abandonment or if, due to mental or physical illness,
mental retardation, or long-term imprisonment, the parent is incapable of
providing adequate child care in the foreseeable future.
A showing that one of these grounds exists should be a necessary, but not
a sufficient, basis for termination. No parent's rights should finally be termi-
nated unless and until a permanent placement is available. If the aim of
termination is the achievement of stability, there is no reason to terminate
unless such stability is in fact available. All termination orders should there-
fore be conditioned on the child's adoption by a new family.390
CONCLUSION
No child welfare system can operate perfectly. Our knowledge of child
389. Most termination standards drafted by minimum intervention theorists do not mandate
agency performance as a precondition to termination. But see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at
162-63 (mandating agency satisfaction of court-ordered obligations as precondition to termination
of parental rights when child involuntarily placed but not when voluntarily placed); MODEL DIsso-
LUTION OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP ACT § IX(B) (1976) (if child has been subject to court
jurisdiction and parent has made "reasonable efforts to maintain a continuing relationship with the
child and to adjust his circumstances... to provide for the child's return and ... it is probable that
the provision of such services would be successful in effecting the return of the child within the
reasonable future," agency failure to provide social services is a defense), reprinted in M. HARDIN &
P. TAZZARA, supra note 386, at 40, 41. Some standards do permit the court to consider agency
efforts as one factor in determining whether termination is appropriate. See, e.g., MODEL ACT TO
FREE CHILDREN FOR PERMANENT PLACEMENT § 4(c), 4(d)(2) (1986), reprinted in Katz, Freeing
Children for Permanent Placement Through a Model Act, 12 FAM. L.Q. 203, 217-18 (1978).
390. In order to enhance the child's chances of achieving stability while in foster care, foster
parents who have cared for a child for a continuous period of two years should also be entitled to a
judicial hearing before the child is removed from their care except for return to his parents.
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development is limited, as is our commitment and ability to cure the family
problems that necessitate state intervention. Competing, and sometimes in-
compatible goals, must be harmonized. Each generation of reformers, oper-
ating within these constraints, tries anew to effect improvements. Some of
these ideas work, but seldom do they work as well as their proponents had
hoped or promised. Often the "solutions" cause new problems, creating the
need for new reforms.
The most recent reform movement has sought to create a new child wel-
fare system based on the philosophy of minimum intervention. While the
previous reform movement succeeded in removing children from institutions
and establishing a right to minimal public assistance benefits, it failed to ac-
complish its central aims of preserving families that could be kept together
and rehabilitating those who could not. The previous reform movement also
created new problems of unnecessary and protracted placement. The new
reform movement has succeeded in reducing the use and length of foster care
placement, but at the risk of depriving children who genuinely need state
assistance. Proposed standards for intervention have been drawn too nar-
rowly. The dangers of placement have been overemphasized, and/insufficient
attention has been paid to improving child welfare practice. The minimum
intervention movement has also failed to initiate meaningful reforms in the
voluntary sector of the child welfare system. This article has attempted to
correct these deficiencies, to chart a more balanced, realistic course for child
welfare reform, and to emphasize the limits of what reform can accomplish.
The problems that the child welfare system confronts, however, can be
expected to remain with us. The need for child welfare services-and the
difficulty of providing them successfully-springs largely from the chronic
stresses and deprivations of poverty. It is no accident that virtually all of the
children in foster care come from families that are impoverished or that chil-
dren who stay in foster care seem to fare better than those who go home. If
we, as a society, are not willing to give families sufficient support to avert the
extreme stresses that produce abuse, neglect, and family dysfunction, then we
must expect a population of damaged children with diminished potential.
And given our limited therapeutic abilities and commitment to rehabilita-
tion, we must expect that child welfare services will fail to help many of these
children.
The child welfare system thus functions much like a hospital located next
to a mosquito-filled swamp that provides diagnostic and therapeutic services
to malaria victims. The least drastic alternative, a rational observer would
probably say, is not better diagnosis and treatment, but draining the swamp.
The least drastic alternative for child welfare problems is not, then, embodied
in the standards proposed herein anymore than it could be found in the plans
of the hospital administrator; child welfare administration must take its place
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in the broader context of public assistance administration in order to achieve
meaningful least drastic alternatives for children and families. Unless we re-
duce poverty and its related stresses, the least drastic alternative will remain
an elusive goal.
The artificial separation of child welfare administration from this broader
context is not, of course, an accident. It reflects values, prejudices, and poli-
tics that are deeply rooted in American tradition and difficult to eradicate.
The standards proposed are thus premised on the assumption that the
demographics of child welfare work will remain constant. But children's ad-
vocates must begin to focus on the larger picture, for only when there is a
national commitment to provide families with sufficient resources to ensure
adequate child care can the least drastic alternative for needy children truly
be achieved.
